Bluetooth: Introduce trusted flag for management control sockets
Providing a global trusted flag for management control sockets provides
an easy way for identifying sockets and imposing restriction on it. For
now all management sockets are trusted since they require CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
index 00775c4..5411886 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
@@ -796,6 +796,11 @@
goto done;
}
+ /* The monitor interface is restricted to CAP_NET_RAW
+ * capabilities and with that implicitly trusted.
+ */
+ hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED);
+
send_monitor_replay(sk);
atomic_inc(&monitor_promisc);
@@ -817,6 +822,12 @@
goto done;
}
+ /* Since the access to control channels is currently
+ * restricted to CAP_NET_ADMIN capabilities, every
+ * socket is implicitly trusted.
+ */
+ hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED);
+
/* At the moment the index and unconfigured index events
* are enabled unconditionally. Setting them on each
* socket when binding keeps this functionality. They
