scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner
cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet
created a pid namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 905dcc6..2dc6cda 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -52,7 +53,8 @@
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
- if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
+ if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
+ ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
