[XFRM]: xfrm audit calls
This patch modifies the current ipsec audit layer
by breaking it up into purpose driven audit calls.
So far, the only audit calls made are when add/delete
an SA/policy. It had been discussed to give each
key manager it's own calls to do this, but I found
there to be much redundnacy since they did the exact
same things, except for how they got auid and sid, so I
combined them. The below audit calls can be made by any
key manager. Hopefully, this is ok.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index d4356e6f..15734ad 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#include <linux/ipsec.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
-#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "xfrm_hash.h"
@@ -301,8 +300,8 @@
if (!err && x->id.spi)
km_state_expired(x, 1, 0);
- xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0,
- AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA, err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x);
+ xfrm_audit_state_delete(x, err ? 0 : 1,
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0);
out:
spin_unlock(&x->lock);
@@ -403,11 +402,9 @@
hlist_for_each_entry(x, entry, xfrm_state_bydst+i, bydst) {
if (xfrm_id_proto_match(x->id.proto, proto) &&
(err = security_xfrm_state_delete(x)) != 0) {
- xfrm_audit_log(audit_info->loginuid,
- audit_info->secid,
- AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA,
- 0, NULL, x);
-
+ xfrm_audit_state_delete(x, 0,
+ audit_info->loginuid,
+ audit_info->secid);
return err;
}
}
@@ -443,10 +440,9 @@
spin_unlock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock);
err = xfrm_state_delete(x);
- xfrm_audit_log(audit_info->loginuid,
- audit_info->secid,
- AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA,
- err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x);
+ xfrm_audit_state_delete(x, err ? 0 : 1,
+ audit_info->loginuid,
+ audit_info->secid);
xfrm_state_put(x);
spin_lock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock);
@@ -1821,3 +1817,72 @@
INIT_WORK(&xfrm_state_gc_work, xfrm_state_gc_task);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+static inline void xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct audit_buffer *audit_buf)
+{
+ if (x->security)
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_alg=%u sec_doi=%u sec_obj=%s",
+ x->security->ctx_alg, x->security->ctx_doi,
+ x->security->ctx_str);
+
+ switch(x->props.family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src=%u.%u.%u.%u dst=%u.%u.%u.%u",
+ NIPQUAD(x->props.saddr.a4),
+ NIPQUAD(x->id.daddr.a4));
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ {
+ struct in6_addr saddr6, daddr6;
+
+ memcpy(&saddr6, x->props.saddr.a6,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ memcpy(&daddr6, x->id.daddr.a6,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf,
+ " src=" NIP6_FMT " dst=" NIP6_FMT,
+ NIP6(saddr6), NIP6(daddr6));
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ extern int audit_enabled;
+
+ if (audit_enabled == 0)
+ return;
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(sid, auid);
+ if (audit_buf == NULL)
+ return;
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SAD-add res=%u",result);
+ xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(x, audit_buf);
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%lu(0x%lx)",
+ (unsigned long)x->id.spi, (unsigned long)x->id.spi);
+ audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_add);
+
+void
+xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ extern int audit_enabled;
+
+ if (audit_enabled == 0)
+ return;
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(sid, auid);
+ if (audit_buf == NULL)
+ return;
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SAD-delete res=%u",result);
+ xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(x, audit_buf);
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%lu(0x%lx)",
+ (unsigned long)x->id.spi, (unsigned long)x->id.spi);
+ audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_delete);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
