futex: Do not leak robust list to unprivileged process
It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid
process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This
changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar
info that comes out of /proc.
Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had:
cred->euid != pcred->euid
cred->euid == pcred->uid
so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid
programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure.
(This patch is based on changes from grsecurity.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: spender@grsecurity.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120319231253.GA20893@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
diff --git a/kernel/futex_compat.c b/kernel/futex_compat.c
index 5f9e689..a9642d5 100644
--- a/kernel/futex_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -136,40 +137,29 @@
{
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred;
+ struct task_struct *p;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
- if (!pid)
- head = current->compat_robust_list;
- else {
- struct task_struct *p;
+ rcu_read_lock();
- ret = -ESRCH;
- rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ if (!pid)
+ p = current;
+ else {
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
- ret = -EPERM;
- pcred = __task_cred(p);
- /* If victim is in different user_ns, then uids are not
- comparable, so we must have CAP_SYS_PTRACE */
- if (cred->user->user_ns != pcred->user->user_ns) {
- if (!ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- goto err_unlock;
- goto ok;
- }
- /* If victim is in same user_ns, then uids are comparable */
- if (cred->euid != pcred->euid &&
- cred->euid != pcred->uid &&
- !ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- goto err_unlock;
-ok:
- head = p->compat_robust_list;
- rcu_read_unlock();
}
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ goto err_unlock;
+
+ head = p->compat_robust_list;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(ptr_to_compat(head), head_ptr);
