tree 191ea5d9f6a6077addbe0cab2c3a47aa4acf7cf2
parent 325520142b47690018d09060a874327d5e7f0709
parent f3f1a18330ac1b717cd7a32adff38d965f365aa2
author Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 1528150879 -0700
committer Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 1528150879 -0700

Merge branch 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

Pull userns updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This is the last couple of vfs bits to enable root in a user namespace
  to mount and manipulate a filesystem with backing store (AKA not a
  virtual filesystem like proc, but a filesystem where the unprivileged
  user controls the content). The target filesystem for this work is
  fuse, and Miklos should be sending you the pull request for the fuse
  bits this merge window.

  The two key patches are "evm: Don't update hmacs in user ns mounts"
  and "vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an
  invalid uid or gid". Those close small gaps in the vfs that would be a
  problem if an unprivileged fuse filesystem is mounted.

  The rest of the changes are things that are now safe to allow a root
  user in a user namespace to do with a filesystem they have mounted.
  The most interesting development is that remount is now safe"

* 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  fs: Allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in s_user_ns to freeze and thaw filesystems
  capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs
  fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb()
  fs: Allow superblock owner to replace invalid owners of inodes
  vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems.
  vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid
  evm: Don't update hmacs in user ns mounts