diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index e19974b..03d9067 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -993,16 +993,28 @@ fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.3
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_priv_data {
+ *		opaque databody_priv<>
+ *	};
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ *		unsigned int seq_num;
+ *		proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ *	};
+ */
 static int
-unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq,
+			struct gss_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	u32 priv_len, maj_stat;
+	u32 len, seq_num, maj_stat;
 	int pad, remaining_len, offset;
-	u32 rseqno;
 
 	clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
 
-	priv_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
+	len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
 	if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
 		/* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
 		 * check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
@@ -1012,14 +1024,14 @@ unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gs
 	 * request to the end, where head[0].iov_len is just the bytes
 	 * not yet read from the head, so these two values are different: */
 	remaining_len = total_buf_len(buf);
-	if (priv_len > remaining_len)
+	if (len > remaining_len)
 		goto unwrap_failed;
-	pad = remaining_len - priv_len;
+	pad = remaining_len - len;
 	buf->len -= pad;
 	fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
 
-	maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, priv_len, buf);
-	pad = priv_len - buf->len;
+	maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, len, buf);
+	pad = len - buf->len;
 	/* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries.
 	 * In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to
 	 * move it around. */
@@ -1035,8 +1047,8 @@ unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gs
 	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
 		goto bad_unwrap;
 out_seq:
-	rseqno = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
-	if (rseqno != seq)
+	seq_num = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
+	if (seq_num != seq)
 		goto bad_seqno;
 	return 0;
 
@@ -1044,7 +1056,7 @@ unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gs
 	trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap_failed(rqstp);
 	return -EINVAL;
 bad_seqno:
-	trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, rseqno);
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, seq_num);
 	return -EINVAL;
 bad_unwrap:
 	trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap(rqstp, maj_stat);
@@ -1677,8 +1689,8 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
 			/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
 			svc_putnl(resv, 0);
 			svc_putnl(resv, 0);
-			if (unwrap_priv_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
-					gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
+			if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
+						    gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
 				goto garbage_args;
 			rqstp->rq_auth_slack = RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2;
 			svcxdr_init_decode(rqstp);