boot/grub2/0133-kern-efi-Add-initial-stack-protector-implementation.patch

From 133d73079c5771bbf3d8311281b6772846357ec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 23:03:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi: Add initial stack protector implementation

It works only on UEFI platforms but can be quite easily extended to
others architectures and platforms if needed.

Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
 acinclude.m4                   | 38 ++++++++++++++++-
 configure                      | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 configure.ac                   | 44 ++++++++++++++++---
 grub-core/Makefile.am          |  1 +
 grub-core/Makefile.in          |  1 +
 grub-core/kern/efi/init.c      | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/efi/api.h         | 19 +++++++++
 include/grub/stack_protector.h | 30 +++++++++++++
 po/POTFILES.in                 |  1 +
 9 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/grub/stack_protector.h

diff --git a/acinclude.m4 b/acinclude.m4
index 78cdf6e..6e14bb5 100644
--- a/acinclude.m4
+++ b/acinclude.m4
@@ -305,9 +305,9 @@ fi
 ])
 
 
-dnl Check if the C compiler supports `-fstack-protector'.
+dnl Check if the C compiler supports the stack protector
 AC_DEFUN([grub_CHECK_STACK_PROTECTOR],[
-[# Smashing stack protector.
+[# Stack smashing protector.
 ssp_possible=yes]
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether `$CC' accepts `-fstack-protector'])
 # Is this a reliable test case?
@@ -324,6 +324,40 @@ else
   ssp_possible=no]
   AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
 [fi]
+[# Strong stack smashing protector.
+ssp_strong_possible=yes]
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether `$CC' accepts `-fstack-protector-strong'])
+# Is this a reliable test case?
+AC_LANG_CONFTEST([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+void foo (void) { volatile char a[8]; a[3]; }
+]])])
+[# `$CC -c -o ...' might not be portable.  But, oh, well...  Is calling
+# `ac_compile' like this correct, after all?
+if eval "$ac_compile -S -fstack-protector-strong -o conftest.s" 2> /dev/null; then]
+  AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+  [# Should we clear up other files as well, having called `AC_LANG_CONFTEST'?
+  rm -f conftest.s
+else
+  ssp_strong_possible=no]
+  AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+[fi]
+[# Global stack smashing protector.
+ssp_global_possible=yes]
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether `$CC' accepts `-mstack-protector-guard=global'])
+# Is this a reliable test case?
+AC_LANG_CONFTEST([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+void foo (void) { volatile char a[8]; a[3]; }
+]])])
+[# `$CC -c -o ...' might not be portable.  But, oh, well...  Is calling
+# `ac_compile' like this correct, after all?
+if eval "$ac_compile -S -fstack-protector -mstack-protector-guard=global -o conftest.s" 2> /dev/null; then]
+  AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+  [# Should we clear up other files as well, having called `AC_LANG_CONFTEST'?
+  rm -f conftest.s
+else
+  ssp_global_possible=no]
+  AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+[fi]
 ])
 
 dnl Check if the C compiler supports `-mstack-arg-probe' (Cygwin).
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 9290ae8..973f702 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -1778,6 +1778,7 @@ with_libintl_prefix
 with_libpth_prefix
 with_included_regex
 enable_efiemu
+enable_stack_protector
 enable_mm_debug
 enable_cache_stats
 enable_boot_time
@@ -2459,6 +2460,8 @@ Optional Features:
   --disable-rpath         do not hardcode runtime library paths
   --enable-efiemu         build and install the efiemu runtimes
                           (default=guessed)
+  --enable-stack-protector
+                          enable the stack protector
   --enable-mm-debug       include memory manager debugging
   --enable-cache-stats    enable disk cache statistics collection
   --enable-boot-time      enable boot time statistics collection
@@ -32348,9 +32351,9 @@ fi
 
 CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS"
 
-# Smashing stack protector.
+# Stack smashing protector.
 
-# Smashing stack protector.
+# Stack smashing protector.
 ssp_possible=yes
 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-fstack-protector'" >&5
 $as_echo_n "checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-fstack-protector'... " >&6; }
@@ -32373,11 +32376,88 @@ else
   { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
 $as_echo "no" >&6; }
 fi
+# Strong stack smashing protector.
+ssp_strong_possible=yes
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-fstack-protector-strong'" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-fstack-protector-strong'... " >&6; }
+# Is this a reliable test case?
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
 
-# Need that, because some distributions ship compilers that include
-# `-fstack-protector' in the default specs.
-if test "x$ssp_possible" = xyes; then
-  TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fno-stack-protector"
+void foo (void) { volatile char a[8]; a[3]; }
+
+_ACEOF
+# `$CC -c -o ...' might not be portable.  But, oh, well...  Is calling
+# `ac_compile' like this correct, after all?
+if eval "$ac_compile -S -fstack-protector-strong -o conftest.s" 2> /dev/null; then
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+  # Should we clear up other files as well, having called `AC_LANG_CONFTEST'?
+  rm -f conftest.s
+else
+  ssp_strong_possible=no
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+# Global stack smashing protector.
+ssp_global_possible=yes
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-mstack-protector-guard=global'" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-mstack-protector-guard=global'... " >&6; }
+# Is this a reliable test case?
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+void foo (void) { volatile char a[8]; a[3]; }
+
+_ACEOF
+# `$CC -c -o ...' might not be portable.  But, oh, well...  Is calling
+# `ac_compile' like this correct, after all?
+if eval "$ac_compile -S -fstack-protector -mstack-protector-guard=global -o conftest.s" 2> /dev/null; then
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+  # Should we clear up other files as well, having called `AC_LANG_CONFTEST'?
+  rm -f conftest.s
+else
+  ssp_global_possible=no
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-stack-protector was given.
+if test "${enable_stack_protector+set}" = set; then :
+  enableval=$enable_stack_protector;
+else
+  enable_stack_protector=no
+fi
+
+if test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xno; then
+  if test "x$ssp_possible" = xyes; then
+    # Need that, because some distributions ship compilers that include
+    # `-fstack-protector' in the default specs.
+    TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fno-stack-protector"
+  fi
+elif test "x$platform" != xefi; then
+  as_fn_error $? "--enable-stack-protector is only supported on EFI platforms" "$LINENO" 5
+elif test "x$ssp_global_possible" != xyes; then
+  as_fn_error $? "--enable-stack-protector is not supported (compiler doesn't support -mstack-protector-guard=global)" "$LINENO" 5
+else
+  TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -mstack-protector-guard=global"
+  if test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xyes; then
+    if test "x$ssp_possible" != xyes; then
+      as_fn_error $? "--enable-stack-protector is not supported (compiler doesn't support -fstack-protector)" "$LINENO" 5
+    fi
+    TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fstack-protector"
+  elif test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xstrong; then
+    if test "x$ssp_strong_possible" != xyes; then
+      as_fn_error $? "--enable-stack-protector=strong is not supported (compiler doesn't support -fstack-protector-strong)" "$LINENO" 5
+    fi
+    TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fstack-protector-strong"
+  else
+    # Note, -fstack-protector-all requires that the protector is disabled for
+    # functions that appear in the call stack when the canary is initialized.
+    as_fn_error $? "invalid value $enable_stack_protector for --enable-stack-protector" "$LINENO" 5
+  fi
+  TARGET_CPPFLAGS="$TARGET_CPPFLAGS -DGRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR=1"
 fi
 
 CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS"
@@ -37054,5 +37134,10 @@ echo "Without liblzma (no support for XZ-compressed mips images) ($liblzma_excus
 else
 echo "With liblzma from $LIBLZMA (support for XZ-compressed mips images)"
 fi
+if test "x$enable_stack_protector" != xno; then
+echo "With stack smashing protector: Yes"
+else
+echo "With stack smashing protector: No"
+fi
 echo "*******************************************************"
 
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 7656f24..bb6b02a 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1285,12 +1285,41 @@ fi]
 
 CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS"
 
-# Smashing stack protector.
+# Stack smashing protector.
 grub_CHECK_STACK_PROTECTOR
-# Need that, because some distributions ship compilers that include
-# `-fstack-protector' in the default specs.
-if test "x$ssp_possible" = xyes; then
-  TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fno-stack-protector"
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([stack-protector],
+	      AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-stack-protector],
+			     [enable the stack protector]),
+	      [],
+	      [enable_stack_protector=no])
+if test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xno; then
+  if test "x$ssp_possible" = xyes; then
+    # Need that, because some distributions ship compilers that include
+    # `-fstack-protector' in the default specs.
+    TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fno-stack-protector"
+  fi
+elif test "x$platform" != xefi; then
+  AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-stack-protector is only supported on EFI platforms])
+elif test "x$ssp_global_possible" != xyes; then
+  AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-stack-protector is not supported (compiler doesn't support -mstack-protector-guard=global)])
+else
+  TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -mstack-protector-guard=global"
+  if test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xyes; then
+    if test "x$ssp_possible" != xyes; then
+      AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-stack-protector is not supported (compiler doesn't support -fstack-protector)])
+    fi
+    TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fstack-protector"
+  elif test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xstrong; then
+    if test "x$ssp_strong_possible" != xyes; then
+      AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-stack-protector=strong is not supported (compiler doesn't support -fstack-protector-strong)])
+    fi
+    TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fstack-protector-strong"
+  else
+    # Note, -fstack-protector-all requires that the protector is disabled for
+    # functions that appear in the call stack when the canary is initialized.
+    AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid value $enable_stack_protector for --enable-stack-protector])
+  fi
+  TARGET_CPPFLAGS="$TARGET_CPPFLAGS -DGRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR=1"
 fi
 
 CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS"
@@ -2103,5 +2132,10 @@ echo "Without liblzma (no support for XZ-compressed mips images) ($liblzma_excus
 else
 echo "With liblzma from $LIBLZMA (support for XZ-compressed mips images)"
 fi
+if test "x$enable_stack_protector" != xno; then
+echo "With stack smashing protector: Yes"
+else
+echo "With stack smashing protector: No"
+fi
 echo "*******************************************************"
 ]
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.am b/grub-core/Makefile.am
index 30e23ad..ee88e44 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.am
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.am
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ endif
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/mm.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/parser.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/partition.h
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/stack_protector.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/term.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/time.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/verify.h
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.in b/grub-core/Makefile.in
index 1f8133b..50c70b5 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.in
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.in
@@ -16425,6 +16425,7 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES = $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/cache.h \
 	$(am__append_5795) $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/mm.h \
 	$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/parser.h \
 	$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/partition.h \
+	$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/stack_protector.h \
 	$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/term.h \
 	$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/time.h \
 	$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/verify.h \
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
index 1333465..7facacf 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
@@ -27,6 +27,58 @@
 #include <grub/env.h>
 #include <grub/mm.h>
 #include <grub/kernel.h>
+#include <grub/stack_protector.h>
+
+#ifdef GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR
+
+static grub_efi_guid_t rng_protocol_guid = GRUB_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL_GUID;
+
+/*
+ * Don't put this on grub_efi_init()'s local stack to avoid it
+ * getting a stack check.
+ */
+static grub_efi_uint8_t stack_chk_guard_buf[32];
+
+grub_addr_t __stack_chk_guard;
+
+void __attribute__ ((noreturn))
+__stack_chk_fail (void)
+{
+  /*
+   * Assume it's not safe to call into EFI Boot Services. Sorry, that
+   * means no console message here.
+   */
+  do
+    {
+      /* Do not optimize out the loop. */
+      asm volatile ("");
+    }
+  while (1);
+}
+
+static void
+stack_protector_init (void)
+{
+  grub_efi_rng_protocol_t *rng;
+
+  /* Set up the stack canary. Make errors here non-fatal for now. */
+  rng = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&rng_protocol_guid, NULL);
+  if (rng != NULL)
+    {
+      grub_efi_status_t status;
+
+      status = efi_call_4 (rng->get_rng, rng, NULL, sizeof (stack_chk_guard_buf),
+			   stack_chk_guard_buf);
+      if (status == GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+	grub_memcpy (&__stack_chk_guard, stack_chk_guard_buf, sizeof (__stack_chk_guard));
+    }
+}
+#else
+static void
+stack_protector_init (void)
+{
+}
+#endif
 
 grub_addr_t grub_modbase;
 
@@ -38,6 +90,8 @@ grub_efi_init (void)
      messages.  */
   grub_console_init ();
 
+  stack_protector_init ();
+
   /* Initialize the memory management system.  */
   grub_efi_mm_init ();
 
diff --git a/include/grub/efi/api.h b/include/grub/efi/api.h
index 13e5715..5517f7e 100644
--- a/include/grub/efi/api.h
+++ b/include/grub/efi/api.h
@@ -339,6 +339,11 @@
     { 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 } \
   }
 
+#define GRUB_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL_GUID \
+  { 0x3152bca5, 0xeade, 0x433d, \
+    { 0x86, 0x2e, 0xc0, 0x1c, 0xdc, 0x29, 0x1f, 0x44 } \
+  }
+
 struct grub_efi_sal_system_table
 {
   grub_uint32_t signature;
@@ -1700,6 +1705,20 @@ struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol
 };
 typedef struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t;
 
+typedef grub_efi_guid_t grub_efi_rng_algorithm_t;
+
+struct grub_efi_rng_protocol
+{
+  grub_efi_status_t (*get_info) (struct grub_efi_rng_protocol *this,
+				 grub_efi_uintn_t *rng_algorithm_list_size,
+				 grub_efi_rng_algorithm_t *rng_algorithm_list);
+  grub_efi_status_t (*get_rng) (struct grub_efi_rng_protocol *this,
+				grub_efi_rng_algorithm_t *rng_algorithm,
+				grub_efi_uintn_t rng_value_length,
+				grub_efi_uint8_t *rng_value);
+};
+typedef struct grub_efi_rng_protocol grub_efi_rng_protocol_t;
+
 #if (GRUB_TARGET_SIZEOF_VOID_P == 4) || defined (__ia64__) \
   || defined (__aarch64__) || defined (__MINGW64__) || defined (__CYGWIN__) \
   || defined(__riscv)
diff --git a/include/grub/stack_protector.h b/include/grub/stack_protector.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c88dc00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/stack_protector.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2021  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR_H
+#define GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR_H	1
+
+#include <grub/symbol.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+
+#ifdef GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR
+extern grub_addr_t EXPORT_VAR (__stack_chk_guard);
+extern void __attribute__ ((noreturn)) EXPORT_FUNC (__stack_chk_fail) (void);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR_H */
diff --git a/po/POTFILES.in b/po/POTFILES.in
index 7753ab4..ef42c7d 100644
--- a/po/POTFILES.in
+++ b/po/POTFILES.in
@@ -1319,6 +1319,7 @@
 ./include/grub/sparc64/time.h
 ./include/grub/sparc64/types.h
 ./include/grub/speaker.h
+./include/grub/stack_protector.h
 ./include/grub/symbol.h
 ./include/grub/syslinux_parse.h
 ./include/grub/term.h
-- 
2.14.2