| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
| /* -*- linux-c -*- |
| * sysctl_net.c: sysctl interface to net subsystem. |
| * |
| * Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver. |
| * Added /proc/sys/net directories for each protocol family. [MS] |
| * |
| * Revision 1.2 1996/05/08 20:24:40 shaver |
| * Added bits for NET_BRIDGE and the NET_IPV4_ARP stuff and |
| * NET_IPV4_IP_FORWARD. |
| * |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/mm.h> |
| #include <linux/export.h> |
| #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
| #include <linux/nsproxy.h> |
| |
| #include <net/sock.h> |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_INET |
| #include <net/ip.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_NET |
| #include <linux/if_ether.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| static struct ctl_table_set * |
| net_ctl_header_lookup(struct ctl_table_root *root) |
| { |
| return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls; |
| } |
| |
| static int is_seen(struct ctl_table_set *set) |
| { |
| return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls == set; |
| } |
| |
| /* Return standard mode bits for table entry. */ |
| static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head, |
| struct ctl_table *table) |
| { |
| struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls); |
| |
| /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ |
| if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { |
| int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; |
| return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; |
| } |
| |
| return table->mode; |
| } |
| |
| static void net_ctl_set_ownership(struct ctl_table_header *head, |
| struct ctl_table *table, |
| kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid) |
| { |
| struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls); |
| kuid_t ns_root_uid; |
| kgid_t ns_root_gid; |
| |
| ns_root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0); |
| if (uid_valid(ns_root_uid)) |
| *uid = ns_root_uid; |
| |
| ns_root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0); |
| if (gid_valid(ns_root_gid)) |
| *gid = ns_root_gid; |
| } |
| |
| static struct ctl_table_root net_sysctl_root = { |
| .lookup = net_ctl_header_lookup, |
| .permissions = net_ctl_permissions, |
| .set_ownership = net_ctl_set_ownership, |
| }; |
| |
| static int __net_init sysctl_net_init(struct net *net) |
| { |
| setup_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls, &net_sysctl_root, is_seen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void __net_exit sysctl_net_exit(struct net *net) |
| { |
| retire_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls); |
| } |
| |
| static struct pernet_operations sysctl_pernet_ops = { |
| .init = sysctl_net_init, |
| .exit = sysctl_net_exit, |
| }; |
| |
| static struct ctl_table_header *net_header; |
| __init int net_sysctl_init(void) |
| { |
| static struct ctl_table empty[1]; |
| int ret = -ENOMEM; |
| /* Avoid limitations in the sysctl implementation by |
| * registering "/proc/sys/net" as an empty directory not in a |
| * network namespace. |
| */ |
| net_header = register_sysctl("net", empty); |
| if (!net_header) |
| goto out; |
| ret = register_pernet_subsys(&sysctl_pernet_ops); |
| if (ret) |
| goto out1; |
| out: |
| return ret; |
| out1: |
| unregister_sysctl_table(net_header); |
| net_header = NULL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Verify that sysctls for non-init netns are safe by either: |
| * 1) being read-only, or |
| * 2) having a data pointer which points outside of the global kernel/module |
| * data segment, and rather into the heap where a per-net object was |
| * allocated. |
| */ |
| static void ensure_safe_net_sysctl(struct net *net, const char *path, |
| struct ctl_table *table) |
| { |
| struct ctl_table *ent; |
| |
| pr_debug("Registering net sysctl (net %p): %s\n", net, path); |
| for (ent = table; ent->procname; ent++) { |
| unsigned long addr; |
| const char *where; |
| |
| pr_debug(" procname=%s mode=%o proc_handler=%ps data=%p\n", |
| ent->procname, ent->mode, ent->proc_handler, ent->data); |
| |
| /* If it's not writable inside the netns, then it can't hurt. */ |
| if ((ent->mode & 0222) == 0) { |
| pr_debug(" Not writable by anyone\n"); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Where does data point? */ |
| addr = (unsigned long)ent->data; |
| if (is_module_address(addr)) |
| where = "module"; |
| else if (core_kernel_data(addr)) |
| where = "kernel"; |
| else |
| continue; |
| |
| /* If it is writable and points to kernel/module global |
| * data, then it's probably a netns leak. |
| */ |
| WARN(1, "sysctl %s/%s: data points to %s global data: %ps\n", |
| path, ent->procname, where, ent->data); |
| |
| /* Make it "safe" by dropping writable perms */ |
| ent->mode &= ~0222; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| struct ctl_table_header *register_net_sysctl(struct net *net, |
| const char *path, struct ctl_table *table) |
| { |
| if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) |
| ensure_safe_net_sysctl(net, path, table); |
| |
| return __register_sysctl_table(&net->sysctls, path, table); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_net_sysctl); |
| |
| void unregister_net_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header) |
| { |
| unregister_sysctl_table(header); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_net_sysctl_table); |