| #include <linux/bpf.h> |
| #include <linux/vmalloc.h> |
| #include <linux/fdtable.h> |
| #include <linux/file.h> |
| #include <linux/fs.h> |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| #include <linux/idr.h> |
| #include <linux/namei.h> |
| #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
| #include <linux/security.h> |
| |
| static bool bpf_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) |
| { |
| return ns_capable(ns, cap) || (cap != CAP_SYS_ADMIN && ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)); |
| } |
| |
| bool bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap) |
| { |
| struct user_namespace *userns; |
| |
| /* BPF token allows ns_capable() level of capabilities */ |
| userns = token ? token->userns : &init_user_ns; |
| if (!bpf_ns_capable(userns, cap)) |
| return false; |
| if (token && security_bpf_token_capable(token, cap) < 0) |
| return false; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void bpf_token_inc(struct bpf_token *token) |
| { |
| atomic64_inc(&token->refcnt); |
| } |
| |
| static void bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token) |
| { |
| security_bpf_token_free(token); |
| put_user_ns(token->userns); |
| kfree(token); |
| } |
| |
| static void bpf_token_put_deferred(struct work_struct *work) |
| { |
| struct bpf_token *token = container_of(work, struct bpf_token, work); |
| |
| bpf_token_free(token); |
| } |
| |
| void bpf_token_put(struct bpf_token *token) |
| { |
| if (!token) |
| return; |
| |
| if (!atomic64_dec_and_test(&token->refcnt)) |
| return; |
| |
| INIT_WORK(&token->work, bpf_token_put_deferred); |
| schedule_work(&token->work); |
| } |
| |
| static int bpf_token_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) |
| { |
| struct bpf_token *token = filp->private_data; |
| |
| bpf_token_put(token); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void bpf_token_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp) |
| { |
| struct bpf_token *token = filp->private_data; |
| u64 mask; |
| |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_CMD >= 64); |
| mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_CMD) - 1; |
| if ((token->allowed_cmds & mask) == mask) |
| seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\tany\n"); |
| else |
| seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_cmds); |
| |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE >= 64); |
| mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE) - 1; |
| if ((token->allowed_maps & mask) == mask) |
| seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\tany\n"); |
| else |
| seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_maps); |
| |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE >= 64); |
| mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE) - 1; |
| if ((token->allowed_progs & mask) == mask) |
| seq_printf(m, "allowed_progs:\tany\n"); |
| else |
| seq_printf(m, "allowed_progs:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_progs); |
| |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE >= 64); |
| mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE) - 1; |
| if ((token->allowed_attachs & mask) == mask) |
| seq_printf(m, "allowed_attachs:\tany\n"); |
| else |
| seq_printf(m, "allowed_attachs:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_attachs); |
| } |
| |
| #define BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME "bpf-token" |
| |
| static const struct inode_operations bpf_token_iops = { }; |
| |
| static const struct file_operations bpf_token_fops = { |
| .release = bpf_token_release, |
| .show_fdinfo = bpf_token_show_fdinfo, |
| }; |
| |
| int bpf_token_create(union bpf_attr *attr) |
| { |
| struct bpf_mount_opts *mnt_opts; |
| struct bpf_token *token = NULL; |
| struct user_namespace *userns; |
| struct inode *inode; |
| struct file *file; |
| struct path path; |
| struct fd f; |
| umode_t mode; |
| int err, fd; |
| |
| f = fdget(attr->token_create.bpffs_fd); |
| if (!f.file) |
| return -EBADF; |
| |
| path = f.file->f_path; |
| path_get(&path); |
| fdput(f); |
| |
| if (path.dentry != path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_root) { |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto out_path; |
| } |
| if (path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_op != &bpf_super_ops) { |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto out_path; |
| } |
| err = path_permission(&path, MAY_ACCESS); |
| if (err) |
| goto out_path; |
| |
| userns = path.dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns; |
| /* |
| * Enforce that creators of BPF tokens are in the same user |
| * namespace as the BPF FS instance. This makes reasoning about |
| * permissions a lot easier and we can always relax this later. |
| */ |
| if (current_user_ns() != userns) { |
| err = -EPERM; |
| goto out_path; |
| } |
| if (!ns_capable(userns, CAP_BPF)) { |
| err = -EPERM; |
| goto out_path; |
| } |
| |
| /* Creating BPF token in init_user_ns doesn't make much sense. */ |
| if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns) { |
| err = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| goto out_path; |
| } |
| |
| mnt_opts = path.dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; |
| if (mnt_opts->delegate_cmds == 0 && |
| mnt_opts->delegate_maps == 0 && |
| mnt_opts->delegate_progs == 0 && |
| mnt_opts->delegate_attachs == 0) { |
| err = -ENOENT; /* no BPF token delegation is set up */ |
| goto out_path; |
| } |
| |
| mode = S_IFREG | ((S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) & ~current_umask()); |
| inode = bpf_get_inode(path.mnt->mnt_sb, NULL, mode); |
| if (IS_ERR(inode)) { |
| err = PTR_ERR(inode); |
| goto out_path; |
| } |
| |
| inode->i_op = &bpf_token_iops; |
| inode->i_fop = &bpf_token_fops; |
| clear_nlink(inode); /* make sure it is unlinked */ |
| |
| file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, path.mnt, BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME, O_RDWR, &bpf_token_fops); |
| if (IS_ERR(file)) { |
| iput(inode); |
| err = PTR_ERR(file); |
| goto out_path; |
| } |
| |
| token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_USER); |
| if (!token) { |
| err = -ENOMEM; |
| goto out_file; |
| } |
| |
| atomic64_set(&token->refcnt, 1); |
| |
| /* remember bpffs owning userns for future ns_capable() checks */ |
| token->userns = get_user_ns(userns); |
| |
| token->allowed_cmds = mnt_opts->delegate_cmds; |
| token->allowed_maps = mnt_opts->delegate_maps; |
| token->allowed_progs = mnt_opts->delegate_progs; |
| token->allowed_attachs = mnt_opts->delegate_attachs; |
| |
| err = security_bpf_token_create(token, attr, &path); |
| if (err) |
| goto out_token; |
| |
| fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC); |
| if (fd < 0) { |
| err = fd; |
| goto out_token; |
| } |
| |
| file->private_data = token; |
| fd_install(fd, file); |
| |
| path_put(&path); |
| return fd; |
| |
| out_token: |
| bpf_token_free(token); |
| out_file: |
| fput(file); |
| out_path: |
| path_put(&path); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd) |
| { |
| struct fd f = fdget(ufd); |
| struct bpf_token *token; |
| |
| if (!f.file) |
| return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); |
| if (f.file->f_op != &bpf_token_fops) { |
| fdput(f); |
| return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
| } |
| |
| token = f.file->private_data; |
| bpf_token_inc(token); |
| fdput(f); |
| |
| return token; |
| } |
| |
| bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd) |
| { |
| if (!token) |
| return false; |
| if (!(token->allowed_cmds & BIT_ULL(cmd))) |
| return false; |
| return security_bpf_token_cmd(token, cmd) == 0; |
| } |
| |
| bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type) |
| { |
| if (!token || type >= __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE) |
| return false; |
| |
| return token->allowed_maps & BIT_ULL(type); |
| } |
| |
| bool bpf_token_allow_prog_type(const struct bpf_token *token, |
| enum bpf_prog_type prog_type, |
| enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) |
| { |
| if (!token || prog_type >= __MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE || attach_type >= __MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE) |
| return false; |
| |
| return (token->allowed_progs & BIT_ULL(prog_type)) && |
| (token->allowed_attachs & BIT_ULL(attach_type)); |
| } |