| /* |
| * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter -- |
| * Jitter RNG standalone code. |
| * |
| * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2015 - 2020 |
| * |
| * Design |
| * ====== |
| * |
| * See https://www.chronox.de/jent.html |
| * |
| * License |
| * ======= |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, |
| * including the disclaimer of warranties. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote |
| * products derived from this software without specific prior |
| * written permission. |
| * |
| * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of |
| * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are |
| * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is |
| * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and |
| * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED |
| * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES |
| * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF |
| * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE |
| * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR |
| * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT |
| * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR |
| * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF |
| * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT |
| * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE |
| * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH |
| * DAMAGE. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library |
| * version 2.2.0 provided at https://www.chronox.de/jent.html |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef __OPTIMIZE__ |
| #error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy.c." |
| #endif |
| |
| typedef unsigned long long __u64; |
| typedef long long __s64; |
| typedef unsigned int __u32; |
| #define NULL ((void *) 0) |
| |
| /* The entropy pool */ |
| struct rand_data { |
| /* all data values that are vital to maintain the security |
| * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not |
| * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to |
| * calculate the next random value. */ |
| __u64 data; /* SENSITIVE Actual random number */ |
| __u64 old_data; /* SENSITIVE Previous random number */ |
| __u64 prev_time; /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */ |
| #define DATA_SIZE_BITS ((sizeof(__u64)) * 8) |
| __u64 last_delta; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */ |
| __s64 last_delta2; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */ |
| unsigned int osr; /* Oversample rate */ |
| #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64 |
| #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32 |
| #define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128 |
| #define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE) |
| unsigned char *mem; /* Memory access location with size of |
| * memblocks * memblocksize */ |
| unsigned int memlocation; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */ |
| unsigned int memblocks; /* Number of memory blocks in *mem */ |
| unsigned int memblocksize; /* Size of one memory block in bytes */ |
| unsigned int memaccessloops; /* Number of memory accesses per random |
| * bit generation */ |
| |
| /* Repetition Count Test */ |
| int rct_count; /* Number of stuck values */ |
| |
| /* Adaptive Proportion Test for a significance level of 2^-30 */ |
| #define JENT_APT_CUTOFF 325 /* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.2 */ |
| #define JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE 512 /* Data window size */ |
| /* LSB of time stamp to process */ |
| #define JENT_APT_LSB 16 |
| #define JENT_APT_WORD_MASK (JENT_APT_LSB - 1) |
| unsigned int apt_observations; /* Number of collected observations */ |
| unsigned int apt_count; /* APT counter */ |
| unsigned int apt_base; /* APT base reference */ |
| unsigned int apt_base_set:1; /* APT base reference set? */ |
| |
| unsigned int health_failure:1; /* Permanent health failure */ |
| }; |
| |
| /* Flags that can be used to initialize the RNG */ |
| #define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) /* Disable memory access for more |
| * entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for |
| * entropy collector */ |
| |
| /* -- error codes for init function -- */ |
| #define JENT_ENOTIME 1 /* Timer service not available */ |
| #define JENT_ECOARSETIME 2 /* Timer too coarse for RNG */ |
| #define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC 3 /* Timer is not monotonic increasing */ |
| #define JENT_EVARVAR 5 /* Timer does not produce variations of |
| * variations (2nd derivation of time is |
| * zero). */ |
| #define JENT_ESTUCK 8 /* Too many stuck results during init. */ |
| #define JENT_EHEALTH 9 /* Health test failed during initialization */ |
| #define JENT_ERCT 10 /* RCT failed during initialization */ |
| |
| /* |
| * The output n bits can receive more than n bits of min entropy, of course, |
| * but the fixed output of the conditioning function can only asymptotically |
| * approach the output size bits of min entropy, not attain that bound. Random |
| * maps will tend to have output collisions, which reduces the creditable |
| * output entropy (that is what SP 800-90B Section 3.1.5.1.2 attempts to bound). |
| * |
| * The value "64" is justified in Appendix A.4 of the current 90C draft, |
| * and aligns with NIST's in "epsilon" definition in this document, which is |
| * that a string can be considered "full entropy" if you can bound the min |
| * entropy in each bit of output to at least 1-epsilon, where epsilon is |
| * required to be <= 2^(-32). |
| */ |
| #define JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR 64 |
| |
| #include <linux/fips.h> |
| #include "jitterentropy.h" |
| |
| /*************************************************************************** |
| * Adaptive Proportion Test |
| * |
| * This test complies with SP800-90B section 4.4.2. |
| ***************************************************************************/ |
| |
| /* |
| * Reset the APT counter |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector |
| */ |
| static void jent_apt_reset(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked) |
| { |
| /* Reset APT counter */ |
| ec->apt_count = 0; |
| ec->apt_base = delta_masked; |
| ec->apt_observations = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Insert a new entropy event into APT |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector |
| * @delta_masked [in] Masked time delta to process |
| */ |
| static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked) |
| { |
| /* Initialize the base reference */ |
| if (!ec->apt_base_set) { |
| ec->apt_base = delta_masked; |
| ec->apt_base_set = 1; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (delta_masked == ec->apt_base) { |
| ec->apt_count++; |
| |
| if (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF) |
| ec->health_failure = 1; |
| } |
| |
| ec->apt_observations++; |
| |
| if (ec->apt_observations >= JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) |
| jent_apt_reset(ec, delta_masked); |
| } |
| |
| /*************************************************************************** |
| * Stuck Test and its use as Repetition Count Test |
| * |
| * The Jitter RNG uses an enhanced version of the Repetition Count Test |
| * (RCT) specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.1. Instead of counting identical |
| * back-to-back values, the input to the RCT is the counting of the stuck |
| * values during the generation of one Jitter RNG output block. |
| * |
| * The RCT is applied with an alpha of 2^{-30} compliant to FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. |
| * |
| * During the counting operation, the Jitter RNG always calculates the RCT |
| * cut-off value of C. If that value exceeds the allowed cut-off value, |
| * the Jitter RNG output block will be calculated completely but discarded at |
| * the end. The caller of the Jitter RNG is informed with an error code. |
| ***************************************************************************/ |
| |
| /* |
| * Repetition Count Test as defined in SP800-90B section 4.4.1 |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector |
| * @stuck [in] Indicator whether the value is stuck |
| */ |
| static void jent_rct_insert(struct rand_data *ec, int stuck) |
| { |
| /* |
| * If we have a count less than zero, a previous RCT round identified |
| * a failure. We will not overwrite it. |
| */ |
| if (ec->rct_count < 0) |
| return; |
| |
| if (stuck) { |
| ec->rct_count++; |
| |
| /* |
| * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration: |
| * alpha = 2^-30 as recommended in FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. |
| * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/OSR as this |
| * is the minimum entropy required to provide full entropy. |
| * Note, we collect 64 * OSR deltas for inserting them into |
| * the entropy pool which should then have (close to) 64 bits |
| * of entropy. |
| * |
| * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo |
| * code of SP800-90B section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence |
| * we need to subtract one from the cutoff value as calculated |
| * following SP800-90B. |
| */ |
| if ((unsigned int)ec->rct_count >= (31 * ec->osr)) { |
| ec->rct_count = -1; |
| ec->health_failure = 1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ec->rct_count = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Is there an RCT health test failure? |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector |
| * |
| * @return |
| * 0 No health test failure |
| * 1 Permanent health test failure |
| */ |
| static int jent_rct_failure(struct rand_data *ec) |
| { |
| if (ec->rct_count < 0) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static inline __u64 jent_delta(__u64 prev, __u64 next) |
| { |
| #define JENT_UINT64_MAX (__u64)(~((__u64) 0)) |
| return (prev < next) ? (next - prev) : |
| (JENT_UINT64_MAX - prev + 1 + next); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Stuck test by checking the: |
| * 1st derivative of the jitter measurement (time delta) |
| * 2nd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas) |
| * 3rd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas) |
| * |
| * All values must always be non-zero. |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector |
| * @current_delta [in] Jitter time delta |
| * |
| * @return |
| * 0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit) |
| * 1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit) |
| */ |
| static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta) |
| { |
| __u64 delta2 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta, current_delta); |
| __u64 delta3 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta2, delta2); |
| |
| ec->last_delta = current_delta; |
| ec->last_delta2 = delta2; |
| |
| /* |
| * Insert the result of the comparison of two back-to-back time |
| * deltas. |
| */ |
| jent_apt_insert(ec, current_delta); |
| |
| if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3) { |
| /* RCT with a stuck bit */ |
| jent_rct_insert(ec, 1); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* RCT with a non-stuck bit */ |
| jent_rct_insert(ec, 0); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Report any health test failures |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector |
| * |
| * @return |
| * 0 No health test failure |
| * 1 Permanent health test failure |
| */ |
| static int jent_health_failure(struct rand_data *ec) |
| { |
| return ec->health_failure; |
| } |
| |
| /*************************************************************************** |
| * Noise sources |
| ***************************************************************************/ |
| |
| /* |
| * Update of the loop count used for the next round of |
| * an entropy collection. |
| * |
| * Input: |
| * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL |
| * @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider |
| * @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at |
| * the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value |
| * |
| * @return Newly calculated loop counter |
| */ |
| static __u64 jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec, |
| unsigned int bits, unsigned int min) |
| { |
| __u64 time = 0; |
| __u64 shuffle = 0; |
| unsigned int i = 0; |
| unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1; |
| |
| jent_get_nstime(&time); |
| /* |
| * Mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle |
| * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more. |
| */ |
| if (ec) |
| time ^= ec->data; |
| /* |
| * We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many |
| * bits of the time stamp are included as possible. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + bits - 1) / bits) > i; i++) { |
| shuffle ^= time & mask; |
| time = time >> bits; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum |
| * RNG loop count. |
| */ |
| return (shuffle + (1<<min)); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU |
| * execution time jitter |
| * |
| * This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the |
| * entropy pool using an LFSR. |
| * |
| * The code is deliberately inefficient with respect to the bit shifting |
| * and shall stay that way. This function is the root cause why the code |
| * shall be compiled without optimization. This function not only acts as |
| * folding operation, but this function's execution is used to measure |
| * the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in this function |
| * implies that careful retesting must be done. |
| * |
| * @ec [in] entropy collector struct |
| * @time [in] time stamp to be injected |
| * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as |
| * number of loops to perform the folding |
| * @stuck [in] Is the time stamp identified as stuck? |
| * |
| * Output: |
| * updated ec->data |
| * |
| * @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed |
| */ |
| static void jent_lfsr_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time, __u64 loop_cnt, |
| int stuck) |
| { |
| unsigned int i; |
| __u64 j = 0; |
| __u64 new = 0; |
| #define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4 |
| #define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0 |
| __u64 fold_loop_cnt = |
| jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT); |
| |
| /* |
| * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not |
| * needed during runtime |
| */ |
| if (loop_cnt) |
| fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; |
| for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) { |
| new = ec->data; |
| for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) { |
| __u64 tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i); |
| |
| tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1); |
| |
| /* |
| * Fibonacci LSFR with polynomial of |
| * x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is |
| * primitive according to |
| * http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf |
| * (the shift values are the polynomial values minus one |
| * due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current |
| * position is always the LSB, the polynomial only needs |
| * to shift data in from the left without wrap. |
| */ |
| tmp ^= ((new >> 63) & 1); |
| tmp ^= ((new >> 60) & 1); |
| tmp ^= ((new >> 55) & 1); |
| tmp ^= ((new >> 30) & 1); |
| tmp ^= ((new >> 27) & 1); |
| tmp ^= ((new >> 22) & 1); |
| new <<= 1; |
| new ^= tmp; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value into |
| * the entropy pool. Although this operation should not do any harm |
| * even when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B requires that |
| * any conditioning operation (SP800-90B considers the LFSR to be a |
| * conditioning operation) to have an identical amount of input |
| * data according to section 3.1.5. |
| */ |
| if (!stuck) |
| ec->data = new; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in |
| * memory access times |
| * |
| * This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing |
| * variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be |
| * added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1 |
| * caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing. |
| * |
| * The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is usually |
| * slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal |
| * variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant |
| * variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more |
| * and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses. |
| * L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However, |
| * to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite |
| * large which is usually not desirable. |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if |
| * the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise |
| * source is disabled |
| * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value |
| * number of loops to perform the LFSR |
| */ |
| static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt) |
| { |
| unsigned int wrap = 0; |
| __u64 i = 0; |
| #define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7 |
| #define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0 |
| __u64 acc_loop_cnt = |
| jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT); |
| |
| if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem) |
| return; |
| wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks; |
| |
| /* |
| * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not |
| * needed during runtime |
| */ |
| if (loop_cnt) |
| acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) { |
| unsigned char *tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation; |
| /* |
| * memory access: just add 1 to one byte, |
| * wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read |
| * from and write to memory location |
| */ |
| *tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff; |
| /* |
| * Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer |
| * with wrap around logic to ensure that every |
| * memory location is hit evenly |
| */ |
| ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1; |
| ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /*************************************************************************** |
| * Start of entropy processing logic |
| ***************************************************************************/ |
| /* |
| * This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and |
| * use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is injected into the |
| * entropy pool. |
| * |
| * WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output |
| * of this function! This can be done by calling this function |
| * and not using its result. |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector |
| * |
| * @return result of stuck test |
| */ |
| static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec) |
| { |
| __u64 time = 0; |
| __u64 current_delta = 0; |
| int stuck; |
| |
| /* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */ |
| jent_memaccess(ec, 0); |
| |
| /* |
| * Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous |
| * invocation to measure the timing variations |
| */ |
| jent_get_nstime(&time); |
| current_delta = jent_delta(ec->prev_time, time); |
| ec->prev_time = time; |
| |
| /* Check whether we have a stuck measurement. */ |
| stuck = jent_stuck(ec, current_delta); |
| |
| /* Now call the next noise sources which also injects the data */ |
| jent_lfsr_time(ec, current_delta, 0, stuck); |
| |
| return stuck; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Generator of one 64 bit random number |
| * Function fills rand_data->data |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector |
| */ |
| static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec) |
| { |
| unsigned int k = 0, safety_factor = 0; |
| |
| if (fips_enabled) |
| safety_factor = JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR; |
| |
| /* priming of the ->prev_time value */ |
| jent_measure_jitter(ec); |
| |
| while (!jent_health_failure(ec)) { |
| /* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */ |
| if (jent_measure_jitter(ec)) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* |
| * We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the |
| * oversampling rate requested by the caller |
| */ |
| if (++k >= ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + safety_factor) * ec->osr)) |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller. |
| * |
| * This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate |
| * as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic |
| * creates 64 bit per invocation. |
| * |
| * This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact |
| * size specified by the caller. |
| * |
| * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector |
| * @data [in] pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already |
| * exist |
| * @len [in] size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random |
| * in bytes |
| * |
| * @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error |
| * |
| * The following error codes can occur: |
| * -1 entropy_collector is NULL |
| * -2 RCT failed |
| * -3 APT test failed |
| */ |
| int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data, |
| unsigned int len) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = data; |
| |
| if (!ec) |
| return -1; |
| |
| while (len > 0) { |
| unsigned int tocopy; |
| |
| jent_gen_entropy(ec); |
| |
| if (jent_health_failure(ec)) { |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (jent_rct_failure(ec)) |
| ret = -2; |
| else |
| ret = -3; |
| |
| /* |
| * Re-initialize the noise source |
| * |
| * If the health test fails, the Jitter RNG remains |
| * in failure state and will return a health failure |
| * during next invocation. |
| */ |
| if (jent_entropy_init()) |
| return ret; |
| |
| /* Set APT to initial state */ |
| jent_apt_reset(ec, 0); |
| ec->apt_base_set = 0; |
| |
| /* Set RCT to initial state */ |
| ec->rct_count = 0; |
| |
| /* Re-enable Jitter RNG */ |
| ec->health_failure = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Return the health test failure status to the |
| * caller as the generated value is not appropriate. |
| */ |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len) |
| tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8); |
| else |
| tocopy = len; |
| jent_memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy); |
| |
| len -= tocopy; |
| p += tocopy; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*************************************************************************** |
| * Initialization logic |
| ***************************************************************************/ |
| |
| struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr, |
| unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| struct rand_data *entropy_collector; |
| |
| entropy_collector = jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data)); |
| if (!entropy_collector) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) { |
| /* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory |
| * access |
| */ |
| entropy_collector->mem = jent_zalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE); |
| if (!entropy_collector->mem) { |
| jent_zfree(entropy_collector); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE; |
| entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS; |
| entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS; |
| } |
| |
| /* verify and set the oversampling rate */ |
| if (osr == 0) |
| osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */ |
| entropy_collector->osr = osr; |
| |
| /* fill the data pad with non-zero values */ |
| jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector); |
| |
| return entropy_collector; |
| } |
| |
| void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) |
| { |
| jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem); |
| entropy_collector->mem = NULL; |
| jent_zfree(entropy_collector); |
| } |
| |
| int jent_entropy_init(void) |
| { |
| int i; |
| __u64 delta_sum = 0; |
| __u64 old_delta = 0; |
| unsigned int nonstuck = 0; |
| int time_backwards = 0; |
| int count_mod = 0; |
| int count_stuck = 0; |
| struct rand_data ec = { 0 }; |
| |
| /* Required for RCT */ |
| ec.osr = 1; |
| |
| /* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is |
| * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These |
| * loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce |
| * false positives. |
| * |
| * Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic |
| * jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But |
| * the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely |
| * used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus, |
| * no statistical tests. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or |
| * check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the |
| * following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution |
| * timer. |
| */ |
| /* |
| * TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is |
| * definitely too little. |
| * |
| * SP800-90B requires at least 1024 initial test cycles. |
| */ |
| #define TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024 |
| #define CLEARCACHE 100 |
| for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) { |
| __u64 time = 0; |
| __u64 time2 = 0; |
| __u64 delta = 0; |
| unsigned int lowdelta = 0; |
| int stuck; |
| |
| /* Invoke core entropy collection logic */ |
| jent_get_nstime(&time); |
| ec.prev_time = time; |
| jent_lfsr_time(&ec, time, 0, 0); |
| jent_get_nstime(&time2); |
| |
| /* test whether timer works */ |
| if (!time || !time2) |
| return JENT_ENOTIME; |
| delta = jent_delta(time, time2); |
| /* |
| * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide |
| * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this |
| * implies that we also have a high resolution timer |
| */ |
| if (!delta) |
| return JENT_ECOARSETIME; |
| |
| stuck = jent_stuck(&ec, delta); |
| |
| /* |
| * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be |
| * evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we |
| * already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction, |
| * etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case |
| * measurements. |
| */ |
| if (i < CLEARCACHE) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (stuck) |
| count_stuck++; |
| else { |
| nonstuck++; |
| |
| /* |
| * Ensure that the APT succeeded. |
| * |
| * With the check below that count_stuck must be less |
| * than 10% of the overall generated raw entropy values |
| * it is guaranteed that the APT is invoked at |
| * floor((TESTLOOPCOUNT * 0.9) / 64) == 14 times. |
| */ |
| if ((nonstuck % JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) == 0) { |
| jent_apt_reset(&ec, |
| delta & JENT_APT_WORD_MASK); |
| if (jent_health_failure(&ec)) |
| return JENT_EHEALTH; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Validate RCT */ |
| if (jent_rct_failure(&ec)) |
| return JENT_ERCT; |
| |
| /* test whether we have an increasing timer */ |
| if (!(time2 > time)) |
| time_backwards++; |
| |
| /* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */ |
| lowdelta = time2 - time; |
| if (!(lowdelta % 100)) |
| count_mod++; |
| |
| /* |
| * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary |
| * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check |
| * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime |
| * the old_data value |
| */ |
| if (delta > old_delta) |
| delta_sum += (delta - old_delta); |
| else |
| delta_sum += (old_delta - delta); |
| old_delta = delta; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * we allow up to three times the time running backwards. |
| * CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus, |
| * if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it |
| * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being |
| * performed during our test run. |
| */ |
| if (time_backwards > 3) |
| return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC; |
| |
| /* |
| * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger |
| * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation |
| * implied with 1 is preserved |
| */ |
| if ((delta_sum) <= 1) |
| return JENT_EVARVAR; |
| |
| /* |
| * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at |
| * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments |
| * in multiples of 100, but not always |
| */ |
| if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod) |
| return JENT_ECOARSETIME; |
| |
| /* |
| * If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is |
| * likely to not work well. |
| */ |
| if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_stuck) |
| return JENT_ESTUCK; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |