Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst - linux - Git at Google

 .. _securitybugs:

 Security bugs
 =============

 Linux kernel developers take security very seriously.  As such, we'd
 like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
 disclosed as quickly as possible.  Please report security bugs to the
 Linux kernel security team.

 Contact
 -------

 The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
 <security@kernel.org>.  This is a private list of security officers
 who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
 If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
 that can speed up the process considerably.  It is possible that the
 security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
 understand and fix the security vulnerability.

 As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
 will be to diagnose and fix.  Please review the procedure outlined in
 'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what
 information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
 be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
 made public.

 Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible.
 It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex
 issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments.  Think of it like a
 :doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>`
 (even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list
 reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text.

 Disclosure and embargoed information
 ------------------------------------

 The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination
 below.

 Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes
 for publicly known bugs are released immediately.

 Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
 as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
 the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
 of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
 if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The
 only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
 the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
 coordination.

 While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
 order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
 the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
 reporter.  This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
 and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
 identity of the reporter.

 In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed.  All other
 information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
 of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
 lifted, in perpetuity.

 Coordination
 ------------

 Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
 escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
 <linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
 are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
 upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
 will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
 publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
 the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
 include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
 the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
 <http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>

 CVE assignment
 --------------

 The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
 for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
 may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
 assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
 linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
 before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
 message if the reporter agrees.

 Non-disclosure agreements
 -------------------------

 The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
 to enter any non-disclosure agreements.
	.. _securitybugs:

	Security bugs
	=============

	Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd
	like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
	disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the
	Linux kernel security team.

	Contact
	-------

	The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
	<security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers
	who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
	If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
	that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the
	security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
	understand and fix the security vulnerability.

	As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
	will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in
	'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what
	information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
	be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
	made public.

	Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible.
	It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex
	issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments. Think of it like a
	:doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>`
	(even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list
	reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text.

	Disclosure and embargoed information
	------------------------------------

	The security list is not a disclosure channel. For that, see Coordination
	below.

	Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts. Fixes
	for publicly known bugs are released immediately.

	Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
	as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
	the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
	of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
	if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time. The
	only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
	the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
	coordination.

	While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
	order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
	the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
	reporter. This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
	and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
	identity of the reporter.

	In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed. All other
	information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
	of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
	lifted, in perpetuity.

	Coordination
	------------

	Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
	escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
	<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
	are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
	upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
	will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
	publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
	the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
	include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
	the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
	<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>

	CVE assignment
	--------------

	The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
	for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
	may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
	assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
	linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
	before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
	message if the reporter agrees.

	Non-disclosure agreements
	-------------------------

	The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
	to enter any non-disclosure agreements.