| .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| |
| Confidential Computing VMs |
| ========================== |
| Hyper-V can create and run Linux guests that are Confidential Computing |
| (CoCo) VMs. Such VMs cooperate with the physical processor to better protect |
| the confidentiality and integrity of data in the VM's memory, even in the |
| face of a hypervisor/VMM that has been compromised and may behave maliciously. |
| CoCo VMs on Hyper-V share the generic CoCo VM threat model and security |
| objectives described in Documentation/security/snp-tdx-threat-model.rst. Note |
| that Hyper-V specific code in Linux refers to CoCo VMs as "isolated VMs" or |
| "isolation VMs". |
| |
| A Linux CoCo VM on Hyper-V requires the cooperation and interaction of the |
| following: |
| |
| * Physical hardware with a processor that supports CoCo VMs |
| |
| * The hardware runs a version of Windows/Hyper-V with support for CoCo VMs |
| |
| * The VM runs a version of Linux that supports being a CoCo VM |
| |
| The physical hardware requirements are as follows: |
| |
| * AMD processor with SEV-SNP. Hyper-V does not run guest VMs with AMD SME, |
| SEV, or SEV-ES encryption, and such encryption is not sufficient for a CoCo |
| VM on Hyper-V. |
| |
| * Intel processor with TDX |
| |
| To create a CoCo VM, the "Isolated VM" attribute must be specified to Hyper-V |
| when the VM is created. A VM cannot be changed from a CoCo VM to a normal VM, |
| or vice versa, after it is created. |
| |
| Operational Modes |
| ----------------- |
| Hyper-V CoCo VMs can run in two modes. The mode is selected when the VM is |
| created and cannot be changed during the life of the VM. |
| |
| * Fully-enlightened mode. In this mode, the guest operating system is |
| enlightened to understand and manage all aspects of running as a CoCo VM. |
| |
| * Paravisor mode. In this mode, a paravisor layer between the guest and the |
| host provides some operations needed to run as a CoCo VM. The guest operating |
| system can have fewer CoCo enlightenments than is required in the |
| fully-enlightened case. |
| |
| Conceptually, fully-enlightened mode and paravisor mode may be treated as |
| points on a spectrum spanning the degree of guest enlightenment needed to run |
| as a CoCo VM. Fully-enlightened mode is one end of the spectrum. A full |
| implementation of paravisor mode is the other end of the spectrum, where all |
| aspects of running as a CoCo VM are handled by the paravisor, and a normal |
| guest OS with no knowledge of memory encryption or other aspects of CoCo VMs |
| can run successfully. However, the Hyper-V implementation of paravisor mode |
| does not go this far, and is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Some |
| aspects of CoCo VMs are handled by the Hyper-V paravisor while the guest OS |
| must be enlightened for other aspects. Unfortunately, there is no |
| standardized enumeration of feature/functions that might be provided in the |
| paravisor, and there is no standardized mechanism for a guest OS to query the |
| paravisor for the feature/functions it provides. The understanding of what |
| the paravisor provides is hard-coded in the guest OS. |
| |
| Paravisor mode has similarities to the `Coconut project`_, which aims to provide |
| a limited paravisor to provide services to the guest such as a virtual TPM. |
| However, the Hyper-V paravisor generally handles more aspects of CoCo VMs |
| than is currently envisioned for Coconut, and so is further toward the "no |
| guest enlightenments required" end of the spectrum. |
| |
| .. _Coconut project: https://github.com/coconut-svsm/svsm |
| |
| In the CoCo VM threat model, the paravisor is in the guest security domain |
| and must be trusted by the guest OS. By implication, the hypervisor/VMM must |
| protect itself against a potentially malicious paravisor just like it |
| protects against a potentially malicious guest. |
| |
| The hardware architectural approach to fully-enlightened vs. paravisor mode |
| varies depending on the underlying processor. |
| |
| * With AMD SEV-SNP processors, in fully-enlightened mode the guest OS runs in |
| VMPL 0 and has full control of the guest context. In paravisor mode, the |
| guest OS runs in VMPL 2 and the paravisor runs in VMPL 0. The paravisor |
| running in VMPL 0 has privileges that the guest OS in VMPL 2 does not have. |
| Certain operations require the guest to invoke the paravisor. Furthermore, in |
| paravisor mode the guest OS operates in "virtual Top Of Memory" (vTOM) mode |
| as defined by the SEV-SNP architecture. This mode simplifies guest management |
| of memory encryption when a paravisor is used. |
| |
| * With Intel TDX processor, in fully-enlightened mode the guest OS runs in an |
| L1 VM. In paravisor mode, TD partitioning is used. The paravisor runs in the |
| L1 VM, and the guest OS runs in a nested L2 VM. |
| |
| Hyper-V exposes a synthetic MSR to guests that describes the CoCo mode. This |
| MSR indicates if the underlying processor uses AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX, and |
| whether a paravisor is being used. It is straightforward to build a single |
| kernel image that can boot and run properly on either architecture, and in |
| either mode. |
| |
| Paravisor Effects |
| ----------------- |
| Running in paravisor mode affects the following areas of generic Linux kernel |
| CoCo VM functionality: |
| |
| * Initial guest memory setup. When a new VM is created in paravisor mode, the |
| paravisor runs first and sets up the guest physical memory as encrypted. The |
| guest Linux does normal memory initialization, except for explicitly marking |
| appropriate ranges as decrypted (shared). In paravisor mode, Linux does not |
| perform the early boot memory setup steps that are particularly tricky with |
| AMD SEV-SNP in fully-enlightened mode. |
| |
| * #VC/#VE exception handling. In paravisor mode, Hyper-V configures the guest |
| CoCo VM to route #VC and #VE exceptions to VMPL 0 and the L1 VM, |
| respectively, and not the guest Linux. Consequently, these exception handlers |
| do not run in the guest Linux and are not a required enlightenment for a |
| Linux guest in paravisor mode. |
| |
| * CPUID flags. Both AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX provide a CPUID flag in the |
| guest indicating that the VM is operating with the respective hardware |
| support. While these CPUID flags are visible in fully-enlightened CoCo VMs, |
| the paravisor filters out these flags and the guest Linux does not see them. |
| Throughout the Linux kernel, explicitly testing these flags has mostly been |
| eliminated in favor of the cc_platform_has() function, with the goal of |
| abstracting the differences between SEV-SNP and TDX. But the |
| cc_platform_has() abstraction also allows the Hyper-V paravisor configuration |
| to selectively enable aspects of CoCo VM functionality even when the CPUID |
| flags are not set. The exception is early boot memory setup on SEV-SNP, which |
| tests the CPUID SEV-SNP flag. But not having the flag in Hyper-V paravisor |
| mode VM achieves the desired effect or not running SEV-SNP specific early |
| boot memory setup. |
| |
| * Device emulation. In paravisor mode, the Hyper-V paravisor provides |
| emulation of devices such as the IO-APIC and TPM. Because the emulation |
| happens in the paravisor in the guest context (instead of the hypervisor/VMM |
| context), MMIO accesses to these devices must be encrypted references instead |
| of the decrypted references that would be used in a fully-enlightened CoCo |
| VM. The __ioremap_caller() function has been enhanced to make a callback to |
| check whether a particular address range should be treated as encrypted |
| (private). See the "is_private_mmio" callback. |
| |
| * Encrypt/decrypt memory transitions. In a CoCo VM, transitioning guest |
| memory between encrypted and decrypted requires coordinating with the |
| hypervisor/VMM. This is done via callbacks invoked from |
| __set_memory_enc_pgtable(). In fully-enlightened mode, the normal SEV-SNP and |
| TDX implementations of these callbacks are used. In paravisor mode, a Hyper-V |
| specific set of callbacks is used. These callbacks invoke the paravisor so |
| that the paravisor can coordinate the transitions and inform the hypervisor |
| as necessary. See hv_vtom_init() where these callback are set up. |
| |
| * Interrupt injection. In fully enlightened mode, a malicious hypervisor |
| could inject interrupts into the guest OS at times that violate x86/x64 |
| architectural rules. For full protection, the guest OS should include |
| enlightenments that use the interrupt injection management features provided |
| by CoCo-capable processors. In paravisor mode, the paravisor mediates |
| interrupt injection into the guest OS, and ensures that the guest OS only |
| sees interrupts that are "legal". The paravisor uses the interrupt injection |
| management features provided by the CoCo-capable physical processor, thereby |
| masking these complexities from the guest OS. |
| |
| Hyper-V Hypercalls |
| ------------------ |
| When in fully-enlightened mode, hypercalls made by the Linux guest are routed |
| directly to the hypervisor, just as in a non-CoCo VM. But in paravisor mode, |
| normal hypercalls trap to the paravisor first, which may in turn invoke the |
| hypervisor. But the paravisor is idiosyncratic in this regard, and a few |
| hypercalls made by the Linux guest must always be routed directly to the |
| hypervisor. These hypercall sites test for a paravisor being present, and use |
| a special invocation sequence. See hv_post_message(), for example. |
| |
| Guest communication with Hyper-V |
| -------------------------------- |
| Separate from the generic Linux kernel handling of memory encryption in Linux |
| CoCo VMs, Hyper-V has VMBus and VMBus devices that communicate using memory |
| shared between the Linux guest and the host. This shared memory must be |
| marked decrypted to enable communication. Furthermore, since the threat model |
| includes a compromised and potentially malicious host, the guest must guard |
| against leaking any unintended data to the host through this shared memory. |
| |
| These Hyper-V and VMBus memory pages are marked as decrypted: |
| |
| * VMBus monitor pages |
| |
| * Synthetic interrupt controller (synic) related pages (unless supplied by |
| the paravisor) |
| |
| * Per-cpu hypercall input and output pages (unless running with a paravisor) |
| |
| * VMBus ring buffers. The direct mapping is marked decrypted in |
| __vmbus_establish_gpadl(). The secondary mapping created in |
| hv_ringbuffer_init() must also include the "decrypted" attribute. |
| |
| When the guest writes data to memory that is shared with the host, it must |
| ensure that only the intended data is written. Padding or unused fields must |
| be initialized to zeros before copying into the shared memory so that random |
| kernel data is not inadvertently given to the host. |
| |
| Similarly, when the guest reads memory that is shared with the host, it must |
| validate the data before acting on it so that a malicious host cannot induce |
| the guest to expose unintended data. Doing such validation can be tricky |
| because the host can modify the shared memory areas even while or after |
| validation is performed. For messages passed from the host to the guest in a |
| VMBus ring buffer, the length of the message is validated, and the message is |
| copied into a temporary (encrypted) buffer for further validation and |
| processing. The copying adds a small amount of overhead, but is the only way |
| to protect against a malicious host. See hv_pkt_iter_first(). |
| |
| Many drivers for VMBus devices have been "hardened" by adding code to fully |
| validate messages received over VMBus, instead of assuming that Hyper-V is |
| acting cooperatively. Such drivers are marked as "allowed_in_isolated" in the |
| vmbus_devs[] table. Other drivers for VMBus devices that are not needed in a |
| CoCo VM have not been hardened, and they are not allowed to load in a CoCo |
| VM. See vmbus_is_valid_offer() where such devices are excluded. |
| |
| Two VMBus devices depend on the Hyper-V host to do DMA data transfers: |
| storvsc for disk I/O and netvsc for network I/O. storvsc uses the normal |
| Linux kernel DMA APIs, and so bounce buffering through decrypted swiotlb |
| memory is done implicitly. netvsc has two modes for data transfers. The first |
| mode goes through send and receive buffer space that is explicitly allocated |
| by the netvsc driver, and is used for most smaller packets. These send and |
| receive buffers are marked decrypted by __vmbus_establish_gpadl(). Because |
| the netvsc driver explicitly copies packets to/from these buffers, the |
| equivalent of bounce buffering between encrypted and decrypted memory is |
| already part of the data path. The second mode uses the normal Linux kernel |
| DMA APIs, and is bounce buffered through swiotlb memory implicitly like in |
| storvsc. |
| |
| Finally, the VMBus virtual PCI driver needs special handling in a CoCo VM. |
| Linux PCI device drivers access PCI config space using standard APIs provided |
| by the Linux PCI subsystem. On Hyper-V, these functions directly access MMIO |
| space, and the access traps to Hyper-V for emulation. But in CoCo VMs, memory |
| encryption prevents Hyper-V from reading the guest instruction stream to |
| emulate the access. So in a CoCo VM, these functions must make a hypercall |
| with arguments explicitly describing the access. See |
| _hv_pcifront_read_config() and _hv_pcifront_write_config() and the |
| "use_calls" flag indicating to use hypercalls. |
| |
| load_unaligned_zeropad() |
| ------------------------ |
| When transitioning memory between encrypted and decrypted, the caller of |
| set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() is responsible for ensuring |
| the memory isn't in use and isn't referenced while the transition is in |
| progress. The transition has multiple steps, and includes interaction with |
| the Hyper-V host. The memory is in an inconsistent state until all steps are |
| complete. A reference while the state is inconsistent could result in an |
| exception that can't be cleanly fixed up. |
| |
| However, the kernel load_unaligned_zeropad() mechanism may make stray |
| references that can't be prevented by the caller of set_memory_encrypted() or |
| set_memory_decrypted(), so there's specific code in the #VC or #VE exception |
| handler to fixup this case. But a CoCo VM running on Hyper-V may be |
| configured to run with a paravisor, with the #VC or #VE exception routed to |
| the paravisor. There's no architectural way to forward the exceptions back to |
| the guest kernel, and in such a case, the load_unaligned_zeropad() fixup code |
| in the #VC/#VE handlers doesn't run. |
| |
| To avoid this problem, the Hyper-V specific functions for notifying the |
| hypervisor of the transition mark pages as "not present" while a transition |
| is in progress. If load_unaligned_zeropad() causes a stray reference, a |
| normal page fault is generated instead of #VC or #VE, and the page-fault- |
| based handlers for load_unaligned_zeropad() fixup the reference. When the |
| encrypted/decrypted transition is complete, the pages are marked as "present" |
| again. See hv_vtom_clear_present() and hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(). |