| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| /* |
| * Common Ultravisor functions and initialization |
| * |
| * Copyright IBM Corp. 2019, 2020 |
| */ |
| #define KMSG_COMPONENT "prot_virt" |
| #define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt |
| |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| #include <linux/types.h> |
| #include <linux/sizes.h> |
| #include <linux/bitmap.h> |
| #include <linux/memblock.h> |
| #include <linux/pagemap.h> |
| #include <linux/swap.h> |
| #include <linux/pagewalk.h> |
| #include <asm/facility.h> |
| #include <asm/sections.h> |
| #include <asm/uv.h> |
| |
| #if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM) |
| unsigned long __gmap_translate(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int gmap_fault(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, |
| unsigned int fault_flags) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* the bootdata_preserved fields come from ones in arch/s390/boot/uv.c */ |
| int __bootdata_preserved(prot_virt_guest); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(prot_virt_guest); |
| |
| /* |
| * uv_info contains both host and guest information but it's currently only |
| * expected to be used within modules if it's the KVM module or for |
| * any PV guest module. |
| * |
| * The kernel itself will write these values once in uv_query_info() |
| * and then make some of them readable via a sysfs interface. |
| */ |
| struct uv_info __bootdata_preserved(uv_info); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(uv_info); |
| |
| int __bootdata_preserved(prot_virt_host); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(prot_virt_host); |
| |
| static int __init uv_init(phys_addr_t stor_base, unsigned long stor_len) |
| { |
| struct uv_cb_init uvcb = { |
| .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_INIT_UV, |
| .header.len = sizeof(uvcb), |
| .stor_origin = stor_base, |
| .stor_len = stor_len, |
| }; |
| |
| if (uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb)) { |
| pr_err("Ultravisor init failed with rc: 0x%x rrc: 0%x\n", |
| uvcb.header.rc, uvcb.header.rrc); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void __init setup_uv(void) |
| { |
| void *uv_stor_base; |
| |
| if (!is_prot_virt_host()) |
| return; |
| |
| uv_stor_base = memblock_alloc_try_nid( |
| uv_info.uv_base_stor_len, SZ_1M, SZ_2G, |
| MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_ACCESSIBLE, NUMA_NO_NODE); |
| if (!uv_stor_base) { |
| pr_warn("Failed to reserve %lu bytes for ultravisor base storage\n", |
| uv_info.uv_base_stor_len); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| if (uv_init(__pa(uv_stor_base), uv_info.uv_base_stor_len)) { |
| memblock_free(uv_stor_base, uv_info.uv_base_stor_len); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| pr_info("Reserving %luMB as ultravisor base storage\n", |
| uv_info.uv_base_stor_len >> 20); |
| return; |
| fail: |
| pr_info("Disabling support for protected virtualization"); |
| prot_virt_host = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Requests the Ultravisor to pin the page in the shared state. This will |
| * cause an intercept when the guest attempts to unshare the pinned page. |
| */ |
| int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr) |
| { |
| struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = { |
| .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED, |
| .header.len = sizeof(uvcb), |
| .paddr = paddr, |
| }; |
| |
| if (uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_pin_shared); |
| |
| /* |
| * Requests the Ultravisor to destroy a guest page and make it |
| * accessible to the host. The destroy clears the page instead of |
| * exporting. |
| * |
| * @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be destroyed |
| */ |
| static int uv_destroy(unsigned long paddr) |
| { |
| struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = { |
| .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_DESTR_SEC_STOR, |
| .header.len = sizeof(uvcb), |
| .paddr = paddr |
| }; |
| |
| if (uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb)) { |
| /* |
| * Older firmware uses 107/d as an indication of a non secure |
| * page. Let us emulate the newer variant (no-op). |
| */ |
| if (uvcb.header.rc == 0x107 && uvcb.header.rrc == 0xd) |
| return 0; |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The caller must already hold a reference to the folio |
| */ |
| int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio) |
| { |
| int rc; |
| |
| /* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */ |
| if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| folio_get(folio); |
| rc = uv_destroy(folio_to_phys(folio)); |
| if (!rc) |
| clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags); |
| folio_put(folio); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The present PTE still indirectly holds a folio reference through the mapping. |
| */ |
| int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte) |
| { |
| VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte)); |
| return uv_destroy_folio(pfn_folio(pte_pfn(pte))); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Requests the Ultravisor to encrypt a guest page and make it |
| * accessible to the host for paging (export). |
| * |
| * @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be exported |
| */ |
| static int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) |
| { |
| struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = { |
| .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR, |
| .header.len = sizeof(uvcb), |
| .paddr = paddr |
| }; |
| |
| if (uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The caller must already hold a reference to the folio. |
| */ |
| static int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio) |
| { |
| int rc; |
| |
| /* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */ |
| if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| folio_get(folio); |
| rc = uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio)); |
| if (!rc) |
| clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags); |
| folio_put(folio); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The present PTE still indirectly holds a folio reference through the mapping. |
| */ |
| int uv_convert_from_secure_pte(pte_t pte) |
| { |
| VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte)); |
| return uv_convert_from_secure_folio(pfn_folio(pte_pfn(pte))); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculate the expected ref_count for a folio that would otherwise have no |
| * further pins. This was cribbed from similar functions in other places in |
| * the kernel, but with some slight modifications. We know that a secure |
| * folio can not be a large folio, for example. |
| */ |
| static int expected_folio_refs(struct folio *folio) |
| { |
| int res; |
| |
| res = folio_mapcount(folio); |
| if (folio_test_swapcache(folio)) { |
| res++; |
| } else if (folio_mapping(folio)) { |
| res++; |
| if (folio->private) |
| res++; |
| } |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| static int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb) |
| { |
| int expected, cc = 0; |
| |
| if (folio_test_writeback(folio)) |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| expected = expected_folio_refs(folio); |
| if (!folio_ref_freeze(folio, expected)) |
| return -EBUSY; |
| set_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags); |
| /* |
| * If the UVC does not succeed or fail immediately, we don't want to |
| * loop for long, or we might get stall notifications. |
| * On the other hand, this is a complex scenario and we are holding a lot of |
| * locks, so we can't easily sleep and reschedule. We try only once, |
| * and if the UVC returned busy or partial completion, we return |
| * -EAGAIN and we let the callers deal with it. |
| */ |
| cc = __uv_call(0, (u64)uvcb); |
| folio_ref_unfreeze(folio, expected); |
| /* |
| * Return -ENXIO if the folio was not mapped, -EINVAL for other errors. |
| * If busy or partially completed, return -EAGAIN. |
| */ |
| if (cc == UVC_CC_OK) |
| return 0; |
| else if (cc == UVC_CC_BUSY || cc == UVC_CC_PARTIAL) |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| return uvcb->rc == 0x10a ? -ENXIO : -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * should_export_before_import - Determine whether an export is needed |
| * before an import-like operation |
| * @uvcb: the Ultravisor control block of the UVC to be performed |
| * @mm: the mm of the process |
| * |
| * Returns whether an export is needed before every import-like operation. |
| * This is needed for shared pages, which don't trigger a secure storage |
| * exception when accessed from a different guest. |
| * |
| * Although considered as one, the Unpin Page UVC is not an actual import, |
| * so it is not affected. |
| * |
| * No export is needed also when there is only one protected VM, because the |
| * page cannot belong to the wrong VM in that case (there is no "other VM" |
| * it can belong to). |
| * |
| * Return: true if an export is needed before every import, otherwise false. |
| */ |
| static bool should_export_before_import(struct uv_cb_header *uvcb, struct mm_struct *mm) |
| { |
| /* |
| * The misc feature indicates, among other things, that importing a |
| * shared page from a different protected VM will automatically also |
| * transfer its ownership. |
| */ |
| if (uv_has_feature(BIT_UV_FEAT_MISC)) |
| return false; |
| if (uvcb->cmd == UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED) |
| return false; |
| return atomic_read(&mm->context.protected_count) > 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Drain LRU caches: the local one on first invocation and the ones of all |
| * CPUs on successive invocations. Returns "true" on the first invocation. |
| */ |
| static bool drain_lru(bool *drain_lru_called) |
| { |
| /* |
| * If we have tried a local drain and the folio refcount |
| * still does not match our expected safe value, try with a |
| * system wide drain. This is needed if the pagevecs holding |
| * the page are on a different CPU. |
| */ |
| if (*drain_lru_called) { |
| lru_add_drain_all(); |
| /* We give up here, don't retry immediately. */ |
| return false; |
| } |
| /* |
| * We are here if the folio refcount does not match the |
| * expected safe value. The main culprits are usually |
| * pagevecs. With lru_add_drain() we drain the pagevecs |
| * on the local CPU so that hopefully the refcount will |
| * reach the expected safe value. |
| */ |
| lru_add_drain(); |
| *drain_lru_called = true; |
| /* The caller should try again immediately */ |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Requests the Ultravisor to make a page accessible to a guest. |
| * If it's brought in the first time, it will be cleared. If |
| * it has been exported before, it will be decrypted and integrity |
| * checked. |
| */ |
| int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb) |
| { |
| struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
| bool drain_lru_called = false; |
| spinlock_t *ptelock; |
| unsigned long uaddr; |
| struct folio *folio; |
| pte_t *ptep; |
| int rc; |
| |
| again: |
| rc = -EFAULT; |
| mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm); |
| |
| uaddr = __gmap_translate(gmap, gaddr); |
| if (IS_ERR_VALUE(uaddr)) |
| goto out; |
| vma = vma_lookup(gmap->mm, uaddr); |
| if (!vma) |
| goto out; |
| /* |
| * Secure pages cannot be huge and userspace should not combine both. |
| * In case userspace does it anyway this will result in an -EFAULT for |
| * the unpack. The guest is thus never reaching secure mode. If |
| * userspace is playing dirty tricky with mapping huge pages later |
| * on this will result in a segmentation fault. |
| */ |
| if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| rc = -ENXIO; |
| ptep = get_locked_pte(gmap->mm, uaddr, &ptelock); |
| if (!ptep) |
| goto out; |
| if (pte_present(*ptep) && !(pte_val(*ptep) & _PAGE_INVALID) && pte_write(*ptep)) { |
| folio = page_folio(pte_page(*ptep)); |
| rc = -EAGAIN; |
| if (folio_test_large(folio)) { |
| rc = -E2BIG; |
| } else if (folio_trylock(folio)) { |
| if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm)) |
| uv_convert_from_secure(PFN_PHYS(folio_pfn(folio))); |
| rc = make_folio_secure(folio, uvcb); |
| folio_unlock(folio); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Once we drop the PTL, the folio may get unmapped and |
| * freed immediately. We need a temporary reference. |
| */ |
| if (rc == -EAGAIN || rc == -E2BIG) |
| folio_get(folio); |
| } |
| pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptelock); |
| out: |
| mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm); |
| |
| switch (rc) { |
| case -E2BIG: |
| folio_lock(folio); |
| rc = split_folio(folio); |
| folio_unlock(folio); |
| folio_put(folio); |
| |
| switch (rc) { |
| case 0: |
| /* Splitting succeeded, try again immediately. */ |
| goto again; |
| case -EAGAIN: |
| /* Additional folio references. */ |
| if (drain_lru(&drain_lru_called)) |
| goto again; |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| case -EBUSY: |
| /* Unexpected race. */ |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| } |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(1); |
| return -ENXIO; |
| case -EAGAIN: |
| /* |
| * If we are here because the UVC returned busy or partial |
| * completion, this is just a useless check, but it is safe. |
| */ |
| folio_wait_writeback(folio); |
| folio_put(folio); |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| case -EBUSY: |
| /* Additional folio references. */ |
| if (drain_lru(&drain_lru_called)) |
| goto again; |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| case -ENXIO: |
| if (gmap_fault(gmap, gaddr, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| } |
| return rc; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_make_secure); |
| |
| int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr) |
| { |
| struct uv_cb_cts uvcb = { |
| .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR, |
| .header.len = sizeof(uvcb), |
| .guest_handle = gmap->guest_handle, |
| .gaddr = gaddr, |
| }; |
| |
| return gmap_make_secure(gmap, gaddr, &uvcb); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_convert_to_secure); |
| |
| /** |
| * gmap_destroy_page - Destroy a guest page. |
| * @gmap: the gmap of the guest |
| * @gaddr: the guest address to destroy |
| * |
| * An attempt will be made to destroy the given guest page. If the attempt |
| * fails, an attempt is made to export the page. If both attempts fail, an |
| * appropriate error is returned. |
| */ |
| int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr) |
| { |
| struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
| struct folio_walk fw; |
| unsigned long uaddr; |
| struct folio *folio; |
| int rc; |
| |
| rc = -EFAULT; |
| mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm); |
| |
| uaddr = __gmap_translate(gmap, gaddr); |
| if (IS_ERR_VALUE(uaddr)) |
| goto out; |
| vma = vma_lookup(gmap->mm, uaddr); |
| if (!vma) |
| goto out; |
| /* |
| * Huge pages should not be able to become secure |
| */ |
| if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| rc = 0; |
| folio = folio_walk_start(&fw, vma, uaddr, 0); |
| if (!folio) |
| goto out; |
| /* |
| * See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure. Small |
| * folio implies FW_LEVEL_PTE. |
| */ |
| if (folio_test_large(folio) || !pte_write(fw.pte)) |
| goto out_walk_end; |
| rc = uv_destroy_folio(folio); |
| /* |
| * Fault handlers can race; it is possible that two CPUs will fault |
| * on the same secure page. One CPU can destroy the page, reboot, |
| * re-enter secure mode and import it, while the second CPU was |
| * stuck at the beginning of the handler. At some point the second |
| * CPU will be able to progress, and it will not be able to destroy |
| * the page. In that case we do not want to terminate the process, |
| * we instead try to export the page. |
| */ |
| if (rc) |
| rc = uv_convert_from_secure_folio(folio); |
| out_walk_end: |
| folio_walk_end(&fw, vma); |
| out: |
| mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_destroy_page); |
| |
| /* |
| * To be called with the folio locked or with an extra reference! This will |
| * prevent gmap_make_secure from touching the folio concurrently. Having 2 |
| * parallel arch_make_folio_accessible is fine, as the UV calls will become a |
| * no-op if the folio is already exported. |
| */ |
| int arch_make_folio_accessible(struct folio *folio) |
| { |
| int rc = 0; |
| |
| /* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */ |
| if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * PG_arch_1 is used in 2 places: |
| * 1. for storage keys of hugetlb folios and KVM |
| * 2. As an indication that this small folio might be secure. This can |
| * overindicate, e.g. we set the bit before calling |
| * convert_to_secure. |
| * As secure pages are never large folios, both variants can co-exists. |
| */ |
| if (!test_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| rc = uv_pin_shared(folio_to_phys(folio)); |
| if (!rc) { |
| clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| rc = uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio)); |
| if (!rc) { |
| clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_make_folio_accessible); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_facilities(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n%lx\n%lx\n%lx\n", |
| uv_info.inst_calls_list[0], |
| uv_info.inst_calls_list[1], |
| uv_info.inst_calls_list[2], |
| uv_info.inst_calls_list[3]); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_facilities_attr = |
| __ATTR(facilities, 0444, uv_query_facilities, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_supp_se_hdr_ver(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_se_hdr_ver); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_se_hdr_ver_attr = |
| __ATTR(supp_se_hdr_ver, 0444, uv_query_supp_se_hdr_ver, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_se_hdr_pcf); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf_attr = |
| __ATTR(supp_se_hdr_pcf, 0444, uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_dump_cpu_len(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.guest_cpu_stor_len); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_dump_cpu_len_attr = |
| __ATTR(uv_query_dump_cpu_len, 0444, uv_query_dump_cpu_len, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_dump_storage_state_len(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.conf_dump_storage_state_len); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_dump_storage_state_len_attr = |
| __ATTR(dump_storage_state_len, 0444, uv_query_dump_storage_state_len, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_dump_finalize_len(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.conf_dump_finalize_len); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_dump_finalize_len_attr = |
| __ATTR(dump_finalize_len, 0444, uv_query_dump_finalize_len, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_feature_indications(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.uv_feature_indications); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_feature_indications_attr = |
| __ATTR(feature_indications, 0444, uv_query_feature_indications, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_max_guest_cpus(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_guest_cpu_id + 1); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_guest_cpus_attr = |
| __ATTR(max_cpus, 0444, uv_query_max_guest_cpus, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_max_guest_vms(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_num_sec_conf); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_guest_vms_attr = |
| __ATTR(max_guests, 0444, uv_query_max_guest_vms, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_max_guest_addr(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.max_sec_stor_addr); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_guest_addr_attr = |
| __ATTR(max_address, 0444, uv_query_max_guest_addr, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_att_req_hdr_ver); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver_attr = |
| __ATTR(supp_att_req_hdr_ver, 0444, uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_supp_att_pflags(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_att_pflags); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_att_pflags_attr = |
| __ATTR(supp_att_pflags, 0444, uv_query_supp_att_pflags, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_add_secret_req_ver); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver_attr = |
| __ATTR(supp_add_secret_req_ver, 0444, uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_add_secret_pcf); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf_attr = |
| __ATTR(supp_add_secret_pcf, 0444, uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_supp_secret_types(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_secret_types); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_secret_types_attr = |
| __ATTR(supp_secret_types, 0444, uv_query_supp_secret_types, NULL); |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_query_max_secrets(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_secrets); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_secrets_attr = |
| __ATTR(max_secrets, 0444, uv_query_max_secrets, NULL); |
| |
| static struct attribute *uv_query_attrs[] = { |
| &uv_query_facilities_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_feature_indications_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_max_guest_cpus_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_max_guest_vms_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_max_guest_addr_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_supp_se_hdr_ver_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_dump_storage_state_len_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_dump_finalize_len_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_dump_cpu_len_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_supp_att_pflags_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_supp_secret_types_attr.attr, |
| &uv_query_max_secrets_attr.attr, |
| NULL, |
| }; |
| |
| static struct attribute_group uv_query_attr_group = { |
| .attrs = uv_query_attrs, |
| }; |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_is_prot_virt_guest(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", prot_virt_guest); |
| } |
| |
| static ssize_t uv_is_prot_virt_host(struct kobject *kobj, |
| struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) |
| { |
| return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", prot_virt_host); |
| } |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_prot_virt_guest = |
| __ATTR(prot_virt_guest, 0444, uv_is_prot_virt_guest, NULL); |
| |
| static struct kobj_attribute uv_prot_virt_host = |
| __ATTR(prot_virt_host, 0444, uv_is_prot_virt_host, NULL); |
| |
| static const struct attribute *uv_prot_virt_attrs[] = { |
| &uv_prot_virt_guest.attr, |
| &uv_prot_virt_host.attr, |
| NULL, |
| }; |
| |
| static struct kset *uv_query_kset; |
| static struct kobject *uv_kobj; |
| |
| static int __init uv_info_init(void) |
| { |
| int rc = -ENOMEM; |
| |
| if (!test_facility(158)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| uv_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("uv", firmware_kobj); |
| if (!uv_kobj) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| rc = sysfs_create_files(uv_kobj, uv_prot_virt_attrs); |
| if (rc) |
| goto out_kobj; |
| |
| uv_query_kset = kset_create_and_add("query", NULL, uv_kobj); |
| if (!uv_query_kset) { |
| rc = -ENOMEM; |
| goto out_ind_files; |
| } |
| |
| rc = sysfs_create_group(&uv_query_kset->kobj, &uv_query_attr_group); |
| if (!rc) |
| return 0; |
| |
| kset_unregister(uv_query_kset); |
| out_ind_files: |
| sysfs_remove_files(uv_kobj, uv_prot_virt_attrs); |
| out_kobj: |
| kobject_del(uv_kobj); |
| kobject_put(uv_kobj); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| device_initcall(uv_info_init); |