| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| /* |
| * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "queueing.h" |
| #include "timers.h" |
| #include "device.h" |
| #include "peer.h" |
| #include "socket.h" |
| #include "messages.h" |
| #include "cookie.h" |
| |
| #include <linux/uio.h> |
| #include <linux/inetdevice.h> |
| #include <linux/socket.h> |
| #include <net/ip_tunnels.h> |
| #include <net/udp.h> |
| #include <net/sock.h> |
| |
| static void wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer) |
| { |
| struct message_handshake_initiation packet; |
| |
| if (!wg_birthdate_has_expired(atomic64_read(&peer->last_sent_handshake), |
| REKEY_TIMEOUT)) |
| return; /* This function is rate limited. */ |
| |
| atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); |
| net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending handshake initiation to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", |
| peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, |
| &peer->endpoint.addr); |
| |
| if (wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(&packet, &peer->handshake)) { |
| wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(&packet, sizeof(packet), peer); |
| wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); |
| wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer); |
| atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, |
| ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); |
| wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(peer, &packet, sizeof(packet), |
| HANDSHAKE_DSCP); |
| wg_timers_handshake_initiated(peer); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void wg_packet_handshake_send_worker(struct work_struct *work) |
| { |
| struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, |
| transmit_handshake_work); |
| |
| wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation(peer); |
| wg_peer_put(peer); |
| } |
| |
| void wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer, |
| bool is_retry) |
| { |
| if (!is_retry) |
| peer->timer_handshake_attempts = 0; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock_bh(); |
| /* We check last_sent_handshake here in addition to the actual function |
| * we're queueing up, so that we don't queue things if not strictly |
| * necessary: |
| */ |
| if (!wg_birthdate_has_expired(atomic64_read(&peer->last_sent_handshake), |
| REKEY_TIMEOUT) || |
| unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) |
| goto out; |
| |
| wg_peer_get(peer); |
| /* Queues up calling packet_send_queued_handshakes(peer), where we do a |
| * peer_put(peer) after: |
| */ |
| if (!queue_work(peer->device->handshake_send_wq, |
| &peer->transmit_handshake_work)) |
| /* If the work was already queued, we want to drop the |
| * extra reference: |
| */ |
| wg_peer_put(peer); |
| out: |
| rcu_read_unlock_bh(); |
| } |
| |
| void wg_packet_send_handshake_response(struct wg_peer *peer) |
| { |
| struct message_handshake_response packet; |
| |
| atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); |
| net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending handshake response to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", |
| peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, |
| &peer->endpoint.addr); |
| |
| if (wg_noise_handshake_create_response(&packet, &peer->handshake)) { |
| wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(&packet, sizeof(packet), peer); |
| if (wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(&peer->handshake, |
| &peer->keypairs)) { |
| wg_timers_session_derived(peer); |
| wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); |
| wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer); |
| atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, |
| ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns()); |
| wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(peer, &packet, |
| sizeof(packet), |
| HANDSHAKE_DSCP); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(struct wg_device *wg, |
| struct sk_buff *initiating_skb, |
| __le32 sender_index) |
| { |
| struct message_handshake_cookie packet; |
| |
| net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Sending cookie response for denied handshake message for %pISpfsc\n", |
| wg->dev->name, initiating_skb); |
| wg_cookie_message_create(&packet, initiating_skb, sender_index, |
| &wg->cookie_checker); |
| wg_socket_send_buffer_as_reply_to_skb(wg, initiating_skb, &packet, |
| sizeof(packet)); |
| } |
| |
| static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer) |
| { |
| struct noise_keypair *keypair; |
| bool send; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock_bh(); |
| keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); |
| send = keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid) && |
| (atomic64_read(&keypair->sending_counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES || |
| (keypair->i_am_the_initiator && |
| wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME))); |
| rcu_read_unlock_bh(); |
| |
| if (unlikely(send)) |
| wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); |
| } |
| |
| static unsigned int calculate_skb_padding(struct sk_buff *skb) |
| { |
| unsigned int padded_size, last_unit = skb->len; |
| |
| if (unlikely(!PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu)) |
| return ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE) - last_unit; |
| |
| /* We do this modulo business with the MTU, just in case the networking |
| * layer gives us a packet that's bigger than the MTU. In that case, we |
| * wouldn't want the final subtraction to overflow in the case of the |
| * padded_size being clamped. Fortunately, that's very rarely the case, |
| * so we optimize for that not happening. |
| */ |
| if (unlikely(last_unit > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu)) |
| last_unit %= PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu; |
| |
| padded_size = min(PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu, |
| ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE)); |
| return padded_size - last_unit; |
| } |
| |
| static bool encrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair) |
| { |
| unsigned int padding_len, plaintext_len, trailer_len; |
| struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 8]; |
| struct message_data *header; |
| struct sk_buff *trailer; |
| int num_frags; |
| |
| /* Force hash calculation before encryption so that flow analysis is |
| * consistent over the inner packet. |
| */ |
| skb_get_hash(skb); |
| |
| /* Calculate lengths. */ |
| padding_len = calculate_skb_padding(skb); |
| trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0); |
| plaintext_len = skb->len + padding_len; |
| |
| /* Expand data section to have room for padding and auth tag. */ |
| num_frags = skb_cow_data(skb, trailer_len, &trailer); |
| if (unlikely(num_frags < 0 || num_frags > ARRAY_SIZE(sg))) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* Set the padding to zeros, and make sure it and the auth tag are part |
| * of the skb. |
| */ |
| memset(skb_tail_pointer(trailer), 0, padding_len); |
| |
| /* Expand head section to have room for our header and the network |
| * stack's headers. |
| */ |
| if (unlikely(skb_cow_head(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM) < 0)) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* Finalize checksum calculation for the inner packet, if required. */ |
| if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && |
| skb_checksum_help(skb))) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* Only after checksumming can we safely add on the padding at the end |
| * and the header. |
| */ |
| skb_set_inner_network_header(skb, 0); |
| header = (struct message_data *)skb_push(skb, sizeof(*header)); |
| header->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_DATA); |
| header->key_idx = keypair->remote_index; |
| header->counter = cpu_to_le64(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce); |
| pskb_put(skb, trailer, trailer_len); |
| |
| /* Now we can encrypt the scattergather segments */ |
| sg_init_table(sg, num_frags); |
| if (skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct message_data), |
| noise_encrypted_len(plaintext_len)) <= 0) |
| return false; |
| return chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg_inplace(sg, plaintext_len, NULL, 0, |
| PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, |
| keypair->sending.key); |
| } |
| |
| void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_peer *peer) |
| { |
| struct sk_buff *skb; |
| |
| if (skb_queue_empty(&peer->staged_packet_queue)) { |
| skb = alloc_skb(DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM + MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH, |
| GFP_ATOMIC); |
| if (unlikely(!skb)) |
| return; |
| skb_reserve(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM); |
| skb->dev = peer->device->dev; |
| PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu = skb->dev->mtu; |
| skb_queue_tail(&peer->staged_packet_queue, skb); |
| net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending keepalive packet to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n", |
| peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id, |
| &peer->endpoint.addr); |
| } |
| |
| wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer); |
| } |
| |
| static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first) |
| { |
| struct sk_buff *skb, *next; |
| bool is_keepalive, data_sent = false; |
| |
| wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer); |
| wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer); |
| skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) { |
| is_keepalive = skb->len == message_data_len(0); |
| if (likely(!wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(peer, skb, |
| PACKET_CB(skb)->ds) && !is_keepalive)) |
| data_sent = true; |
| } |
| |
| if (likely(data_sent)) |
| wg_timers_data_sent(peer); |
| |
| keep_key_fresh(peer); |
| } |
| |
| void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_struct *work) |
| { |
| struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, transmit_packet_work); |
| struct noise_keypair *keypair; |
| enum packet_state state; |
| struct sk_buff *first; |
| |
| while ((first = wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->tx_queue)) != NULL && |
| (state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(first)->state)) != |
| PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) { |
| wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(&peer->tx_queue); |
| keypair = PACKET_CB(first)->keypair; |
| |
| if (likely(state == PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED)) |
| wg_packet_create_data_done(peer, first); |
| else |
| kfree_skb_list(first); |
| |
| wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); |
| wg_peer_put(peer); |
| if (need_resched()) |
| cond_resched(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work) |
| { |
| struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct multicore_worker, |
| work)->ptr; |
| struct sk_buff *first, *skb, *next; |
| |
| while ((first = ptr_ring_consume_bh(&queue->ring)) != NULL) { |
| enum packet_state state = PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED; |
| |
| skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) { |
| if (likely(encrypt_packet(skb, |
| PACKET_CB(first)->keypair))) { |
| wg_reset_packet(skb, true); |
| } else { |
| state = PACKET_STATE_DEAD; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, state); |
| if (need_resched()) |
| cond_resched(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void wg_packet_create_data(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first) |
| { |
| struct wg_device *wg = peer->device; |
| int ret = -EINVAL; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock_bh(); |
| if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead))) |
| goto err; |
| |
| ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue, &peer->tx_queue, first, |
| wg->packet_crypt_wq); |
| if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE)) |
| wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, PACKET_STATE_DEAD); |
| err: |
| rcu_read_unlock_bh(); |
| if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) |
| return; |
| wg_noise_keypair_put(PACKET_CB(first)->keypair, false); |
| wg_peer_put(peer); |
| kfree_skb_list(first); |
| } |
| |
| void wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer) |
| { |
| spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); |
| DEV_STATS_ADD(peer->device->dev, tx_dropped, |
| peer->staged_packet_queue.qlen); |
| __skb_queue_purge(&peer->staged_packet_queue); |
| spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); |
| } |
| |
| void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer) |
| { |
| struct noise_keypair *keypair; |
| struct sk_buff_head packets; |
| struct sk_buff *skb; |
| |
| /* Steal the current queue into our local one. */ |
| __skb_queue_head_init(&packets); |
| spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); |
| skb_queue_splice_init(&peer->staged_packet_queue, &packets); |
| spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); |
| if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&packets))) |
| return; |
| |
| /* First we make sure we have a valid reference to a valid key. */ |
| rcu_read_lock_bh(); |
| keypair = wg_noise_keypair_get( |
| rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair)); |
| rcu_read_unlock_bh(); |
| if (unlikely(!keypair)) |
| goto out_nokey; |
| if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid))) |
| goto out_nokey; |
| if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, |
| REJECT_AFTER_TIME))) |
| goto out_invalid; |
| |
| /* After we know we have a somewhat valid key, we now try to assign |
| * nonces to all of the packets in the queue. If we can't assign nonces |
| * for all of them, we just consider it a failure and wait for the next |
| * handshake. |
| */ |
| skb_queue_walk(&packets, skb) { |
| /* 0 for no outer TOS: no leak. TODO: at some later point, we |
| * might consider using flowi->tos as outer instead. |
| */ |
| PACKET_CB(skb)->ds = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(0, ip_hdr(skb), skb); |
| PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce = |
| atomic64_inc_return(&keypair->sending_counter) - 1; |
| if (unlikely(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) |
| goto out_invalid; |
| } |
| |
| packets.prev->next = NULL; |
| wg_peer_get(keypair->entry.peer); |
| PACKET_CB(packets.next)->keypair = keypair; |
| wg_packet_create_data(peer, packets.next); |
| return; |
| |
| out_invalid: |
| WRITE_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid, false); |
| out_nokey: |
| wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false); |
| |
| /* We orphan the packets if we're waiting on a handshake, so that they |
| * don't block a socket's pool. |
| */ |
| skb_queue_walk(&packets, skb) |
| skb_orphan(skb); |
| /* Then we put them back on the top of the queue. We're not too |
| * concerned about accidentally getting things a little out of order if |
| * packets are being added really fast, because this queue is for before |
| * packets can even be sent and it's small anyway. |
| */ |
| spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); |
| skb_queue_splice(&packets, &peer->staged_packet_queue); |
| spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock); |
| |
| /* If we're exiting because there's something wrong with the key, it |
| * means we should initiate a new handshake. |
| */ |
| wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false); |
| } |