|  | #include <linux/kernel.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/syscalls.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/fdtable.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/string.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/random.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/module.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/init.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/errno.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/cache.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/bug.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/err.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/kcmp.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <asm/unistd.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons. | 
|  | * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we | 
|  | * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with | 
|  | * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space. | 
|  | * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to | 
|  | * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product | 
|  | * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is | 
|  | * relative prime to 2^n). | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed | 
|  | * it can be changed to an alternate scheme. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly; | 
|  |  | 
|  | static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type) | 
|  | { | 
|  | return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1]; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2 | 
|  | * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2 | 
|  | * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2 | 
|  | * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future) | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type) | 
|  | { | 
|  | long t1, t2; | 
|  |  | 
|  | t1 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type); | 
|  | t2 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return (t1 < t2) | ((t1 > t2) << 1); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* The caller must have pinned the task */ | 
|  | static struct file * | 
|  | get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct file *file = NULL; | 
|  |  | 
|  | task_lock(task); | 
|  | rcu_read_lock(); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (task->files) | 
|  | file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | rcu_read_unlock(); | 
|  | task_unlock(task); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return file; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2) | 
|  | { | 
|  | if (likely(m2 != m1)) | 
|  | mutex_unlock(m2); | 
|  | mutex_unlock(m1); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (m2 > m1) | 
|  | swap(m1, m2); | 
|  |  | 
|  | err = mutex_lock_killable(m1); | 
|  | if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) { | 
|  | err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); | 
|  | if (err) | 
|  | mutex_unlock(m1); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return err; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type, | 
|  | unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct task_struct *task1, *task2; | 
|  | int ret; | 
|  |  | 
|  | rcu_read_lock(); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1); | 
|  | task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2); | 
|  | if (!task1 || !task2) | 
|  | goto err_no_task; | 
|  |  | 
|  | get_task_struct(task1); | 
|  | get_task_struct(task2); | 
|  |  | 
|  | rcu_read_unlock(); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * One should have enough rights to inspect task details. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex, | 
|  | &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex); | 
|  | if (ret) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  | if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) || | 
|  | !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) { | 
|  | ret = -EPERM; | 
|  | goto err_unlock; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | switch (type) { | 
|  | case KCMP_FILE: { | 
|  | struct file *filp1, *filp2; | 
|  |  | 
|  | filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1); | 
|  | filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (filp1 && filp2) | 
|  | ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE); | 
|  | else | 
|  | ret = -EBADF; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | } | 
|  | case KCMP_VM: | 
|  | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM); | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case KCMP_FILES: | 
|  | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES); | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case KCMP_FS: | 
|  | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS); | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case KCMP_SIGHAND: | 
|  | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND); | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case KCMP_IO: | 
|  | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO); | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case KCMP_SYSVSEM: | 
|  | #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC | 
|  | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list, | 
|  | task2->sysvsem.undo_list, | 
|  | KCMP_SYSVSEM); | 
|  | #else | 
|  | ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; | 
|  | #endif | 
|  | break; | 
|  | default: | 
|  | ret = -EINVAL; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | err_unlock: | 
|  | kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex, | 
|  | &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex); | 
|  | err: | 
|  | put_task_struct(task1); | 
|  | put_task_struct(task2); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  |  | 
|  | err_no_task: | 
|  | rcu_read_unlock(); | 
|  | return -ESRCH; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int i; | 
|  |  | 
|  | get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies)); | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++) | 
|  | cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >>  1) | 1); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  | arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init); |