| .. _securitybugs: |
| |
| Security bugs |
| ============= |
| |
| Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd |
| like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and |
| disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the |
| Linux kernel security team. |
| |
| Contact |
| ------- |
| |
| The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at |
| <security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers |
| who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix. |
| If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as |
| that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the |
| security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to |
| understand and fix the security vulnerability. |
| |
| As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it |
| will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in |
| 'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what |
| information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not |
| be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been |
| made public. |
| |
| Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible. |
| It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex |
| issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments. Think of it like a |
| :doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>` |
| (even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list |
| reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text. |
| |
| Disclosure and embargoed information |
| ------------------------------------ |
| |
| The security list is not a disclosure channel. For that, see Coordination |
| below. |
| |
| Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts. Fixes |
| for publicly known bugs are released immediately. |
| |
| Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs |
| as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of |
| the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start |
| of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days |
| if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time. The |
| only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate |
| the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release |
| coordination. |
| |
| While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in |
| order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside |
| the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the |
| reporter. This includes but is not limited to the original bug report |
| and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the |
| identity of the reporter. |
| |
| In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed. All other |
| information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions |
| of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been |
| lifted, in perpetuity. |
| |
| Coordination with other groups |
| ------------------------------ |
| |
| While the kernel security team solely focuses on getting bugs fixed, |
| other groups focus on fixing issues in distros and coordinating |
| disclosure between operating system vendors. Coordination is usually |
| handled by the "linux-distros" mailing list and disclosure by the |
| public "oss-security" mailing list, both of which are closely related |
| and presented in the linux-distros wiki: |
| <https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros> |
| |
| Please note that the respective policies and rules are different since |
| the 3 lists pursue different goals. Coordinating between the kernel |
| security team and other teams is difficult since for the kernel security |
| team occasional embargoes (as subject to a maximum allowed number of |
| days) start from the availability of a fix, while for "linux-distros" |
| they start from the initial post to the list regardless of the |
| availability of a fix. |
| |
| As such, the kernel security team strongly recommends that as a reporter |
| of a potential security issue you DO NOT contact the "linux-distros" |
| mailing list UNTIL a fix is accepted by the affected code's maintainers |
| and you have read the distros wiki page above and you fully understand |
| the requirements that contacting "linux-distros" will impose on you and |
| the kernel community. This also means that in general it doesn't make |
| sense to Cc: both lists at once, except maybe for coordination if and |
| while an accepted fix has not yet been merged. In other words, until a |
| fix is accepted do not Cc: "linux-distros", and after it's merged do not |
| Cc: the kernel security team. |
| |
| CVE assignment |
| -------------- |
| |
| The security team does not assign CVEs, nor do we require them for |
| reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may |
| delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier |
| assigned for a confirmed issue, they can contact the :doc:`kernel CVE |
| assignment team<../process/cve>` to obtain one. |
| |
| Non-disclosure agreements |
| ------------------------- |
| |
| The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable |
| to enter any non-disclosure agreements. |