| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ |
| #ifndef _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H |
| #define _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H |
| |
| #include <asm/page_64_types.h> |
| |
| #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ |
| #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> |
| #include <asm/alternative.h> |
| |
| /* duplicated to the one in bootmem.h */ |
| extern unsigned long max_pfn; |
| extern unsigned long phys_base; |
| |
| extern unsigned long page_offset_base; |
| extern unsigned long vmalloc_base; |
| extern unsigned long vmemmap_base; |
| |
| static inline unsigned long __phys_addr_nodebug(unsigned long x) |
| { |
| unsigned long y = x - __START_KERNEL_map; |
| |
| /* use the carry flag to determine if x was < __START_KERNEL_map */ |
| x = y + ((x > y) ? phys_base : (__START_KERNEL_map - PAGE_OFFSET)); |
| |
| return x; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL |
| extern unsigned long __phys_addr(unsigned long); |
| extern unsigned long __phys_addr_symbol(unsigned long); |
| #else |
| #define __phys_addr(x) __phys_addr_nodebug(x) |
| #define __phys_addr_symbol(x) \ |
| ((unsigned long)(x) - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base) |
| #endif |
| |
| #define __phys_reloc_hide(x) (x) |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_FLATMEM |
| #define pfn_valid(pfn) ((pfn) < max_pfn) |
| #endif |
| |
| void clear_page_orig(void *page); |
| void clear_page_rep(void *page); |
| void clear_page_erms(void *page); |
| |
| static inline void clear_page(void *page) |
| { |
| alternative_call_2(clear_page_orig, |
| clear_page_rep, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD, |
| clear_page_erms, X86_FEATURE_ERMS, |
| "=D" (page), |
| "0" (page) |
| : "cc", "memory", "rax", "rcx"); |
| } |
| |
| void copy_page(void *to, void *from); |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL |
| /* |
| * User space process size. This is the first address outside the user range. |
| * There are a few constraints that determine this: |
| * |
| * On Intel CPUs, if a SYSCALL instruction is at the highest canonical |
| * address, then that syscall will enter the kernel with a |
| * non-canonical return address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously. |
| * We avoid this particular problem by preventing anything |
| * from being mapped at the maximum canonical address. |
| * |
| * On AMD CPUs in the Ryzen family, there's a nasty bug in which the |
| * CPUs malfunction if they execute code from the highest canonical page. |
| * They'll speculate right off the end of the canonical space, and |
| * bad things happen. This is worked around in the same way as the |
| * Intel problem. |
| * |
| * With page table isolation enabled, we map the LDT in ... [stay tuned] |
| */ |
| static __always_inline unsigned long task_size_max(void) |
| { |
| unsigned long ret; |
| |
| alternative_io("movq %[small],%0","movq %[large],%0", |
| X86_FEATURE_LA57, |
| "=r" (ret), |
| [small] "i" ((1ul << 47)-PAGE_SIZE), |
| [large] "i" ((1ul << 56)-PAGE_SIZE)); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL */ |
| |
| #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION |
| # define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1 |
| #endif |
| |
| #endif /* _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H */ |