security/safesetid/lsm.c - linux - Git at Google

 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /*
  * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
  *
  * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
  *
  */

 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt

 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include "lsm.h"

 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
 int safesetid_initialized __initdata;

 struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
 struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;


 /* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy. */
 enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
 		kid_t src, kid_t dst)
 {
 	struct setid_rule *rule;
 	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;

 	if (policy->type == UID) {
 		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src.uid)) {
 			if (!uid_eq(rule->src_id.uid, src.uid))
 				continue;
 			if (uid_eq(rule->dst_id.uid, dst.uid))
 				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
 			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
 		}
 	} else if (policy->type == GID) {
 		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kgid_val(src.gid)) {
 			if (!gid_eq(rule->src_id.gid, src.gid))
 				continue;
 			if (gid_eq(rule->dst_id.gid, dst.gid)){
 				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
 			}
 			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* Should not reach here, report the ID as contrainsted */
 		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
 	}
 	return result;
 }

 /*
  * Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under the active
  * policy.
  */
 static enum sid_policy_type setid_policy_lookup(kid_t src, kid_t dst, enum setid_type new_type)
 {
 	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
 	struct setid_ruleset *pol;

 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (new_type == UID)
 		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
 	else if (new_type == GID)
 		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setgid_rules);
 	else { /* Should not reach here */
 		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return result;
 	}

 	if (pol) {
 		pol->type = new_type;
 		result = _setid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return result;
 }

 static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
 				      struct user_namespace *ns,
 				      int cap,
 				      unsigned int opts)
 {
 	/* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID. */
 	if (cap != CAP_SETUID && cap != CAP_SETGID)
 		return 0;

 	/*
 	 * If CAP_SET{U/G}ID is currently used for a setid or setgroups syscall, we
 	 * want to let it go through here; the real security check happens later, in
 	 * the task_fix_set{u/g}id or task_fix_setgroups hooks.
 	 */
 	if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
 		return 0;

 	switch (cap) {
 	case CAP_SETUID:
 		/*
 		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
 		* other purposes.
 		*/
 		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = cred->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 			return 0;
 		/*
 		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
 		 * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
 		 */
 		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
 			__kuid_val(cred->uid));
 		return -EPERM;
 	case CAP_SETGID:
 		/*
 		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETGID for
 		* other purposes.
 		*/
 		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = cred->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 			return 0;
 		/*
 		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
 		 * set*gid() (e.g. setting up userns gid mappings).
 		 */
 		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETGID, which is not available to GID %u for operations besides approved set*gid transitions\n",
 			__kuid_val(cred->uid));
 		return -EPERM;
 	default:
 		/* Error, the only capabilities were checking for is CAP_SETUID/GID */
 		return 0;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

 /*
  * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
  * credentials that contain @new_id.
  */
 static bool id_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kid_t new_id, enum setid_type new_type)
 {
 	bool permitted;

 	/* If our old creds already had this ID in it, it's fine. */
 	if (new_type == UID) {
 		if (uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->euid) ||
 			uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->suid))
 			return true;
 	} else if (new_type == GID){
 		if (gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->gid) || gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->egid) ||
 			gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->sgid))
 			return true;
 	} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
 		return false;

 	/*
 	 * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
 	 * RUID.
 	 */
 	permitted =
 	    setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, new_id, new_type) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;

 	if (!permitted) {
 		if (new_type == UID) {
 			pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
 				__kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
 				__kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_id.uid));
 		} else if (new_type == GID) {
 			pr_warn("GID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
 				__kgid_val(old->gid), __kgid_val(old->egid),
 				__kgid_val(old->sgid), __kgid_val(new_id.gid));
 		} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
 			return false;
 	}
 	return permitted;
 }

 /*
  * Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
  * set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
  * Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
  */
 static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
 				     const struct cred *old,
 				     int flags)
 {

 	/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
 	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 		return 0;

 	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->uid}, UID) &&
 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->euid}, UID) &&
 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->suid}, UID) &&
 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->fsuid}, UID))
 		return 0;

 	/*
 	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
 	 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
 	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
 	 */
 	force_sig(SIGKILL);
 	return -EACCES;
 }

 static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
 				     const struct cred *old,
 				     int flags)
 {

 	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
 	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 		return 0;

 	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->gid}, GID) &&
 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->egid}, GID) &&
 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->sgid}, GID) &&
 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->fsgid}, GID))
 		return 0;

 	/*
 	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
 	 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
 	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
 	 */
 	force_sig(SIGKILL);
 	return -EACCES;
 }

 static int safesetid_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 	int i;

 	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
 	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 		return 0;

 	get_group_info(new->group_info);
 	for (i = 0; i < new->group_info->ngroups; i++) {
 		if (!id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->group_info->gid[i]}, GID)) {
 			put_group_info(new->group_info);
 			/*
 			 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
 			 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
 			 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
 			 */
 			force_sig(SIGKILL);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 	}

 	put_group_info(new->group_info);
 	return 0;
 }

 static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgroups, safesetid_task_fix_setgroups),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
 };

 static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
 {
 	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
 			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");

 	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
 	safesetid_initialized = 1;

 	return 0;
 }

 DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
 	.init = safesetid_security_init,
 	.name = "safesetid",
 };
	// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
	/*
	* SafeSetID Linux Security Module
	*
	* Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
	*
	* Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
	*
	* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
	* published by the Free Software Foundation.
	*
	*/

	#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt

	#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
	#include <linux/module.h>
	#include <linux/ptrace.h>
	#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
	#include <linux/security.h>
	#include "lsm.h"

	/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
	int safesetid_initialized __initdata;

	struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
	struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;


	/* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy. */
	enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
	kid_t src, kid_t dst)
	{
	struct setid_rule *rule;
	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;

	if (policy->type == UID) {
	hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src.uid)) {
	if (!uid_eq(rule->src_id.uid, src.uid))
	continue;
	if (uid_eq(rule->dst_id.uid, dst.uid))
	return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
	result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
	}
	} else if (policy->type == GID) {
	hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kgid_val(src.gid)) {
	if (!gid_eq(rule->src_id.gid, src.gid))
	continue;
	if (gid_eq(rule->dst_id.gid, dst.gid)){
	return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
	}
	result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
	}
	} else {
	/* Should not reach here, report the ID as contrainsted */
	result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
	}
	return result;
	}

	/*
	* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under the active
	* policy.
	*/
	static enum sid_policy_type setid_policy_lookup(kid_t src, kid_t dst, enum setid_type new_type)
	{
	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
	struct setid_ruleset *pol;

	rcu_read_lock();
	if (new_type == UID)
	pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
	else if (new_type == GID)
	pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setgid_rules);
	else { /* Should not reach here */
	result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
	rcu_read_unlock();
	return result;
	}

	if (pol) {
	pol->type = new_type;
	result = _setid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
	}
	rcu_read_unlock();
	return result;
	}

	static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
	struct user_namespace *ns,
	int cap,
	unsigned int opts)
	{
	/* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID. */
	if (cap != CAP_SETUID && cap != CAP_SETGID)
	return 0;

	/*
	* If CAP_SET{U/G}ID is currently used for a setid or setgroups syscall, we
	* want to let it go through here; the real security check happens later, in
	* the task_fix_set{u/g}id or task_fix_setgroups hooks.
	*/
	if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
	return 0;

	switch (cap) {
	case CAP_SETUID:
	/*
	* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
	* other purposes.
	*/
	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = cred->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
	return 0;
	/*
	* Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
	* set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
	*/
	pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
	__kuid_val(cred->uid));
	return -EPERM;
	case CAP_SETGID:
	/*
	* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETGID for
	* other purposes.
	*/
	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = cred->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
	return 0;
	/*
	* Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
	* set*gid() (e.g. setting up userns gid mappings).
	*/
	pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETGID, which is not available to GID %u for operations besides approved set*gid transitions\n",
	__kuid_val(cred->uid));
	return -EPERM;
	default:
	/* Error, the only capabilities were checking for is CAP_SETUID/GID */
	return 0;
	}
	return 0;
	}

	/*
	* Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
	* credentials that contain @new_id.
	*/
	static bool id_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kid_t new_id, enum setid_type new_type)
	{
	bool permitted;

	/* If our old creds already had this ID in it, it's fine. */
	if (new_type == UID) {
	if (uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->uid) \|\| uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->euid) \|\|
	uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->suid))
	return true;
	} else if (new_type == GID){
	if (gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->gid) \|\| gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->egid) \|\|
	gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->sgid))
	return true;
	} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
	return false;

	/*
	* Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
	* RUID.
	*/
	permitted =
	setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, new_id, new_type) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;

	if (!permitted) {
	if (new_type == UID) {
	pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
	__kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
	__kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_id.uid));
	} else if (new_type == GID) {
	pr_warn("GID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
	__kgid_val(old->gid), __kgid_val(old->egid),
	__kgid_val(old->sgid), __kgid_val(new_id.gid));
	} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
	return false;
	}
	return permitted;
	}

	/*
	* Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
	* set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
	* Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
	*/
	static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
	const struct cred *old,
	int flags)
	{

	/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
	return 0;

	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->uid}, UID) &&
	id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->euid}, UID) &&
	id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->suid}, UID) &&
	id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->fsuid}, UID))
	return 0;

	/*
	* Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
	* that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
	* privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
	*/
	force_sig(SIGKILL);
	return -EACCES;
	}

	static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
	const struct cred *old,
	int flags)
	{

	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
	return 0;

	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->gid}, GID) &&
	id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->egid}, GID) &&
	id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->sgid}, GID) &&
	id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->fsgid}, GID))
	return 0;

	/*
	* Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
	* that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
	* privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
	*/
	force_sig(SIGKILL);
	return -EACCES;
	}

	static int safesetid_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred new, const struct cred old)
	{
	int i;

	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
	return 0;

	get_group_info(new->group_info);
	for (i = 0; i < new->group_info->ngroups; i++) {
	if (!id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->group_info->gid[i]}, GID)) {
	put_group_info(new->group_info);
	/*
	* Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
	* that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
	* privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
	*/
	force_sig(SIGKILL);
	return -EACCES;
	}
	}

	put_group_info(new->group_info);
	return 0;
	}

	static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgroups, safesetid_task_fix_setgroups),
	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
	};

	static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
	{
	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
	ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");

	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
	safesetid_initialized = 1;

	return 0;
	}

	DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
	.init = safesetid_security_init,
	.name = "safesetid",
	};