| ========================================= |
| rpcsec_gss support for kernel RPC servers |
| ========================================= |
| |
| This document gives references to the standards and protocols used to |
| implement RPCGSS authentication in kernel RPC servers such as the NFS |
| server and the NFS client's NFSv4.0 callback server. (But note that |
| NFSv4.1 and higher don't require the client to act as a server for the |
| purposes of authentication.) |
| |
| RPCGSS is specified in a few IETF documents: |
| |
| - RFC2203 v1: https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2203.txt |
| - RFC5403 v2: https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5403.txt |
| |
| and there is a 3rd version being proposed: |
| |
| - https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-williams-rpcsecgssv3.txt |
| (At draft n. 02 at the time of writing) |
| |
| Background |
| ========== |
| |
| The RPCGSS Authentication method describes a way to perform GSSAPI |
| Authentication for NFS. Although GSSAPI is itself completely mechanism |
| agnostic, in many cases only the KRB5 mechanism is supported by NFS |
| implementations. |
| |
| The Linux kernel, at the moment, supports only the KRB5 mechanism, and |
| depends on GSSAPI extensions that are KRB5 specific. |
| |
| GSSAPI is a complex library, and implementing it completely in kernel is |
| unwarranted. However GSSAPI operations are fundementally separable in 2 |
| parts: |
| |
| - initial context establishment |
| - integrity/privacy protection (signing and encrypting of individual |
| packets) |
| |
| The former is more complex and policy-independent, but less |
| performance-sensitive. The latter is simpler and needs to be very fast. |
| |
| Therefore, we perform per-packet integrity and privacy protection in the |
| kernel, but leave the initial context establishment to userspace. We |
| need upcalls to request userspace to perform context establishment. |
| |
| NFS Server Legacy Upcall Mechanism |
| ================================== |
| |
| The classic upcall mechanism uses a custom text based upcall mechanism |
| to talk to a custom daemon called rpc.svcgssd that is provide by the |
| nfs-utils package. |
| |
| This upcall mechanism has 2 limitations: |
| |
| A) It can handle tokens that are no bigger than 2KiB |
| |
| In some Kerberos deployment GSSAPI tokens can be quite big, up and |
| beyond 64KiB in size due to various authorization extensions attacked to |
| the Kerberos tickets, that needs to be sent through the GSS layer in |
| order to perform context establishment. |
| |
| B) It does not properly handle creds where the user is member of more |
| than a few thousand groups (the current hard limit in the kernel is 65K |
| groups) due to limitation on the size of the buffer that can be send |
| back to the kernel (4KiB). |
| |
| NFS Server New RPC Upcall Mechanism |
| =================================== |
| |
| The newer upcall mechanism uses RPC over a unix socket to a daemon |
| called gss-proxy, implemented by a userspace program called Gssproxy. |
| |
| The gss_proxy RPC protocol is currently documented `here |
| <https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/wiki/ProtocolDocumentation>`_. |
| |
| This upcall mechanism uses the kernel rpc client and connects to the gssproxy |
| userspace program over a regular unix socket. The gssproxy protocol does not |
| suffer from the size limitations of the legacy protocol. |
| |
| Negotiating Upcall Mechanisms |
| ============================= |
| |
| To provide backward compatibility, the kernel defaults to using the |
| legacy mechanism. To switch to the new mechanism, gss-proxy must bind |
| to /var/run/gssproxy.sock and then write "1" to |
| /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy. If gss-proxy dies, it must repeat both |
| steps. |
| |
| Once the upcall mechanism is chosen, it cannot be changed. To prevent |
| locking into the legacy mechanisms, the above steps must be performed |
| before starting nfsd. Whoever starts nfsd can guarantee this by reading |
| from /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy and checking that it contains a |
| "1"--the read will block until gss-proxy has done its write to the file. |