| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ |
| /* |
| * GCC stack protector support. |
| * |
| * Stack protector works by putting predefined pattern at the start of |
| * the stack frame and verifying that it hasn't been overwritten when |
| * returning from the function. The pattern is called stack canary |
| * and unfortunately gcc requires it to be at a fixed offset from %gs. |
| * On x86_64, the offset is 40 bytes and on x86_32 20 bytes. x86_64 |
| * and x86_32 use segment registers differently and thus handles this |
| * requirement differently. |
| * |
| * On x86_64, %gs is shared by percpu area and stack canary. All |
| * percpu symbols are zero based and %gs points to the base of percpu |
| * area. The first occupant of the percpu area is always |
| * fixed_percpu_data which contains stack_canary at offset 40. Userland |
| * %gs is always saved and restored on kernel entry and exit using |
| * swapgs, so stack protector doesn't add any complexity there. |
| * |
| * On x86_32, it's slightly more complicated. As in x86_64, %gs is |
| * used for userland TLS. Unfortunately, some processors are much |
| * slower at loading segment registers with different value when |
| * entering and leaving the kernel, so the kernel uses %fs for percpu |
| * area and manages %gs lazily so that %gs is switched only when |
| * necessary, usually during task switch. |
| * |
| * As gcc requires the stack canary at %gs:20, %gs can't be managed |
| * lazily if stack protector is enabled, so the kernel saves and |
| * restores userland %gs on kernel entry and exit. This behavior is |
| * controlled by CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and accessors are defined in |
| * system.h to hide the details. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H |
| #define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1 |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR |
| |
| #include <asm/tsc.h> |
| #include <asm/processor.h> |
| #include <asm/percpu.h> |
| #include <asm/desc.h> |
| |
| #include <linux/random.h> |
| #include <linux/sched.h> |
| |
| /* |
| * 24 byte read-only segment initializer for stack canary. Linker |
| * can't handle the address bit shifting. Address will be set in |
| * head_32 for boot CPU and setup_per_cpu_areas() for others. |
| */ |
| #define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT \ |
| [GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4090, 0, 0x18), |
| |
| /* |
| * Initialize the stackprotector canary value. |
| * |
| * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return |
| * and it must always be inlined. |
| * |
| * In addition, it should be called from a compilation unit for which |
| * stack protector is disabled. Alternatively, the caller should not end |
| * with a function call which gets tail-call optimized as that would |
| * lead to checking a modified canary value. |
| */ |
| static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) |
| { |
| u64 canary; |
| u64 tsc; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct fixed_percpu_data, stack_canary) != 40); |
| #endif |
| /* |
| * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source |
| * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, |
| * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later |
| * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too. |
| */ |
| get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); |
| tsc = rdtsc(); |
| canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL); |
| canary &= CANARY_MASK; |
| |
| current->stack_canary = canary; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 |
| this_cpu_write(fixed_percpu_data.stack_canary, canary); |
| #else |
| this_cpu_write(stack_canary.canary, canary); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static inline void cpu_init_stack_canary(int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 |
| per_cpu(fixed_percpu_data.stack_canary, cpu) = idle->stack_canary; |
| #else |
| per_cpu(stack_canary.canary, cpu) = idle->stack_canary; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 |
| unsigned long canary = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(stack_canary, cpu); |
| struct desc_struct *gdt_table = get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu); |
| struct desc_struct desc; |
| |
| desc = gdt_table[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY]; |
| set_desc_base(&desc, canary); |
| write_gdt_entry(gdt_table, GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY, &desc, DESCTYPE_S); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 |
| asm("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY) : "memory"); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| #else /* STACKPROTECTOR */ |
| |
| #define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT |
| |
| /* dummy boot_init_stack_canary() is defined in linux/stackprotector.h */ |
| |
| static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu) |
| { } |
| |
| static inline void cpu_init_stack_canary(int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) |
| { } |
| |
| static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 |
| asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0)); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* STACKPROTECTOR */ |
| #endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */ |