| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
| /* |
| * AppArmor security module |
| * |
| * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE |
| * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> |
| #include <linux/moduleparam.h> |
| #include <linux/mm.h> |
| #include <linux/mman.h> |
| #include <linux/mount.h> |
| #include <linux/namei.h> |
| #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
| #include <linux/ctype.h> |
| #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
| #include <linux/audit.h> |
| #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
| #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> |
| #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> |
| #include <linux/zlib.h> |
| #include <net/sock.h> |
| #include <uapi/linux/mount.h> |
| |
| #include "include/apparmor.h" |
| #include "include/apparmorfs.h" |
| #include "include/audit.h" |
| #include "include/capability.h" |
| #include "include/cred.h" |
| #include "include/file.h" |
| #include "include/ipc.h" |
| #include "include/net.h" |
| #include "include/path.h" |
| #include "include/label.h" |
| #include "include/policy.h" |
| #include "include/policy_ns.h" |
| #include "include/procattr.h" |
| #include "include/mount.h" |
| #include "include/secid.h" |
| |
| /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ |
| int apparmor_initialized; |
| |
| union aa_buffer { |
| struct list_head list; |
| char buffer[1]; |
| }; |
| |
| #define RESERVE_COUNT 2 |
| static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT; |
| static int buffer_count; |
| |
| static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers); |
| static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock); |
| |
| /* |
| * LSM hook functions |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * put the associated labels |
| */ |
| static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
| { |
| aa_put_label(cred_label(cred)); |
| set_cred_label(cred, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
| { |
| set_cred_label(cred, NULL); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
| gfp_t gfp) |
| { |
| set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds |
| */ |
| static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
| { |
| set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); |
| } |
| |
| static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) |
| { |
| |
| aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task)); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, |
| unsigned long clone_flags) |
| { |
| struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task); |
| |
| aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current)); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
| unsigned int mode) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; |
| int error; |
| |
| tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| tracee = aa_get_task_label(child); |
| error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, |
| (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ |
| : AA_PTRACE_TRACE); |
| aa_put_label(tracee); |
| __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; |
| int error; |
| |
| tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent); |
| error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE); |
| aa_put_label(tracer); |
| __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ |
| static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
| kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| const struct cred *cred; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| cred = __task_cred(target); |
| label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); |
| |
| /* |
| * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will |
| * initialize effective and permitted. |
| */ |
| if (!unconfined(label)) { |
| struct aa_profile *profile; |
| struct label_it i; |
| |
| label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { |
| if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) |
| continue; |
| *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, |
| profile->caps.allow); |
| *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, |
| profile->caps.allow); |
| } |
| } |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| aa_put_label(label); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, |
| int cap, unsigned int opts) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); |
| if (!unconfined(label)) |
| error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts); |
| aa_put_label(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths |
| * @op: operation being checked |
| * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) |
| * @mask: requested permissions mask |
| * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
| * |
| * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
| */ |
| static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask, |
| struct path_cond *cond) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| if (!unconfined(label)) |
| error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond); |
| __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond |
| * @op: operation being checked |
| * @path: location to check (NOT NULL) |
| * @mask: requested permissions mask |
| * |
| * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
| */ |
| static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask) |
| { |
| struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt); |
| struct path_cond cond = { |
| i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, d_backing_inode(path->dentry)), |
| d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode |
| }; |
| |
| if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry |
| * @op: operation being checked |
| * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) |
| * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) |
| * @mask: requested permissions mask |
| * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
| * |
| * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
| */ |
| static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir, |
| struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, |
| struct path_cond *cond) |
| { |
| struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry }; |
| |
| return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm |
| * @op: operation being checked |
| * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) |
| * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) |
| * @mask: requested permission mask |
| * |
| * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
| */ |
| static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir, |
| struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) |
| { |
| struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
| struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(dir->mnt); |
| struct path_cond cond = { }; |
| |
| if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| cond.uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); |
| cond.mode = inode->i_mode; |
| |
| return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create |
| * @op: operation being checked |
| * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) |
| * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) |
| * @mask: request permission mask |
| * @mode: created file mode |
| * |
| * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
| */ |
| static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir, |
| struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode) |
| { |
| struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; |
| |
| if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
| { |
| return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
| umode_t mode) |
| { |
| return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
| S_IFDIR); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
| { |
| return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
| umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) |
| { |
| return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path) |
| { |
| return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
| const char *old_name) |
| { |
| return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
| S_IFLNK); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, |
| struct dentry *new_dentry) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| if (!unconfined(label)) |
| error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); |
| end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
| const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| if (!unconfined(label)) { |
| struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(old_dir->mnt); |
| struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt, |
| .dentry = old_dentry }; |
| struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, |
| .dentry = new_dentry }; |
| struct path_cond cond = { |
| i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, d_backing_inode(old_dentry)), |
| d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode |
| }; |
| |
| error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0, |
| MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | |
| AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, |
| &cond); |
| if (!error) |
| error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path, |
| 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | |
| AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); |
| |
| } |
| end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) |
| { |
| return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) |
| { |
| return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) |
| { |
| return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) |
| { |
| struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. |
| * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with |
| * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to |
| * actually execute the image. |
| */ |
| if (current->in_execve) { |
| fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred); |
| if (!unconfined(label)) { |
| struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = file_mnt_user_ns(file); |
| struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); |
| struct path_cond cond = { |
| i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), |
| inode->i_mode |
| }; |
| |
| error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0, |
| aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); |
| /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ |
| fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); |
| } |
| aa_put_label(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
| { |
| struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); |
| struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| |
| spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); |
| rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); |
| end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
| { |
| struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); |
| |
| if (ctx) |
| aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)); |
| } |
| |
| static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask, |
| bool in_atomic) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| /* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */ |
| if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry) |
| return -EACCES; |
| |
| label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask, in_atomic); |
| __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file) |
| { |
| return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file), |
| false); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
| { |
| return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask, false); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
| { |
| u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; |
| |
| if (cmd == F_WRLCK) |
| mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
| |
| return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask, false); |
| } |
| |
| static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, |
| unsigned long flags, bool in_atomic) |
| { |
| int mask = 0; |
| |
| if (!file || !file_ctx(file)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (prot & PROT_READ) |
| mask |= MAY_READ; |
| /* |
| * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't |
| * write back to the files |
| */ |
| if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) |
| mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
| if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
| mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
| |
| return common_file_perm(op, file, mask, in_atomic); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
| unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) |
| { |
| return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags, GFP_ATOMIC); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
| unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) |
| { |
| return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, |
| !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0, |
| false); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, |
| const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| /* Discard magic */ |
| if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) |
| flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; |
| |
| flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; |
| |
| label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| if (!unconfined(label)) { |
| if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) |
| error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data); |
| else if (flags & MS_BIND) |
| error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags); |
| else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | |
| MS_UNBINDABLE)) |
| error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags); |
| else if (flags & MS_MOVE) |
| error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name); |
| else |
| error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type, |
| flags, data); |
| } |
| __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| if (!unconfined(label)) |
| error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags); |
| __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, |
| const struct path *new_path) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| label = aa_get_current_label(); |
| if (!unconfined(label)) |
| error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path); |
| aa_put_label(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, |
| char **value) |
| { |
| int error = -ENOENT; |
| /* released below */ |
| const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); |
| struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); |
| struct aa_label *label = NULL; |
| |
| if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) |
| label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred)); |
| else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous) |
| label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); |
| else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec) |
| label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec); |
| else |
| error = -EINVAL; |
| |
| if (label) |
| error = aa_getprocattr(label, value); |
| |
| aa_put_label(label); |
| put_cred(cred); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, |
| size_t size) |
| { |
| char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value; |
| size_t arg_size; |
| int error; |
| DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR); |
| |
| if (size == 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ |
| if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { |
| /* null terminate */ |
| largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!args) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| memcpy(args, value, size); |
| args[size] = '\0'; |
| } |
| |
| error = -EINVAL; |
| args = strim(args); |
| command = strsep(&args, " "); |
| if (!args) |
| goto out; |
| args = skip_spaces(args); |
| if (!*args) |
| goto out; |
| |
| arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value)); |
| if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { |
| if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { |
| error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
| AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); |
| } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { |
| error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
| AA_CHANGE_TEST); |
| } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { |
| error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); |
| } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { |
| error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST); |
| } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) { |
| error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK); |
| } else |
| goto fail; |
| } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { |
| if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0) |
| error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC); |
| else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) |
| error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC | |
| AA_CHANGE_STACK)); |
| else |
| goto fail; |
| } else |
| /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ |
| goto fail; |
| |
| if (!error) |
| error = size; |
| out: |
| kfree(largs); |
| return error; |
| |
| fail: |
| aad(&sa)->label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| aad(&sa)->info = name; |
| aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL; |
| aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL); |
| end_current_label_crit_section(aad(&sa)->label); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds |
| * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) |
| */ |
| static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label(); |
| struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred); |
| |
| /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ |
| if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) || |
| (unconfined(new_label))) |
| return; |
| |
| aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files); |
| |
| current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
| |
| /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */ |
| __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_bprm_committed_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed |
| * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) |
| */ |
| static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| { |
| /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */ |
| aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current)); |
| |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p); |
| *secid = label->secid; |
| aa_put_label(label); |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, |
| unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| if (!unconfined(label)) |
| error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim); |
| __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info, |
| int sig, const struct cred *cred) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *cl, *tl; |
| int error; |
| |
| if (cred) { |
| /* |
| * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior |
| */ |
| cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); |
| tl = aa_get_task_label(target); |
| error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); |
| aa_put_label(cl); |
| aa_put_label(tl); |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| tl = aa_get_task_label(target); |
| error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); |
| aa_put_label(tl); |
| __end_current_label_crit_section(cl); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) |
| { |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags); |
| if (!ctx) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| SK_CTX(sk) = ctx; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field |
| */ |
| static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) |
| { |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
| |
| SK_CTX(sk) = NULL; |
| aa_put_label(ctx->label); |
| aa_put_label(ctx->peer); |
| kfree(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field |
| */ |
| static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, |
| struct sock *newsk) |
| { |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); |
| |
| if (new->label) |
| aa_put_label(new->label); |
| new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); |
| |
| if (new->peer) |
| aa_put_label(new->peer); |
| new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
| |
| label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) |
| error = af_select(family, |
| create_perm(label, family, type, protocol), |
| aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
| family, type, protocol)); |
| end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct |
| * |
| * Note: |
| * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to |
| * move to a special kernel label |
| * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or |
| * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in |
| * sock_graft. |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, |
| int type, int protocol, int kern) |
| { |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| |
| if (kern) { |
| struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns(); |
| |
| label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns)); |
| aa_put_ns(ns); |
| } else |
| label = aa_get_current_label(); |
| |
| if (sock->sk) { |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk); |
| |
| aa_put_label(ctx->label); |
| ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); |
| } |
| aa_put_label(label); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, |
| struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
| { |
| AA_BUG(!sock); |
| AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
| AA_BUG(!address); |
| AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
| |
| return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
| bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen), |
| aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk)); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, |
| struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
| { |
| AA_BUG(!sock); |
| AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
| AA_BUG(!address); |
| AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
| |
| return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
| connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen), |
| aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk)); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) |
| { |
| AA_BUG(!sock); |
| AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
| AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
| |
| return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
| listen_perm(sock, backlog), |
| aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk)); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection. |
| * |
| * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept |
| * has not been done. |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) |
| { |
| AA_BUG(!sock); |
| AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
| AA_BUG(!newsock); |
| AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
| |
| return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
| accept_perm(sock, newsock), |
| aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk)); |
| } |
| |
| static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, |
| struct msghdr *msg, int size) |
| { |
| AA_BUG(!sock); |
| AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
| AA_BUG(!msg); |
| AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
| |
| return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
| msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size), |
| aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, |
| struct msghdr *msg, int size) |
| { |
| return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, |
| struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) |
| { |
| return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); |
| } |
| |
| /* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ |
| static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) |
| { |
| AA_BUG(!sock); |
| AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
| AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
| |
| return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
| sock_perm(op, request, sock), |
| aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) |
| { |
| return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) |
| { |
| return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); |
| } |
| |
| /* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ |
| static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, |
| int level, int optname) |
| { |
| AA_BUG(!sock); |
| AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
| AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
| |
| return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
| opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname), |
| aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
| int optname) |
| { |
| return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, |
| level, optname); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
| int optname) |
| { |
| return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, |
| level, optname); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) |
| { |
| return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk |
| * |
| * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held |
| * |
| * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() |
| * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
| { |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
| |
| if (!skb->secmark) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, |
| skb->secmark, sk); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) |
| { |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
| |
| if (ctx->peer) |
| return ctx->peer; |
| |
| return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer |
| * |
| * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, |
| char __user *optval, |
| int __user *optlen, |
| unsigned int len) |
| { |
| char *name; |
| int slen, error = 0; |
| struct aa_label *label; |
| struct aa_label *peer; |
| |
| label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
| peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); |
| if (IS_ERR(peer)) { |
| error = PTR_ERR(peer); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, |
| FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | |
| FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); |
| /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ |
| if (slen < 0) { |
| error = -ENOMEM; |
| } else { |
| if (slen > len) { |
| error = -ERANGE; |
| } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) { |
| error = -EFAULT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (put_user(slen, optlen)) |
| error = -EFAULT; |
| out: |
| kfree(name); |
| |
| } |
| |
| done: |
| end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet |
| * @sock: the peer socket |
| * @skb: packet data |
| * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet |
| * |
| * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent |
| */ |
| static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, |
| struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) |
| |
| { |
| /* TODO: requires secid support */ |
| return -ENOPROTOOPT; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket |
| * @sk: child sock |
| * @parent: parent socket |
| * |
| * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can |
| * just set sk security information off of current creating process label |
| * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based |
| * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled |
| * socket is shared by different tasks. |
| */ |
| static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) |
| { |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
| |
| if (!ctx->label) |
| ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
| static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
| struct request_sock *req) |
| { |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
| |
| if (!skb->secmark) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, |
| skb->secmark, sk); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_task_ctx. |
| */ |
| struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { |
| .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *), |
| .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), |
| .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), |
| }; |
| |
| static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), |
| #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), |
| #endif |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, |
| apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, |
| apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), |
| #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request), |
| #endif |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, apparmor_task_getsecid), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free), |
| #endif |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx), |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * AppArmor sysfs module parameters |
| */ |
| |
| static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool |
| static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { |
| .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, |
| .set = param_set_aabool, |
| .get = param_get_aabool |
| }; |
| |
| static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint |
| static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { |
| .set = param_set_aauint, |
| .get = param_get_aauint |
| }; |
| |
| static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, |
| const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, |
| const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| #define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int |
| static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = { |
| .set = param_set_aacompressionlevel, |
| .get = param_get_aacompressionlevel |
| }; |
| |
| static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool |
| static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { |
| .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, |
| .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, |
| .get = param_get_aalockpolicy |
| }; |
| |
| static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| |
| static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| |
| /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters |
| * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. |
| */ |
| |
| /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ |
| enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; |
| module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, |
| &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
| |
| /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */ |
| bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH |
| module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* policy loaddata compression level */ |
| int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION; |
| module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, |
| aacompressionlevel, 0400); |
| |
| /* Debug mode */ |
| bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES); |
| module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
| |
| /* Audit mode */ |
| enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; |
| module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, |
| &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
| |
| /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This |
| * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running |
| */ |
| bool aa_g_audit_header = true; |
| module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, |
| S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
| |
| /* lock out loading/removal of policy |
| * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to |
| * load policy, if lock_policy is set |
| */ |
| bool aa_g_lock_policy; |
| module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, |
| S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
| |
| /* Syscall logging mode */ |
| bool aa_g_logsyscall; |
| module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
| |
| /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ |
| unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; |
| module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); |
| |
| /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification |
| * on the loaded policy is done. |
| * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now |
| * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. |
| */ |
| bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; |
| module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); |
| |
| static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
| #define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int |
| static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = { |
| .set = param_set_aaintbool, |
| .get = param_get_aaintbool |
| }; |
| /* Boot time disable flag */ |
| static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1; |
| module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444); |
| |
| static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) |
| { |
| unsigned long enabled; |
| int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled); |
| if (!error) |
| apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); |
| |
| /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ |
| static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
| } |
| |
| static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
| } |
| |
| static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
| } |
| |
| static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
| } |
| |
| static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| int error; |
| |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */ |
| if (apparmor_initialized) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| error = param_set_uint(val, kp); |
| aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer)); |
| pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); |
| } |
| |
| /* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */ |
| static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| struct kernel_param kp_local; |
| bool value; |
| int error; |
| |
| if (apparmor_initialized) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ |
| value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); |
| memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); |
| kp_local.arg = &value; |
| |
| error = param_set_bool(val, &kp_local); |
| if (!error) |
| *((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg); |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to |
| * 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for |
| * display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM |
| * infrastructure. |
| */ |
| static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| struct kernel_param kp_local; |
| bool value; |
| |
| /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ |
| value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); |
| memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); |
| kp_local.arg = &value; |
| |
| return param_get_bool(buffer, &kp_local); |
| } |
| |
| static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, |
| const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| int error; |
| |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| error = param_set_int(val, kp); |
| |
| aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, |
| Z_NO_COMPRESSION, |
| Z_BEST_COMPRESSION); |
| pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %u\n", |
| aa_g_rawdata_compression_level); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, |
| const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| return param_get_int(buffer, kp); |
| } |
| |
| static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); |
| } |
| |
| static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (!val) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val); |
| if (i < 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| aa_g_audit = i; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); |
| } |
| |
| static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (!val) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX, |
| val); |
| if (i < 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| aa_g_profile_mode = i; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic) |
| { |
| union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
| bool try_again = true; |
| gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
| |
| retry: |
| spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
| if (buffer_count > reserve_count || |
| (in_atomic && !list_empty(&aa_global_buffers))) { |
| aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, |
| list); |
| list_del(&aa_buf->list); |
| buffer_count--; |
| spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
| return &aa_buf->buffer[0]; |
| } |
| if (in_atomic) { |
| /* |
| * out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase |
| * how many buffers to keep in reserve |
| */ |
| reserve_count++; |
| flags = GFP_ATOMIC; |
| } |
| spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
| |
| if (!in_atomic) |
| might_sleep(); |
| aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, flags); |
| if (!aa_buf) { |
| if (try_again) { |
| try_again = false; |
| goto retry; |
| } |
| pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n"); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return &aa_buf->buffer[0]; |
| } |
| |
| void aa_put_buffer(char *buf) |
| { |
| union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
| |
| if (!buf) |
| return; |
| aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]); |
| |
| spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
| list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers); |
| buffer_count++; |
| spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * AppArmor init functions |
| */ |
| |
| /** |
| * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task. |
| * |
| * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined |
| */ |
| static int __init set_init_ctx(void) |
| { |
| struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred; |
| |
| set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns))); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void destroy_buffers(void) |
| { |
| union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
| |
| spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
| while (!list_empty(&aa_global_buffers)) { |
| aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, |
| list); |
| list_del(&aa_buf->list); |
| spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
| kfree(aa_buf); |
| spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
| } |
| spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
| } |
| |
| static int __init alloc_buffers(void) |
| { |
| union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
| int i, num; |
| |
| /* |
| * A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are |
| * used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers |
| * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more |
| * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow. |
| * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be |
| * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high. |
| */ |
| if (num_online_cpus() > 1) |
| num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT; |
| else |
| num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
| |
| aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL | |
| __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
| if (!aa_buf) { |
| destroy_buffers(); |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| aa_put_buffer(&aa_buf->buffer[0]); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL |
| static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, |
| void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
| { |
| if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
| } |
| |
| static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = { |
| { .procname = "kernel", }, |
| { } |
| }; |
| |
| static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { |
| { |
| .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy", |
| .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy, |
| .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
| .mode = 0600, |
| .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, |
| }, |
| { } |
| }; |
| |
| static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void) |
| { |
| return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path, |
| apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| #else |
| static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ |
| |
| #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK) |
| static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv, |
| struct sk_buff *skb, |
| const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
| { |
| struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; |
| struct sock *sk; |
| |
| if (!skb->secmark) |
| return NF_ACCEPT; |
| |
| sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); |
| if (sk == NULL) |
| return NF_ACCEPT; |
| |
| ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
| if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, |
| skb->secmark, sk)) |
| return NF_ACCEPT; |
| |
| return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
| |
| } |
| |
| static unsigned int apparmor_ipv4_postroute(void *priv, |
| struct sk_buff *skb, |
| const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
| { |
| return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state); |
| } |
| |
| #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) |
| static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv, |
| struct sk_buff *skb, |
| const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
| { |
| return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = { |
| { |
| .hook = apparmor_ipv4_postroute, |
| .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |
| .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
| .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
| }, |
| #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) |
| { |
| .hook = apparmor_ipv6_postroute, |
| .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, |
| .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
| .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
| }, |
| #endif |
| }; |
| |
| static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, |
| ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net) |
| { |
| nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, |
| ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); |
| } |
| |
| static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = { |
| .init = apparmor_nf_register, |
| .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister, |
| }; |
| |
| static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void) |
| { |
| int err; |
| |
| if (!apparmor_enabled) |
| return 0; |
| |
| err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops); |
| if (err) |
| panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| __initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init); |
| #endif |
| |
| static int __init apparmor_init(void) |
| { |
| int error; |
| |
| aa_secids_init(); |
| |
| error = aa_setup_dfa_engine(); |
| if (error) { |
| AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n"); |
| goto alloc_out; |
| } |
| |
| error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); |
| if (error) { |
| AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); |
| goto alloc_out; |
| } |
| |
| error = apparmor_init_sysctl(); |
| if (error) { |
| AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n"); |
| goto alloc_out; |
| |
| } |
| |
| error = alloc_buffers(); |
| if (error) { |
| AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n"); |
| goto alloc_out; |
| } |
| |
| error = set_init_ctx(); |
| if (error) { |
| AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); |
| aa_free_root_ns(); |
| goto buffers_out; |
| } |
| security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks), |
| "apparmor"); |
| |
| /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ |
| apparmor_initialized = 1; |
| if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) |
| aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); |
| else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) |
| aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); |
| else |
| aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); |
| |
| return error; |
| |
| buffers_out: |
| destroy_buffers(); |
| alloc_out: |
| aa_destroy_aafs(); |
| aa_teardown_dfa_engine(); |
| |
| apparmor_enabled = false; |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = { |
| .name = "apparmor", |
| .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, |
| .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, |
| .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, |
| .init = apparmor_init, |
| }; |