| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| #include <linux/tboot.h> |
| |
| #include <asm/cpufeature.h> |
| #include <asm/msr-index.h> |
| #include <asm/processor.h> |
| #include <asm/vmx.h> |
| #include "cpu.h" |
| |
| #undef pr_fmt |
| #define pr_fmt(fmt) "x86/cpu: " fmt |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES |
| enum vmx_feature_leafs { |
| MISC_FEATURES = 0, |
| PRIMARY_CTLS, |
| SECONDARY_CTLS, |
| NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS, |
| }; |
| |
| #define VMX_F(x) BIT(VMX_FEATURE_##x & 0x1f) |
| |
| static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) |
| { |
| u32 supported, funcs, ept, vpid, ign; |
| |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(NVMXINTS != NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS); |
| |
| /* |
| * The high bits contain the allowed-1 settings, i.e. features that can |
| * be turned on. The low bits contain the allowed-0 settings, i.e. |
| * features that can be turned off. Ignore the allowed-0 settings, |
| * if a feature can be turned on then it's supported. |
| * |
| * Use raw rdmsr() for primary processor controls and pin controls MSRs |
| * as they exist on any CPU that supports VMX, i.e. we want the WARN if |
| * the RDMSR faults. |
| */ |
| rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS, ign, supported); |
| c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] = supported; |
| |
| rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, &ign, &supported); |
| c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] = supported; |
| |
| rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS, ign, supported); |
| rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC, &ign, &funcs); |
| |
| /* |
| * Except for EPT+VPID, which enumerates support for both in a single |
| * MSR, low for EPT, high for VPID. |
| */ |
| rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP, &ept, &vpid); |
| |
| /* Pin, EPT, VPID and VM-Func are merged into a single word. */ |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(supported >> 16); |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(funcs >> 4); |
| c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] = (supported & 0xffff) | |
| ((vpid & 0x1) << 16) | |
| ((funcs & 0xf) << 28); |
| |
| /* EPT bits are full on scattered and must be manually handled. */ |
| if (ept & VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT) |
| c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY); |
| if (ept & VMX_EPT_AD_BIT) |
| c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_AD); |
| if (ept & VMX_EPT_1GB_PAGE_BIT) |
| c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_1GB); |
| |
| /* Synthetic APIC features that are aggregates of multiple features. */ |
| if ((c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR)) && |
| (c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRT_APIC_ACCESSES))) |
| c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(FLEXPRIORITY); |
| |
| if ((c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR)) && |
| (c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)) && |
| (c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRT_INTR_DELIVERY)) && |
| (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(POSTED_INTR))) |
| c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(APICV); |
| |
| /* Set the synthetic cpufeatures to preserve /proc/cpuinfo's ABI. */ |
| if (c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR)) |
| set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW); |
| if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(FLEXPRIORITY)) |
| set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY); |
| if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_NMIS)) |
| set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VNMI); |
| if (c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(EPT)) |
| set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EPT); |
| if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(EPT_AD)) |
| set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD); |
| if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(VPID)) |
| set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VPID); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */ |
| |
| void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) |
| { |
| bool tboot = tboot_enabled(); |
| u64 msr; |
| |
| if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) { |
| clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) |
| goto update_caps; |
| |
| /* |
| * Ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR to avoid enabling random |
| * features or faulting on the WRMSR. |
| */ |
| msr = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED; |
| |
| /* |
| * Enable VMX if and only if the kernel may do VMXON at some point, |
| * i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector |
| * for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code. |
| */ |
| if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) { |
| msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; |
| |
| if (tboot) |
| msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX; |
| } |
| |
| wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr); |
| |
| update_caps: |
| set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL); |
| |
| if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) |
| return; |
| |
| if ( (tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)) || |
| (!tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX))) { |
| if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) |
| pr_err_once("VMX (%s TXT) disabled by BIOS\n", |
| tboot ? "inside" : "outside"); |
| clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX); |
| } else { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES |
| init_vmx_capabilities(c); |
| #endif |
| } |
| } |