| # Help: Basic kernel hardening options |
| # |
| # These are considered the basic kernel hardening, self-protection, and |
| # attack surface reduction options. They are expected to have low (or |
| # no) performance impact on most workloads, and have a reasonable level |
| # of legacy API removals. |
| |
| # Make sure reporting of various hardening actions is possible. |
| CONFIG_BUG=y |
| |
| # Basic kernel memory permission enforcement. |
| CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y |
| CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y |
| CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y |
| |
| # Kernel image and memory ASLR. |
| CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y |
| CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY=y |
| |
| # Randomize allocator freelists, harden metadata. |
| CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y |
| CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y |
| CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR=y |
| CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES=y |
| |
| # Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry. |
| CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT=y |
| |
| # Basic stack frame overflow protection. |
| CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y |
| CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y |
| |
| # Basic buffer length bounds checking. |
| CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y |
| CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y |
| |
| # Basic array index bounds checking. |
| CONFIG_UBSAN=y |
| CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y |
| CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y |
| # CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT is not set |
| # CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO is not set |
| # CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE is not set |
| # CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP is not set |
| # CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL is not set |
| # CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM is not set |
| # CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT is not set |
| |
| # Sampling-based heap out-of-bounds and use-after-free detection. |
| CONFIG_KFENCE=y |
| |
| # Linked list integrity checking. |
| CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED=y |
| |
| # Initialize all heap variables to zero on allocation. |
| CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y |
| |
| # Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry. |
| CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y |
| |
| # Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI. For more details, see: |
| # https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/ |
| # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058 |
| CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION=y |
| |
| # Disable DMA between EFI hand-off and the kernel's IOMMU setup. |
| CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA=y |
| |
| # Force IOMMU TLB invalidation so devices will never be able to access stale |
| # data content. |
| CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT=y |
| CONFIG_IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT=y |
| |
| # Do not allow direct physical memory access to non-device memory. |
| CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y |
| CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y |
| |
| # Provide userspace with seccomp BPF API for syscall attack surface reduction. |
| CONFIG_SECCOMP=y |
| CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y |
| |
| # Provides some protections against SYN flooding. |
| CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES=y |
| |
| # Attack surface reduction: do not autoload TTY line disciplines. |
| # CONFIG_LDISC_AUTOLOAD is not set |
| |
| # Dangerous; enabling this disables userspace brk ASLR. |
| # CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set |
| |
| # Dangerous; exposes kernel text image layout. |
| # CONFIG_PROC_KCORE is not set |
| |
| # Dangerous; enabling this disables userspace VDSO ASLR. |
| # CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO is not set |
| |
| # Attack surface reduction: Use the modern PTY interface (devpts) only. |
| # CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS is not set |