| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| /* |
| * Verification of builtin signatures |
| * |
| * Copyright 2019 Google LLC |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * This file implements verification of fs-verity builtin signatures. Please |
| * take great care before using this feature. It is not the only way to do |
| * signatures with fs-verity, and the alternatives (such as userspace signature |
| * verification, and IMA appraisal) can be much better. For details about the |
| * limitations of this feature, see Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "fsverity_private.h" |
| |
| #include <linux/cred.h> |
| #include <linux/key.h> |
| #include <linux/security.h> |
| #include <linux/slab.h> |
| #include <linux/verification.h> |
| |
| /* |
| * /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures |
| * If 1, all verity files must have a valid builtin signature. |
| */ |
| int fsverity_require_signatures; |
| |
| /* |
| * Keyring that contains the trusted X.509 certificates. |
| * |
| * Only root (kuid=0) can modify this. Also, root may use |
| * keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent any more additions. |
| */ |
| static struct key *fsverity_keyring; |
| |
| /** |
| * fsverity_verify_signature() - check a verity file's signature |
| * @vi: the file's fsverity_info |
| * @signature: the file's built-in signature |
| * @sig_size: size of signature in bytes, or 0 if no signature |
| * |
| * If the file includes a signature of its fs-verity file digest, verify it |
| * against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. Note that signatures |
| * are verified regardless of the state of the 'fsverity_require_signatures' |
| * variable and the LSM subsystem relies on this behavior to help enforce |
| * file integrity policies. Please discuss changes with the LSM list |
| * (thank you!). |
| * |
| * Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure |
| */ |
| int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, |
| const u8 *signature, size_t sig_size) |
| { |
| const struct inode *inode = vi->inode; |
| const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg; |
| struct fsverity_formatted_digest *d; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (sig_size == 0) { |
| if (fsverity_require_signatures) { |
| fsverity_err(inode, |
| "require_signatures=1, rejecting unsigned file!"); |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (fsverity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree == 0) { |
| /* |
| * The ".fs-verity" keyring is empty, due to builtin signatures |
| * being supported by the kernel but not actually being used. |
| * In this case, verify_pkcs7_signature() would always return an |
| * error, usually ENOKEY. It could also be EBADMSG if the |
| * PKCS#7 is malformed, but that isn't very important to |
| * distinguish. So, just skip to ENOKEY to avoid the attack |
| * surface of the PKCS#7 parser, which would otherwise be |
| * reachable by any task able to execute FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. |
| */ |
| fsverity_err(inode, |
| "fs-verity keyring is empty, rejecting signed file!"); |
| return -ENOKEY; |
| } |
| |
| d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!d) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| memcpy(d->magic, "FSVerity", 8); |
| d->digest_algorithm = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs); |
| d->digest_size = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg->digest_size); |
| memcpy(d->digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size); |
| |
| err = verify_pkcs7_signature(d, sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, |
| signature, sig_size, fsverity_keyring, |
| VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, |
| NULL, NULL); |
| kfree(d); |
| |
| if (err) { |
| if (err == -ENOKEY) |
| fsverity_err(inode, |
| "File's signing cert isn't in the fs-verity keyring"); |
| else if (err == -EKEYREJECTED) |
| fsverity_err(inode, "Incorrect file signature"); |
| else if (err == -EBADMSG) |
| fsverity_err(inode, "Malformed file signature"); |
| else |
| fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d verifying file signature", |
| err); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| err = security_inode_setintegrity(inode, |
| LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID, |
| signature, |
| sig_size); |
| |
| if (err) { |
| fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d exposing file signature to LSMs", |
| err); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void __init fsverity_init_signature(void) |
| { |
| fsverity_keyring = |
| keyring_alloc(".fs-verity", KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), |
| current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH | |
| KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE | |
| KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_SETATTR, |
| KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); |
| if (IS_ERR(fsverity_keyring)) |
| panic("failed to allocate \".fs-verity\" keyring"); |
| } |