| /* |
| * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module |
| * |
| * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations. |
| * |
| * Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com> |
| * Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com> |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, |
| * as published by the Free Software Foundation. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * USAGE: |
| * NOTES: |
| * 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config: |
| * CONFIG_SECURITY=y |
| * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y |
| * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y |
| * CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y |
| * ISSUES: |
| * 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation |
| * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines |
| * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt |
| */ |
| #include <linux/config.h> |
| #include <linux/module.h> |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| #include <linux/init.h> |
| #include <linux/security.h> |
| #include <linux/types.h> |
| #include <linux/netfilter.h> |
| #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> |
| #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> |
| #include <linux/ip.h> |
| #include <linux/tcp.h> |
| #include <linux/skbuff.h> |
| #include <linux/xfrm.h> |
| #include <net/xfrm.h> |
| #include <net/checksum.h> |
| #include <net/udp.h> |
| #include <asm/semaphore.h> |
| |
| #include "avc.h" |
| #include "objsec.h" |
| #include "xfrm.h" |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context |
| */ |
| static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) |
| { |
| return (ctx && |
| (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) && |
| (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux |
| */ |
| static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) |
| { |
| return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a socket can be used |
| * with the corresponding xfrm_sec_ctx and direction. |
| */ |
| int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) |
| { |
| int rc = 0; |
| u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
| struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ |
| if ((ctx = xp->security)) { |
| if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; |
| } |
| |
| rc = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, |
| ((dir == FLOW_DIR_IN) ? ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM : |
| ((dir == FLOW_DIR_OUT) ? ASSOCIATION__SENDTO : |
| (ASSOCIATION__SENDTO | ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM))), |
| NULL); |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state |
| * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input |
| */ |
| static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) |
| { |
| int rc = 0; |
| struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; |
| struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| BUG_ON(!uctx); |
| BUG_ON(uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX); |
| |
| if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + |
| uctx->ctx_len, |
| GFP_KERNEL); |
| |
| if (!ctx) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi; |
| ctx->ctx_len = uctx->ctx_len; |
| ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg; |
| |
| memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, |
| uctx+1, |
| ctx->ctx_len); |
| rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, |
| ctx->ctx_len, |
| &ctx->ctx_sid); |
| |
| if (rc) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* |
| * Does the subject have permission to set security or permission to |
| * do the relabel? |
| * Must be permitted to relabel from default socket type (process type) |
| * to specified context |
| */ |
| rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, |
| SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, |
| ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); |
| if (rc) |
| goto out; |
| |
| return rc; |
| |
| out: |
| *ctxp = NULL; |
| kfree(ctx); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to |
| * xfrm_policy. |
| */ |
| int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) |
| { |
| int err; |
| |
| BUG_ON(!xp); |
| |
| err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to |
| * new for policy cloning. |
| */ |
| int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new) |
| { |
| struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx; |
| |
| old_ctx = old->security; |
| |
| if (old_ctx) { |
| new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) + |
| old_ctx->ctx_len, |
| GFP_KERNEL); |
| |
| if (!new_ctx) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx)); |
| memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information. |
| */ |
| void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp) |
| { |
| struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security; |
| if (ctx) |
| kfree(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to |
| * xfrm_state. |
| */ |
| int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) |
| { |
| int err; |
| |
| BUG_ON(!x); |
| |
| err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information. |
| */ |
| void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) |
| { |
| struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; |
| if (ctx) |
| kfree(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected |
| * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security |
| * association used to connect to the remote socket. |
| * |
| * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC. |
| */ |
| u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk) |
| { |
| struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test; |
| u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; |
| |
| if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) |
| goto out; |
| |
| dst = sk_dst_get(sk); |
| if (!dst) |
| goto out; |
| |
| for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0; |
| dst_test = dst_test->child) { |
| struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm; |
| |
| if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { |
| struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; |
| peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| dst_release(dst); |
| |
| out: |
| return peer_sid; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet |
| * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket. |
| * |
| * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message |
| * type SCM_SECURITY. |
| */ |
| u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb) |
| { |
| struct sec_path *sp; |
| |
| if (skb == NULL) |
| return SECSID_NULL; |
| |
| if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) |
| return SECSID_NULL; |
| |
| sp = skb->sp; |
| if (sp) { |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| struct xfrm_state *x = sp->x[i].xvec; |
| if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { |
| struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; |
| return ctx->ctx_sid; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return SECSID_NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If |
| * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was |
| * already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then |
| * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have |
| * gone thru the IPSec process. |
| */ |
| int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) |
| { |
| int i, rc = 0; |
| struct sec_path *sp; |
| |
| sp = skb->sp; |
| |
| if (sp) { |
| /* |
| * __xfrm_policy_check does not approve unless xfrm_policy_ok |
| * says that spi's match for policy and the socket. |
| * |
| * Only need to verify the existence of an authorizable sp. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) { |
| struct xfrm_state *x = sp->x[i].xvec; |
| |
| if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) |
| goto accept; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* check SELinux sock for unlabelled access */ |
| rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, |
| ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, NULL); |
| if (rc) |
| goto drop; |
| |
| accept: |
| return 0; |
| |
| drop: |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing: |
| * If we have no security association, then we need to determine |
| * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination. |
| * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been |
| * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook. |
| */ |
| int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) |
| { |
| struct dst_entry *dst; |
| int rc = 0; |
| |
| dst = skb->dst; |
| |
| if (dst) { |
| struct dst_entry *dst_test; |
| |
| for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0; |
| dst_test = dst_test->child) { |
| struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm; |
| |
| if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) |
| goto accept; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, |
| ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL); |
| if (rc) |
| goto drop; |
| |
| accept: |
| return NF_ACCEPT; |
| |
| drop: |
| return NF_DROP; |
| } |