| .. _perf_security: | |
| Perf Events and tool security | |
| ============================= | |
| Overview | |
| -------- | |
| Usage of Performance Counters for Linux (perf_events) [1]_ , [2]_ , [3]_ | |
| can impose a considerable risk of leaking sensitive data accessed by | |
| monitored processes. The data leakage is possible both in scenarios of | |
| direct usage of perf_events system call API [2]_ and over data files | |
| generated by Perf tool user mode utility (Perf) [3]_ , [4]_ . The risk | |
| depends on the nature of data that perf_events performance monitoring | |
| units (PMU) [2]_ and Perf collect and expose for performance analysis. | |
| Collected system and performance data may be split into several | |
| categories: | |
| 1. System hardware and software configuration data, for example: a CPU | |
| model and its cache configuration, an amount of available memory and | |
| its topology, used kernel and Perf versions, performance monitoring | |
| setup including experiment time, events configuration, Perf command | |
| line parameters, etc. | |
| 2. User and kernel module paths and their load addresses with sizes, | |
| process and thread names with their PIDs and TIDs, timestamps for | |
| captured hardware and software events. | |
| 3. Content of kernel software counters (e.g., for context switches, page | |
| faults, CPU migrations), architectural hardware performance counters | |
| (PMC) [8]_ and machine specific registers (MSR) [9]_ that provide | |
| execution metrics for various monitored parts of the system (e.g., | |
| memory controller (IMC), interconnect (QPI/UPI) or peripheral (PCIe) | |
| uncore counters) without direct attribution to any execution context | |
| state. | |
| 4. Content of architectural execution context registers (e.g., RIP, RSP, | |
| RBP on x86_64), process user and kernel space memory addresses and | |
| data, content of various architectural MSRs that capture data from | |
| this category. | |
| Data that belong to the fourth category can potentially contain | |
| sensitive process data. If PMUs in some monitoring modes capture values | |
| of execution context registers or data from process memory then access | |
| to such monitoring capabilities requires to be ordered and secured | |
| properly. So, perf_events/Perf performance monitoring is the subject for | |
| security access control management [5]_ . | |
| perf_events/Perf access control | |
| ------------------------------- | |
| To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes | |
| into two categories [6]_ : a) privileged processes (whose effective user | |
| ID is 0, referred to as superuser or root), and b) unprivileged | |
| processes (whose effective UID is nonzero). Privileged processes bypass | |
| all kernel security permission checks so perf_events performance | |
| monitoring is fully available to privileged processes without access, | |
| scope and resource restrictions. | |
| Unprivileged processes are subject to a full security permission check | |
| based on the process's credentials [5]_ (usually: effective UID, | |
| effective GID, and supplementary group list). | |
| Linux divides the privileges traditionally associated with superuser | |
| into distinct units, known as capabilities [6]_ , which can be | |
| independently enabled and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and | |
| files of unprivileged users. | |
| Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated | |
| as privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance | |
| monitoring and bypass *scope* permissions checks in the kernel. | |
| Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject | |
| for PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check [7]_ , whose | |
| outcome determines whether monitoring is permitted. So unprivileged | |
| processes provided with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively | |
| permitted to pass the check. | |
| Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can | |
| effectively enable capturing of additional data required for later | |
| performance analysis of monitored processes or a system. For example, | |
| CAP_SYSLOG capability permits reading kernel space memory addresses from | |
| /proc/kallsyms file. | |
| perf_events/Perf privileged users | |
| --------------------------------- | |
| Mechanisms of capabilities, privileged capability-dumb files [6]_ and | |
| file system ACLs [10]_ can be used to create a dedicated group of | |
| perf_events/Perf privileged users who are permitted to execute | |
| performance monitoring without scope limits. The following steps can be | |
| taken to create such a group of privileged Perf users. | |
| 1. Create perf_users group of privileged Perf users, assign perf_users | |
| group to Perf tool executable and limit access to the executable for | |
| other users in the system who are not in the perf_users group: | |
| :: | |
| # groupadd perf_users | |
| # ls -alhF | |
| -rwxr-xr-x 2 root root 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf | |
| # chgrp perf_users perf | |
| # ls -alhF | |
| -rwxr-xr-x 2 root perf_users 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf | |
| # chmod o-rwx perf | |
| # ls -alhF | |
| -rwxr-x--- 2 root perf_users 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf | |
| 2. Assign the required capabilities to the Perf tool executable file and | |
| enable members of perf_users group with performance monitoring | |
| privileges [6]_ : | |
| :: | |
| # setcap "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf | |
| # setcap -v "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf | |
| perf: OK | |
| # getcap perf | |
| perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_sys_admin,cap_syslog+ep | |
| As a result, members of perf_users group are capable of conducting | |
| performance monitoring by using functionality of the configured Perf | |
| tool executable that, when executes, passes perf_events subsystem scope | |
| checks. | |
| This specific access control management is only available to superuser | |
| or root running processes with CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_SETFCAP [6]_ | |
| capabilities. | |
| perf_events/Perf unprivileged users | |
| ----------------------------------- | |
| perf_events/Perf *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes | |
| is governed by perf_event_paranoid [2]_ setting: | |
| -1: | |
| Impose no *scope* and *access* restrictions on using perf_events | |
| performance monitoring. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ | |
| locking limit is ignored when allocating memory buffers for storing | |
| performance data. This is the least secure mode since allowed | |
| monitored *scope* is maximized and no perf_events specific limits | |
| are imposed on *resources* allocated for performance monitoring. | |
| >=0: | |
| *scope* includes per-process and system wide performance monitoring | |
| but excludes raw tracepoints and ftrace function tracepoints | |
| monitoring. CPU and system events happened when executing either in | |
| user or in kernel space can be monitored and captured for later | |
| analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is | |
| imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK | |
| [6]_ capability. | |
| >=1: | |
| *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only and | |
| excludes system wide performance monitoring. CPU and system events | |
| happened when executing either in user or in kernel space can be | |
| monitored and captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu | |
| perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but ignored for | |
| unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. | |
| >=2: | |
| *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only. CPU and | |
| system events happened when executing in user space only can be | |
| monitored and captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu | |
| perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but ignored for | |
| unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. | |
| perf_events/Perf resource control | |
| --------------------------------- | |
| Open file descriptors | |
| +++++++++++++++++++++ | |
| The perf_events system call API [2]_ allocates file descriptors for | |
| every configured PMU event. Open file descriptors are a per-process | |
| accountable resource governed by the RLIMIT_NOFILE [11]_ limit | |
| (ulimit -n), which is usually derived from the login shell process. When | |
| configuring Perf collection for a long list of events on a large server | |
| system, this limit can be easily hit preventing required monitoring | |
| configuration. RLIMIT_NOFILE limit can be increased on per-user basis | |
| modifying content of the limits.conf file [12]_ . Ordinarily, a Perf | |
| sampling session (perf record) requires an amount of open perf_event | |
| file descriptors that is not less than the number of monitored events | |
| multiplied by the number of monitored CPUs. | |
| Memory allocation | |
| +++++++++++++++++ | |
| The amount of memory available to user processes for capturing | |
| performance monitoring data is governed by the perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ | |
| setting. This perf_event specific resource setting defines overall | |
| per-cpu limits of memory allowed for mapping by the user processes to | |
| execute performance monitoring. The setting essentially extends the | |
| RLIMIT_MEMLOCK [11]_ limit, but only for memory regions mapped | |
| specifically for capturing monitored performance events and related data. | |
| For example, if a machine has eight cores and perf_event_mlock_kb limit | |
| is set to 516 KiB, then a user process is provided with 516 KiB * 8 = | |
| 4128 KiB of memory above the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit (ulimit -l) for | |
| perf_event mmap buffers. In particular, this means that, if the user | |
| wants to start two or more performance monitoring processes, the user is | |
| required to manually distribute the available 4128 KiB between the | |
| monitoring processes, for example, using the --mmap-pages Perf record | |
| mode option. Otherwise, the first started performance monitoring process | |
| allocates all available 4128 KiB and the other processes will fail to | |
| proceed due to the lack of memory. | |
| RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and perf_event_mlock_kb resource constraints are ignored | |
| for processes with the CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. Thus, perf_events/Perf | |
| privileged users can be provided with memory above the constraints for | |
| perf_events/Perf performance monitoring purpose by providing the Perf | |
| executable with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. | |
| Bibliography | |
| ------------ | |
| .. [1] `<https://lwn.net/Articles/337493/>`_ | |
| .. [2] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html>`_ | |
| .. [3] `<http://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/perf_events/>`_ | |
| .. [4] `<https://perf.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/Main_Page>`_ | |
| .. [5] `<https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html>`_ | |
| .. [6] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html>`_ | |
| .. [7] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html>`_ | |
| .. [8] `<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_performance_counter>`_ | |
| .. [9] `<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-specific_register>`_ | |
| .. [10] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/acl.5.html>`_ | |
| .. [11] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrlimit.2.html>`_ | |
| .. [12] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/limits.conf.5.html>`_ | |