| ========================================== | |
| Encrypted keys for the eCryptfs filesystem | |
| ========================================== | |
| ECryptfs is a stacked filesystem which transparently encrypts and decrypts each | |
| file using a randomly generated File Encryption Key (FEK). | |
| Each FEK is in turn encrypted with a File Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) | |
| either in kernel space or in user space with a daemon called 'ecryptfsd'. In | |
| the former case the operation is performed directly by the kernel CryptoAPI | |
| using a key, the FEKEK, derived from a user prompted passphrase; in the latter | |
| the FEK is encrypted by 'ecryptfsd' with the help of external libraries in order | |
| to support other mechanisms like public key cryptography, PKCS#11 and TPM based | |
| operations. | |
| The data structure defined by eCryptfs to contain information required for the | |
| FEK decryption is called authentication token and, currently, can be stored in a | |
| kernel key of the 'user' type, inserted in the user's session specific keyring | |
| by the userspace utility 'mount.ecryptfs' shipped with the package | |
| 'ecryptfs-utils'. | |
| The 'encrypted' key type has been extended with the introduction of the new | |
| format 'ecryptfs' in order to be used in conjunction with the eCryptfs | |
| filesystem. Encrypted keys of the newly introduced format store an | |
| authentication token in its payload with a FEKEK randomly generated by the | |
| kernel and protected by the parent master key. | |
| In order to avoid known-plaintext attacks, the datablob obtained through | |
| commands 'keyctl print' or 'keyctl pipe' does not contain the overall | |
| authentication token, which content is well known, but only the FEKEK in | |
| encrypted form. | |
| The eCryptfs filesystem may really benefit from using encrypted keys in that the | |
| required key can be securely generated by an Administrator and provided at boot | |
| time after the unsealing of a 'trusted' key in order to perform the mount in a | |
| controlled environment. Another advantage is that the key is not exposed to | |
| threats of malicious software, because it is available in clear form only at | |
| kernel level. | |
| Usage:: | |
| keyctl add encrypted name "new ecryptfs key-type:master-key-name keylen" ring | |
| keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring | |
| keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name" | |
| Where:: | |
| name:= '<16 hexadecimal characters>' | |
| key-type:= 'trusted' | 'user' | |
| keylen:= 64 | |
| Example of encrypted key usage with the eCryptfs filesystem: | |
| Create an encrypted key "1000100010001000" of length 64 bytes with format | |
| 'ecryptfs' and save it using a previously loaded user key "test":: | |
| $ keyctl add encrypted 1000100010001000 "new ecryptfs user:test 64" @u | |
| 19184530 | |
| $ keyctl print 19184530 | |
| ecryptfs user:test 64 490045d4bfe48c99f0d465fbbbb79e7500da954178e2de0697 | |
| dd85091f5450a0511219e9f7cd70dcd498038181466f78ac8d4c19504fcc72402bfc41c2 | |
| f253a41b7507ccaa4b2b03fff19a69d1cc0b16e71746473f023a95488b6edfd86f7fdd40 | |
| 9d292e4bacded1258880122dd553a661 | |
| $ keyctl pipe 19184530 > ecryptfs.blob | |
| Mount an eCryptfs filesystem using the created encrypted key "1000100010001000" | |
| into the '/secret' directory:: | |
| $ mount -i -t ecryptfs -oecryptfs_sig=1000100010001000,\ | |
| ecryptfs_cipher=aes,ecryptfs_key_bytes=32 /secret /secret |