| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| /* |
| * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value |
| * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature |
| * ported from grsecurity/PaX. |
| * |
| * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> |
| * |
| * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can |
| * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/stackleak.h> |
| #include <linux/kprobes.h> |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE |
| #include <linux/jump_label.h> |
| #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
| |
| static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass); |
| |
| int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write, |
| void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass); |
| int prev_state = state; |
| |
| table->data = &state; |
| table->maxlen = sizeof(int); |
| ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
| state = !!state; |
| if (ret || !write || state == prev_state) |
| return ret; |
| |
| if (state) |
| static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass); |
| else |
| static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass); |
| |
| pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n", |
| state ? "enabled" : "disabled"); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass) |
| #else |
| #define skip_erasing() false |
| #endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */ |
| |
| asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase(void) |
| { |
| /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */ |
| unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack; |
| unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current); |
| unsigned int poison_count = 0; |
| const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); |
| |
| if (skip_erasing()) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */ |
| if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE)) |
| kstack_ptr = boundary; |
| |
| /* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */ |
| while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) { |
| if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON) |
| poison_count++; |
| else |
| poison_count = 0; |
| |
| kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and |
| * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y). |
| */ |
| if (kstack_ptr == boundary) |
| kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long); |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS |
| current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from |
| * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that |
| * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison. |
| */ |
| if (on_thread_stack()) |
| boundary = current_stack_pointer; |
| else |
| boundary = current_top_of_stack(); |
| |
| while (kstack_ptr < boundary) { |
| *(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON; |
| kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long); |
| } |
| |
| /* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */ |
| current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64; |
| } |
| |
| void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void) |
| { |
| unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer; |
| |
| /* |
| * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than |
| * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in |
| * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that. |
| */ |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH); |
| |
| /* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */ |
| sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long)); |
| if (sp < current->lowest_stack && |
| sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) + |
| sizeof(unsigned long)) { |
| current->lowest_stack = sp; |
| } |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack); |