| ================================== |
| VFIO - "Virtual Function I/O" [1]_ |
| ================================== |
| |
| Many modern systems now provide DMA and interrupt remapping facilities |
| to help ensure I/O devices behave within the boundaries they've been |
| allotted. This includes x86 hardware with AMD-Vi and Intel VT-d, |
| POWER systems with Partitionable Endpoints (PEs) and embedded PowerPC |
| systems such as Freescale PAMU. The VFIO driver is an IOMMU/device |
| agnostic framework for exposing direct device access to userspace, in |
| a secure, IOMMU protected environment. In other words, this allows |
| safe [2]_, non-privileged, userspace drivers. |
| |
| Why do we want that? Virtual machines often make use of direct device |
| access ("device assignment") when configured for the highest possible |
| I/O performance. From a device and host perspective, this simply |
| turns the VM into a userspace driver, with the benefits of |
| significantly reduced latency, higher bandwidth, and direct use of |
| bare-metal device drivers [3]_. |
| |
| Some applications, particularly in the high performance computing |
| field, also benefit from low-overhead, direct device access from |
| userspace. Examples include network adapters (often non-TCP/IP based) |
| and compute accelerators. Prior to VFIO, these drivers had to either |
| go through the full development cycle to become proper upstream |
| driver, be maintained out of tree, or make use of the UIO framework, |
| which has no notion of IOMMU protection, limited interrupt support, |
| and requires root privileges to access things like PCI configuration |
| space. |
| |
| The VFIO driver framework intends to unify these, replacing both the |
| KVM PCI specific device assignment code as well as provide a more |
| secure, more featureful userspace driver environment than UIO. |
| |
| Groups, Devices, and IOMMUs |
| --------------------------- |
| |
| Devices are the main target of any I/O driver. Devices typically |
| create a programming interface made up of I/O access, interrupts, |
| and DMA. Without going into the details of each of these, DMA is |
| by far the most critical aspect for maintaining a secure environment |
| as allowing a device read-write access to system memory imposes the |
| greatest risk to the overall system integrity. |
| |
| To help mitigate this risk, many modern IOMMUs now incorporate |
| isolation properties into what was, in many cases, an interface only |
| meant for translation (ie. solving the addressing problems of devices |
| with limited address spaces). With this, devices can now be isolated |
| from each other and from arbitrary memory access, thus allowing |
| things like secure direct assignment of devices into virtual machines. |
| |
| This isolation is not always at the granularity of a single device |
| though. Even when an IOMMU is capable of this, properties of devices, |
| interconnects, and IOMMU topologies can each reduce this isolation. |
| For instance, an individual device may be part of a larger multi- |
| function enclosure. While the IOMMU may be able to distinguish |
| between devices within the enclosure, the enclosure may not require |
| transactions between devices to reach the IOMMU. Examples of this |
| could be anything from a multi-function PCI device with backdoors |
| between functions to a non-PCI-ACS (Access Control Services) capable |
| bridge allowing redirection without reaching the IOMMU. Topology |
| can also play a factor in terms of hiding devices. A PCIe-to-PCI |
| bridge masks the devices behind it, making transaction appear as if |
| from the bridge itself. Obviously IOMMU design plays a major factor |
| as well. |
| |
| Therefore, while for the most part an IOMMU may have device level |
| granularity, any system is susceptible to reduced granularity. The |
| IOMMU API therefore supports a notion of IOMMU groups. A group is |
| a set of devices which is isolatable from all other devices in the |
| system. Groups are therefore the unit of ownership used by VFIO. |
| |
| While the group is the minimum granularity that must be used to |
| ensure secure user access, it's not necessarily the preferred |
| granularity. In IOMMUs which make use of page tables, it may be |
| possible to share a set of page tables between different groups, |
| reducing the overhead both to the platform (reduced TLB thrashing, |
| reduced duplicate page tables), and to the user (programming only |
| a single set of translations). For this reason, VFIO makes use of |
| a container class, which may hold one or more groups. A container |
| is created by simply opening the /dev/vfio/vfio character device. |
| |
| On its own, the container provides little functionality, with all |
| but a couple version and extension query interfaces locked away. |
| The user needs to add a group into the container for the next level |
| of functionality. To do this, the user first needs to identify the |
| group associated with the desired device. This can be done using |
| the sysfs links described in the example below. By unbinding the |
| device from the host driver and binding it to a VFIO driver, a new |
| VFIO group will appear for the group as /dev/vfio/$GROUP, where |
| $GROUP is the IOMMU group number of which the device is a member. |
| If the IOMMU group contains multiple devices, each will need to |
| be bound to a VFIO driver before operations on the VFIO group |
| are allowed (it's also sufficient to only unbind the device from |
| host drivers if a VFIO driver is unavailable; this will make the |
| group available, but not that particular device). TBD - interface |
| for disabling driver probing/locking a device. |
| |
| Once the group is ready, it may be added to the container by opening |
| the VFIO group character device (/dev/vfio/$GROUP) and using the |
| VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER ioctl, passing the file descriptor of the |
| previously opened container file. If desired and if the IOMMU driver |
| supports sharing the IOMMU context between groups, multiple groups may |
| be set to the same container. If a group fails to set to a container |
| with existing groups, a new empty container will need to be used |
| instead. |
| |
| With a group (or groups) attached to a container, the remaining |
| ioctls become available, enabling access to the VFIO IOMMU interfaces. |
| Additionally, it now becomes possible to get file descriptors for each |
| device within a group using an ioctl on the VFIO group file descriptor. |
| |
| The VFIO device API includes ioctls for describing the device, the I/O |
| regions and their read/write/mmap offsets on the device descriptor, as |
| well as mechanisms for describing and registering interrupt |
| notifications. |
| |
| VFIO Usage Example |
| ------------------ |
| |
| Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:06:0d.0:: |
| |
| $ readlink /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group |
| ../../../../kernel/iommu_groups/26 |
| |
| This device is therefore in IOMMU group 26. This device is on the |
| pci bus, therefore the user will make use of vfio-pci to manage the |
| group:: |
| |
| # modprobe vfio-pci |
| |
| Binding this device to the vfio-pci driver creates the VFIO group |
| character devices for this group:: |
| |
| $ lspci -n -s 0000:06:0d.0 |
| 06:0d.0 0401: 1102:0002 (rev 08) |
| # echo 0000:06:0d.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/driver/unbind |
| # echo 1102 0002 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/new_id |
| |
| Now we need to look at what other devices are in the group to free |
| it for use by VFIO:: |
| |
| $ ls -l /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group/devices |
| total 0 |
| lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:00:1e.0 -> |
| ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0 |
| lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.0 -> |
| ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.0 |
| lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.1 -> |
| ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.1 |
| |
| This device is behind a PCIe-to-PCI bridge [4]_, therefore we also |
| need to add device 0000:06:0d.1 to the group following the same |
| procedure as above. Device 0000:00:1e.0 is a bridge that does |
| not currently have a host driver, therefore it's not required to |
| bind this device to the vfio-pci driver (vfio-pci does not currently |
| support PCI bridges). |
| |
| The final step is to provide the user with access to the group if |
| unprivileged operation is desired (note that /dev/vfio/vfio provides |
| no capabilities on its own and is therefore expected to be set to |
| mode 0666 by the system):: |
| |
| # chown user:user /dev/vfio/26 |
| |
| The user now has full access to all the devices and the iommu for this |
| group and can access them as follows:: |
| |
| int container, group, device, i; |
| struct vfio_group_status group_status = |
| { .argsz = sizeof(group_status) }; |
| struct vfio_iommu_type1_info iommu_info = { .argsz = sizeof(iommu_info) }; |
| struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_map dma_map = { .argsz = sizeof(dma_map) }; |
| struct vfio_device_info device_info = { .argsz = sizeof(device_info) }; |
| |
| /* Create a new container */ |
| container = open("/dev/vfio/vfio", O_RDWR); |
| |
| if (ioctl(container, VFIO_GET_API_VERSION) != VFIO_API_VERSION) |
| /* Unknown API version */ |
| |
| if (!ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU)) |
| /* Doesn't support the IOMMU driver we want. */ |
| |
| /* Open the group */ |
| group = open("/dev/vfio/26", O_RDWR); |
| |
| /* Test the group is viable and available */ |
| ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_STATUS, &group_status); |
| |
| if (!(group_status.flags & VFIO_GROUP_FLAGS_VIABLE)) |
| /* Group is not viable (ie, not all devices bound for vfio) */ |
| |
| /* Add the group to the container */ |
| ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container); |
| |
| /* Enable the IOMMU model we want */ |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU); |
| |
| /* Get addition IOMMU info */ |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO, &iommu_info); |
| |
| /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */ |
| dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, |
| MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0); |
| dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024; |
| dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */ |
| dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE; |
| |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map); |
| |
| /* Get a file descriptor for the device */ |
| device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0"); |
| |
| /* Test and setup the device */ |
| ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO, &device_info); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_regions; i++) { |
| struct vfio_region_info reg = { .argsz = sizeof(reg) }; |
| |
| reg.index = i; |
| |
| ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO, ®); |
| |
| /* Setup mappings... read/write offsets, mmaps |
| * For PCI devices, config space is a region */ |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_irqs; i++) { |
| struct vfio_irq_info irq = { .argsz = sizeof(irq) }; |
| |
| irq.index = i; |
| |
| ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO, &irq); |
| |
| /* Setup IRQs... eventfds, VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS */ |
| } |
| |
| /* Gratuitous device reset and go... */ |
| ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET); |
| |
| VFIO User API |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| Please see include/linux/vfio.h for complete API documentation. |
| |
| VFIO bus driver API |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| VFIO bus drivers, such as vfio-pci make use of only a few interfaces |
| into VFIO core. When devices are bound and unbound to the driver, |
| the driver should call vfio_register_group_dev() and |
| vfio_unregister_group_dev() respectively:: |
| |
| void vfio_init_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device, |
| struct device *dev, |
| const struct vfio_device_ops *ops); |
| int vfio_register_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device); |
| void vfio_unregister_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device); |
| |
| The driver should embed the vfio_device in its own structure and call |
| vfio_init_group_dev() to pre-configure it before going to registration. |
| vfio_register_group_dev() indicates to the core to begin tracking the |
| iommu_group of the specified dev and register the dev as owned by a VFIO bus |
| driver. Once vfio_register_group_dev() returns it is possible for userspace to |
| start accessing the driver, thus the driver should ensure it is completely |
| ready before calling it. The driver provides an ops structure for callbacks |
| similar to a file operations structure:: |
| |
| struct vfio_device_ops { |
| int (*open)(struct vfio_device *vdev); |
| void (*release)(struct vfio_device *vdev); |
| ssize_t (*read)(struct vfio_device *vdev, char __user *buf, |
| size_t count, loff_t *ppos); |
| ssize_t (*write)(struct vfio_device *vdev, |
| const char __user *buf, |
| size_t size, loff_t *ppos); |
| long (*ioctl)(struct vfio_device *vdev, unsigned int cmd, |
| unsigned long arg); |
| int (*mmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev, |
| struct vm_area_struct *vma); |
| }; |
| |
| Each function is passed the vdev that was originally registered |
| in the vfio_register_group_dev() call above. This allows the bus driver |
| to obtain its private data using container_of(). The open/release |
| callbacks are issued when a new file descriptor is created for a |
| device (via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD). The ioctl interface provides |
| a direct pass through for VFIO_DEVICE_* ioctls. The read/write/mmap |
| interfaces implement the device region access defined by the device's |
| own VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO ioctl. |
| |
| |
| PPC64 sPAPR implementation note |
| ------------------------------- |
| |
| This implementation has some specifics: |
| |
| 1) On older systems (POWER7 with P5IOC2/IODA1) only one IOMMU group per |
| container is supported as an IOMMU table is allocated at the boot time, |
| one table per a IOMMU group which is a Partitionable Endpoint (PE) |
| (PE is often a PCI domain but not always). |
| |
| Newer systems (POWER8 with IODA2) have improved hardware design which allows |
| to remove this limitation and have multiple IOMMU groups per a VFIO |
| container. |
| |
| 2) The hardware supports so called DMA windows - the PCI address range |
| within which DMA transfer is allowed, any attempt to access address space |
| out of the window leads to the whole PE isolation. |
| |
| 3) PPC64 guests are paravirtualized but not fully emulated. There is an API |
| to map/unmap pages for DMA, and it normally maps 1..32 pages per call and |
| currently there is no way to reduce the number of calls. In order to make |
| things faster, the map/unmap handling has been implemented in real mode |
| which provides an excellent performance which has limitations such as |
| inability to do locked pages accounting in real time. |
| |
| 4) According to sPAPR specification, A Partitionable Endpoint (PE) is an I/O |
| subtree that can be treated as a unit for the purposes of partitioning and |
| error recovery. A PE may be a single or multi-function IOA (IO Adapter), a |
| function of a multi-function IOA, or multiple IOAs (possibly including |
| switch and bridge structures above the multiple IOAs). PPC64 guests detect |
| PCI errors and recover from them via EEH RTAS services, which works on the |
| basis of additional ioctl commands. |
| |
| So 4 additional ioctls have been added: |
| |
| VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO |
| returns the size and the start of the DMA window on the PCI bus. |
| |
| VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE |
| enables the container. The locked pages accounting |
| is done at this point. This lets user first to know what |
| the DMA window is and adjust rlimit before doing any real job. |
| |
| VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE |
| disables the container. |
| |
| VFIO_EEH_PE_OP |
| provides an API for EEH setup, error detection and recovery. |
| |
| The code flow from the example above should be slightly changed:: |
| |
| struct vfio_eeh_pe_op pe_op = { .argsz = sizeof(pe_op), .flags = 0 }; |
| |
| ..... |
| /* Add the group to the container */ |
| ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container); |
| |
| /* Enable the IOMMU model we want */ |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) |
| |
| /* Get addition sPAPR IOMMU info */ |
| vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info spapr_iommu_info; |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO, &spapr_iommu_info); |
| |
| if (ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE)) |
| /* Cannot enable container, may be low rlimit */ |
| |
| /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */ |
| dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, |
| MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0); |
| |
| dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024; |
| dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */ |
| dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE; |
| |
| /* Check here is .iova/.size are within DMA window from spapr_iommu_info */ |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map); |
| |
| /* Get a file descriptor for the device */ |
| device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0"); |
| |
| .... |
| |
| /* Gratuitous device reset and go... */ |
| ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET); |
| |
| /* Make sure EEH is supported */ |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_EEH); |
| |
| /* Enable the EEH functionality on the device */ |
| pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_ENABLE; |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); |
| |
| /* You're suggested to create additional data struct to represent |
| * PE, and put child devices belonging to same IOMMU group to the |
| * PE instance for later reference. |
| */ |
| |
| /* Check the PE's state and make sure it's in functional state */ |
| pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_GET_STATE; |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); |
| |
| /* Save device state using pci_save_state(). |
| * EEH should be enabled on the specified device. |
| */ |
| |
| .... |
| |
| /* Inject EEH error, which is expected to be caused by 32-bits |
| * config load. |
| */ |
| pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_INJECT_ERR; |
| pe_op.err.type = EEH_ERR_TYPE_32; |
| pe_op.err.func = EEH_ERR_FUNC_LD_CFG_ADDR; |
| pe_op.err.addr = 0ul; |
| pe_op.err.mask = 0ul; |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); |
| |
| .... |
| |
| /* When 0xFF's returned from reading PCI config space or IO BARs |
| * of the PCI device. Check the PE's state to see if that has been |
| * frozen. |
| */ |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); |
| |
| /* Waiting for pending PCI transactions to be completed and don't |
| * produce any more PCI traffic from/to the affected PE until |
| * recovery is finished. |
| */ |
| |
| /* Enable IO for the affected PE and collect logs. Usually, the |
| * standard part of PCI config space, AER registers are dumped |
| * as logs for further analysis. |
| */ |
| pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_UNFREEZE_IO; |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); |
| |
| /* |
| * Issue PE reset: hot or fundamental reset. Usually, hot reset |
| * is enough. However, the firmware of some PCI adapters would |
| * require fundamental reset. |
| */ |
| pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_HOT; |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); |
| pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_DEACTIVATE; |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); |
| |
| /* Configure the PCI bridges for the affected PE */ |
| pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_CONFIGURE; |
| ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); |
| |
| /* Restored state we saved at initialization time. pci_restore_state() |
| * is good enough as an example. |
| */ |
| |
| /* Hopefully, error is recovered successfully. Now, you can resume to |
| * start PCI traffic to/from the affected PE. |
| */ |
| |
| .... |
| |
| 5) There is v2 of SPAPR TCE IOMMU. It deprecates VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE/ |
| VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE and implements 2 new ioctls: |
| VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY |
| (which are unsupported in v1 IOMMU). |
| |
| PPC64 paravirtualized guests generate a lot of map/unmap requests, |
| and the handling of those includes pinning/unpinning pages and updating |
| mm::locked_vm counter to make sure we do not exceed the rlimit. |
| The v2 IOMMU splits accounting and pinning into separate operations: |
| |
| - VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY/VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY ioctls |
| receive a user space address and size of the block to be pinned. |
| Bisecting is not supported and VFIO_IOMMU_UNREGISTER_MEMORY is expected to |
| be called with the exact address and size used for registering |
| the memory block. The userspace is not expected to call these often. |
| The ranges are stored in a linked list in a VFIO container. |
| |
| - VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA/VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA ioctls only update the actual |
| IOMMU table and do not do pinning; instead these check that the userspace |
| address is from pre-registered range. |
| |
| This separation helps in optimizing DMA for guests. |
| |
| 6) sPAPR specification allows guests to have an additional DMA window(s) on |
| a PCI bus with a variable page size. Two ioctls have been added to support |
| this: VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE. |
| The platform has to support the functionality or error will be returned to |
| the userspace. The existing hardware supports up to 2 DMA windows, one is |
| 2GB long, uses 4K pages and called "default 32bit window"; the other can |
| be as big as entire RAM, use different page size, it is optional - guests |
| create those in run-time if the guest driver supports 64bit DMA. |
| |
| VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE receives a page shift, a DMA window size and |
| a number of TCE table levels (if a TCE table is going to be big enough and |
| the kernel may not be able to allocate enough of physically contiguous |
| memory). It creates a new window in the available slot and returns the bus |
| address where the new window starts. Due to hardware limitation, the user |
| space cannot choose the location of DMA windows. |
| |
| VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE receives the bus start address of the window |
| and removes it. |
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| .. [1] VFIO was originally an acronym for "Virtual Function I/O" in its |
| initial implementation by Tom Lyon while as Cisco. We've since |
| outgrown the acronym, but it's catchy. |
| |
| .. [2] "safe" also depends upon a device being "well behaved". It's |
| possible for multi-function devices to have backdoors between |
| functions and even for single function devices to have alternative |
| access to things like PCI config space through MMIO registers. To |
| guard against the former we can include additional precautions in the |
| IOMMU driver to group multi-function PCI devices together |
| (iommu=group_mf). The latter we can't prevent, but the IOMMU should |
| still provide isolation. For PCI, SR-IOV Virtual Functions are the |
| best indicator of "well behaved", as these are designed for |
| virtualization usage models. |
| |
| .. [3] As always there are trade-offs to virtual machine device |
| assignment that are beyond the scope of VFIO. It's expected that |
| future IOMMU technologies will reduce some, but maybe not all, of |
| these trade-offs. |
| |
| .. [4] In this case the device is below a PCI bridge, so transactions |
| from either function of the device are indistinguishable to the iommu:: |
| |
| -[0000:00]-+-1e.0-[06]--+-0d.0 |
| \-0d.1 |
| |
| 00:1e.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation 82801 PCI Bridge (rev 90) |