blob: 3c789c565b18fc3bfb3298c7df8113d30ae5985c [file]
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* Converted from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jeq_infer_not_null.c */
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include "bpf_misc.h"
#include "bpf_kfuncs.h"
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP);
__uint(max_entries, 1);
__type(key, int);
__type(value, int);
} map_xskmap SEC(".maps");
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
__uint(max_entries, 1);
__type(key, int);
__type(value, int);
} map_hash SEC(".maps");
/* This is equivalent to the following program:
*
* r6 = skb->sk;
* r7 = sk_fullsock(r6);
* r0 = sk_fullsock(r6);
* if (r0 == 0) return 0; (a)
* if (r0 != r7) return 0; (b)
* *r7->type; (c)
* return 0;
*
* It is safe to dereference r7 at point (c), because of (a) and (b).
* The test verifies that relation r0 == r7 is propagated from (b) to (c).
*/
SEC("cgroup/skb")
__description("jne/jeq infer not null, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL -> PTR_TO_SOCKET for JNE false branch")
__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R7 pointer comparison")
__retval(0)
__naked void socket_for_jne_false_branch(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
/* r6 = skb->sk; */ \
r6 = *(u64*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_sk]); \
/* if (r6 == 0) return 0; */ \
if r6 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
/* r7 = sk_fullsock(skb); */ \
r1 = r6; \
call %[bpf_sk_fullsock]; \
r7 = r0; \
/* r0 = sk_fullsock(skb); */ \
r1 = r6; \
call %[bpf_sk_fullsock]; \
/* if (r0 == null) return 0; */ \
if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
/* if (r0 == r7) r0 = *(r7->type); */ \
if r0 != r7 goto l0_%=; /* Use ! JNE ! */\
r0 = *(u32*)(r7 + %[bpf_sock_type]); \
l0_%=: /* return 0 */ \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_sk_fullsock),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_sk, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
__imm_const(bpf_sock_type, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, type))
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Same as above, but verify that another branch of JNE still
* prohibits access to PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
*/
SEC("cgroup/skb")
__description("jne/jeq infer not null, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL unchanged for JNE true branch")
__failure __msg("R7 invalid mem access 'sock_or_null'")
__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R7 pointer comparison")
__naked void unchanged_for_jne_true_branch(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
/* r6 = skb->sk */ \
r6 = *(u64*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_sk]); \
/* if (r6 == 0) return 0; */ \
if r6 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
/* r7 = sk_fullsock(skb); */ \
r1 = r6; \
call %[bpf_sk_fullsock]; \
r7 = r0; \
/* r0 = sk_fullsock(skb); */ \
r1 = r6; \
call %[bpf_sk_fullsock]; \
/* if (r0 == null) return 0; */ \
if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
/* if (r0 == r7) return 0; */ \
if r0 != r7 goto l1_%=; /* Use ! JNE ! */\
goto l0_%=; \
l1_%=: /* r0 = *(r7->type); */ \
r0 = *(u32*)(r7 + %[bpf_sock_type]); \
l0_%=: /* return 0 */ \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_sk_fullsock),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_sk, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
__imm_const(bpf_sock_type, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, type))
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Same as a first test, but not null should be inferred for JEQ branch */
SEC("cgroup/skb")
__description("jne/jeq infer not null, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL -> PTR_TO_SOCKET for JEQ true branch")
__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R7 pointer comparison")
__retval(0)
__naked void socket_for_jeq_true_branch(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
/* r6 = skb->sk; */ \
r6 = *(u64*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_sk]); \
/* if (r6 == null) return 0; */ \
if r6 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
/* r7 = sk_fullsock(skb); */ \
r1 = r6; \
call %[bpf_sk_fullsock]; \
r7 = r0; \
/* r0 = sk_fullsock(skb); */ \
r1 = r6; \
call %[bpf_sk_fullsock]; \
/* if (r0 == null) return 0; */ \
if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
/* if (r0 != r7) return 0; */ \
if r0 == r7 goto l1_%=; /* Use ! JEQ ! */\
goto l0_%=; \
l1_%=: /* r0 = *(r7->type); */ \
r0 = *(u32*)(r7 + %[bpf_sock_type]); \
l0_%=: /* return 0; */ \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_sk_fullsock),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_sk, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
__imm_const(bpf_sock_type, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, type))
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Same as above, but verify that another branch of JNE still
* prohibits access to PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
*/
SEC("cgroup/skb")
__description("jne/jeq infer not null, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL unchanged for JEQ false branch")
__failure __msg("R7 invalid mem access 'sock_or_null'")
__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R7 pointer comparison")
__naked void unchanged_for_jeq_false_branch(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
/* r6 = skb->sk; */ \
r6 = *(u64*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_sk]); \
/* if (r6 == null) return 0; */ \
if r6 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
/* r7 = sk_fullsock(skb); */ \
r1 = r6; \
call %[bpf_sk_fullsock]; \
r7 = r0; \
/* r0 = sk_fullsock(skb); */ \
r1 = r6; \
call %[bpf_sk_fullsock]; \
/* if (r0 == null) return 0; */ \
if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
/* if (r0 != r7) r0 = *(r7->type); */ \
if r0 == r7 goto l0_%=; /* Use ! JEQ ! */\
r0 = *(u32*)(r7 + %[bpf_sock_type]); \
l0_%=: /* return 0; */ \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_sk_fullsock),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_sk, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
__imm_const(bpf_sock_type, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, type))
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Maps are treated in a different branch of `mark_ptr_not_null_reg`,
* so separate test for maps case.
*/
SEC("xdp")
__description("jne/jeq infer not null, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL -> PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE")
__success __retval(0)
__naked void null_ptr_to_map_value(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
/* r9 = &some stack to use as key */ \
r1 = 0; \
*(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
r9 = r10; \
r9 += -8; \
/* r8 = process local map */ \
r8 = %[map_xskmap] ll; \
/* r6 = map_lookup_elem(r8, r9); */ \
r1 = r8; \
r2 = r9; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
r6 = r0; \
/* r7 = map_lookup_elem(r8, r9); */ \
r1 = r8; \
r2 = r9; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
r7 = r0; \
/* if (r6 == 0) return 0; */ \
if r6 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
/* if (r6 != r7) return 0; */ \
if r6 != r7 goto l0_%=; \
/* read *r7; */ \
r0 = *(u32*)(r7 + %[bpf_xdp_sock_queue_id]); \
l0_%=: /* return 0; */ \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_xskmap),
__imm_const(bpf_xdp_sock_queue_id, offsetof(struct bpf_xdp_sock, queue_id))
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Verified that we can detect the pointer as non_null when comparing with
* register with value 0. JEQ test case.
*/
SEC("xdp")
__success __log_level(2)
/* to make sure the branch is not falsely predicted*/
__msg("r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0)")
__msg("from 7 to 9")
__naked void jeq_reg_reg_null_check(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
*(u32*)(r10 - 8) = 0; \
r1 = %[map_xskmap] ll; \
r2 = r10; \
r2 += -8; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
r1 = 0; \
if r0 == r1 goto 1f; \
r0 = *(u32*)(r0 +0); \
1: r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_xskmap)
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Same as above but for JNE.
*/
SEC("xdp")
__success __log_level(2)
/* to make sure the branch is not falsely predicted*/
__msg("r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0)")
__msg("from 7 to 9")
__naked void jne_reg_reg_null_check(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
*(u32*)(r10 - 8) = 0; \
r1 = %[map_xskmap] ll; \
r2 = r10; \
r2 += -8; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
r1 = 0; \
if r0 != r1 goto 1f; \
goto 2f; \
1: r0 = *(u32*)(r0 +0); \
2: r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_xskmap)
: __clobber_all);
}
/*
* A comparison between PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED and
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL should not infer that map pointer is not null.
* A bug in check_cond_jmp_op() made such inference possible.
*/
SEC("raw_tp")
__failure
__msg("error: invalid dereference of R0 (a nullable map value pointer)")
__msg(">>> 11 | (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0)")
__naked void untrusted_mem_does_not_infer_map_value_non_null(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
/* r6 = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0); */ \
r1 = 0; \
r2 = 0; \
call %[bpf_rdonly_cast]; \
r6 = r0; \
/* r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_hash, &key); */ \
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0; \
r1 = %[map_hash] ll; \
r2 = r10; \
r2 += -8; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
/* \
* buggy verifier assumed that r6 can't be null \
* and marked r0 non-null as well. \
*/ \
if r6 != r0 goto 1f; \
r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 + 0); \
1: r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_rdonly_cast),
__imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_hash)
: __clobber_all);
}
/*
* A pointer with an offset that is not bounded from above may be null at
* runtime, hence it is not a witness for the pointer it is compared with.
*/
SEC("socket")
__failure
__msg("error: invalid dereference of R7 (a nullable map value pointer)")
__naked void unbounded_offset_does_not_infer_map_value_non_null(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
/* r6 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_hash, &0); */ \
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0; \
r1 = %[map_hash] ll; \
r2 = r10; \
r2 += -8; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
if r0 == 0 goto 1f; \
r6 = r0; \
/* r7 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_hash, &1); */ \
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 1; \
r1 = %[map_hash] ll; \
r2 = r10; \
r2 += -8; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
r7 = r0; \
/* pointer - pointer is an unknown scalar */ \
r8 = r7; \
r8 -= r6; \
/* r8 is in [0, S64_MAX] */ \
r8 <<= 1; \
r8 >>= 1; \
/* r6 may wrap to zero at runtime */ \
r6 += r8; \
if r7 != r6 goto 1f; \
r0 = *(u8 *)(r7 + 0); \
1: r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_hash)
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Same, but the offset is bounded, so the inference is still done. */
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void bounded_offset_infers_map_value_non_null(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
/* r6 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_hash, &0); */ \
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0; \
r1 = %[map_hash] ll; \
r2 = r10; \
r2 += -8; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
if r0 == 0 goto 1f; \
r6 = r0; \
/* r7 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_hash, &1); */ \
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 1; \
r1 = %[map_hash] ll; \
r2 = r10; \
r2 += -8; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
r7 = r0; \
/* pointer - pointer is an unknown scalar */ \
r8 = r7; \
r8 -= r6; \
/* r8 is in [0, 3] */ \
r8 &= 3; \
r6 += r8; \
if r7 != r6 goto 1f; \
r0 = *(u8 *)(r7 + 0); \
1: r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_hash)
: __clobber_all);
}
/*
* The low 32 bits of a map value pointer may be zero, hence a 32-bit
* compare with zero cannot be predicted from the pointer being non-NULL
* and both successors of such a jump have to be verified.
*/
SEC("socket")
__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=4 off=32 size=4")
__naked void jmp32_ptr_vs_zero_jne(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
/* r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_hash, &key); */ \
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0; \
r1 = %[map_hash] ll; \
r2 = r10; \
r2 += -8; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
if r0 == 0 goto 1f; \
if w0 != 0 goto 1f; \
r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 + 32); \
1: r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_hash)
: __clobber_all);
}
/*
* The below program is explored in two paths: r6 == 0 and r6 == 1.
* On the first path comparison "if r0 == r6 goto 2f" should mark r6 as precise,
* otherwise unsafe path with r6 == 1 would be incorrectly pruned.
*/
SEC("socket")
__failure
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__msg("error: invalid dereference of R0 (a nullable map value pointer)")
__naked void imprecise_zero_does_not_infer_map_value_non_null(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
/* r6 is 0 on the path explored first, 1 on the other */\
r6 = 1; \
if r0 == 0 goto 1f; \
r6 = 0; \
/* r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_hash, &0); */ \
1: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0; \
r1 = %[map_hash] ll; \
r2 = r10; \
r2 += -8; \
call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
if r0 == r6 goto 2f; \
r0 = *(u8 *)(r0 + 0); \
2: r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
__imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_hash)
: __clobber_all);
}
void kfunc_root(void)
{
bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";