| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
| /* |
| * Copyright 2021 Google LLC |
| * |
| * Authors: Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>, |
| * Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> |
| * |
| * Self-tests of fips140.ko cryptographic functionality. These are run at |
| * module load time to fulfill FIPS 140 and NIAP FPT_TST_EXT.1 requirements. |
| * |
| * The actual requirements for these self-tests are somewhat vague, but |
| * section 9 ("Self-Tests") of the FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance document |
| * (https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips140-2/fips1402ig.pdf) |
| * is somewhat helpful. Basically, all implementations of all FIPS approved |
| * algorithms (including modes of operation) must be tested. However: |
| * |
| * - There are provisions for skipping tests that are already sufficiently |
| * covered by other tests. E.g., HMAC-SHA256 may cover SHA-256. |
| * |
| * - Only one test vector is required per algorithm, and it can be generated |
| * by any known-good implementation or taken from any official document. |
| * |
| * - For ciphers, both encryption and decryption must be tested. |
| * |
| * - Only one key size per algorithm needs to be tested. |
| * |
| * There is some ambiguity about whether all implementations of each algorithm |
| * must be tested, or whether it is sufficient to test just the highest priority |
| * implementation. To be safe we test all implementations, except ones that can |
| * be excluded by one of the rules above. |
| * |
| * See fips140_selftests[] for the list of tests we've selected. Currently, all |
| * our test vectors except the AES-CBC-CTS and DRBG ones were generated by the |
| * script tools/crypto/gen_fips140_testvecs.py, using the known-good |
| * implementations in the Python packages hashlib, pycryptodome, and |
| * cryptography. |
| * |
| * Note that we don't reuse the upstream crypto API's self-tests |
| * (crypto/testmgr.{c,h}), for several reasons: |
| * |
| * - To meet FIPS requirements, the self-tests must be located within the FIPS |
| * module boundary (fips140.ko). But testmgr is integrated into the crypto |
| * API framework and can't be extracted into the module. |
| * |
| * - testmgr is much more heavyweight than required for FIPS and NIAP; it |
| * tests more algorithms and does more tests per algorithm, as it's meant to |
| * do proper testing and not just meet certification requirements. We need |
| * tests that can run with minimal overhead on every boot-up. |
| * |
| * - Despite being more heavyweight in general, testmgr doesn't test the |
| * SHA-256 and AES library APIs, despite that being needed here. |
| */ |
| #include <crypto/aead.h> |
| #include <crypto/aes.h> |
| #include <crypto/drbg.h> |
| #include <crypto/hash.h> |
| #include <crypto/rng.h> |
| #include <crypto/sha2.h> |
| #include <crypto/skcipher.h> |
| |
| #include "fips140-module.h" |
| |
| /* Test vector for an AEAD algorithm */ |
| struct aead_testvec { |
| const u8 *key; |
| size_t key_size; |
| const u8 *iv; |
| size_t iv_size; |
| const u8 *assoc; |
| size_t assoc_size; |
| const u8 *plaintext; |
| size_t plaintext_size; |
| const u8 *ciphertext; |
| size_t ciphertext_size; |
| }; |
| |
| /* Test vector for a length-preserving encryption algorithm */ |
| struct skcipher_testvec { |
| const u8 *key; |
| size_t key_size; |
| const u8 *iv; |
| size_t iv_size; |
| const u8 *plaintext; |
| const u8 *ciphertext; |
| size_t message_size; |
| }; |
| |
| /* Test vector for a hash algorithm */ |
| struct hash_testvec { |
| const u8 *key; |
| size_t key_size; |
| const u8 *message; |
| size_t message_size; |
| const u8 *digest; |
| size_t digest_size; |
| }; |
| |
| /* Test vector for a DRBG algorithm */ |
| struct drbg_testvec { |
| const u8 *entropy; |
| size_t entropy_size; |
| const u8 *pers; |
| size_t pers_size; |
| const u8 *entpr_a; |
| const u8 *entpr_b; |
| size_t entpr_size; |
| const u8 *add_a; |
| const u8 *add_b; |
| size_t add_size; |
| const u8 *output; |
| size_t out_size; |
| }; |
| |
| struct fips_test { |
| /* The name of the algorithm, in crypto API syntax */ |
| const char *alg; |
| |
| /* |
| * The optional list of implementations to test. @func will be called |
| * once per implementation, or once with @alg if this list is empty. |
| * The implementation names must be given in crypto API syntax, or in |
| * the case of a library implementation should have "-lib" appended. |
| */ |
| const char *impls[8]; |
| |
| /* |
| * The test function. It should execute a known-answer test on an |
| * algorithm implementation, using the below test vector. |
| */ |
| int __must_check (*func)(const struct fips_test *test, |
| const char *impl); |
| |
| /* The test vector, with a format specific to the type of algorithm */ |
| union { |
| struct aead_testvec aead; |
| struct skcipher_testvec skcipher; |
| struct hash_testvec hash; |
| struct drbg_testvec drbg; |
| }; |
| }; |
| |
| /* Maximum IV size (in bytes) among any algorithm tested here */ |
| #define MAX_IV_SIZE 16 |
| |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_check_result(u8 *result, const u8 *expected_result, size_t result_size, |
| const char *impl, const char *operation) |
| { |
| fips140_inject_selftest_failure(impl, result); |
| if (memcmp(result, expected_result, result_size) != 0) { |
| pr_err("wrong result from %s %s\n", impl, operation); |
| return -EBADMSG; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * None of the algorithms should be ASYNC, as the FIPS module doesn't register |
| * any ASYNC algorithms. (The ASYNC flag is only declared by hardware |
| * algorithms, which would need their own FIPS certification.) |
| * |
| * Ideally we would verify alg->cra_module == THIS_MODULE here as well, but that |
| * doesn't work because the files are compiled as built-in code. |
| */ |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_validate_alg(const struct crypto_alg *alg) |
| { |
| if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) { |
| pr_err("unexpectedly got async implementation of %s (%s)\n", |
| alg->cra_name, alg->cra_driver_name); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_handle_alloc_tfm_error(const char *impl, int err) |
| { |
| if (err == -ENOENT) { |
| /* |
| * The requested implementation of the algorithm wasn't found. |
| * This is expected if the CPU lacks a feature the |
| * implementation needs, such as the ARMv8 Crypto Extensions. |
| * |
| * When this happens, the implementation isn't available for |
| * use, so we can't test it, nor do we need to. So we just skip |
| * the test. |
| */ |
| pr_info("%s is unavailable (no CPU support?), skipping testing it\n", |
| impl); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| pr_err("failed to allocate %s tfm: %d\n", impl, err); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_test_aes_library(const struct fips_test *test, const char *impl) |
| { |
| const struct skcipher_testvec *vec = &test->skcipher; |
| struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx; |
| u8 block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (WARN_ON(vec->message_size != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, vec->key, vec->key_size); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("aes_expandkey() failed: %d\n", err); |
| return err; |
| } |
| aes_encrypt(&ctx, block, vec->plaintext); |
| err = fips_check_result(block, vec->ciphertext, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, |
| impl, "encryption"); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| aes_decrypt(&ctx, block, block); |
| return fips_check_result(block, vec->plaintext, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, |
| impl, "decryption"); |
| } |
| |
| /* Test a length-preserving symmetric cipher using the crypto_skcipher API. */ |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_test_skcipher(const struct fips_test *test, const char *impl) |
| { |
| const struct skcipher_testvec *vec = &test->skcipher; |
| struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; |
| struct skcipher_request *req = NULL; |
| u8 *message = NULL; |
| struct scatterlist sg; |
| u8 iv[MAX_IV_SIZE]; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (WARN_ON(vec->iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (WARN_ON(vec->message_size <= 0)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(impl, 0, 0); |
| if (IS_ERR(tfm)) |
| return fips_handle_alloc_tfm_error(impl, PTR_ERR(tfm)); |
| err = fips_validate_alg(&crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base); |
| if (err) |
| goto out; |
| if (crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm) != vec->iv_size) { |
| pr_err("%s has wrong IV size\n", impl); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); |
| message = kmemdup(vec->plaintext, vec->message_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!req || !message) { |
| err = -ENOMEM; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| sg_init_one(&sg, message, vec->message_size); |
| |
| skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, |
| NULL, NULL); |
| skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, vec->message_size, iv); |
| |
| err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->key_size); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("failed to set %s key: %d\n", impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Encrypt the plaintext, then verify the resulting ciphertext. */ |
| memcpy(iv, vec->iv, vec->iv_size); |
| err = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("%s encryption failed: %d\n", impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| err = fips_check_result(message, vec->ciphertext, vec->message_size, |
| impl, "encryption"); |
| if (err) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* Decrypt the ciphertext, then verify the resulting plaintext. */ |
| memcpy(iv, vec->iv, vec->iv_size); |
| err = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("%s decryption failed: %d\n", impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| err = fips_check_result(message, vec->plaintext, vec->message_size, |
| impl, "decryption"); |
| out: |
| kfree(message); |
| skcipher_request_free(req); |
| crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Test an AEAD using the crypto_aead API. */ |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_test_aead(const struct fips_test *test, const char *impl) |
| { |
| const struct aead_testvec *vec = &test->aead; |
| const int tag_size = vec->ciphertext_size - vec->plaintext_size; |
| struct crypto_aead *tfm; |
| struct aead_request *req = NULL; |
| u8 *assoc = NULL; |
| u8 *message = NULL; |
| struct scatterlist sg[2]; |
| int sg_idx = 0; |
| u8 iv[MAX_IV_SIZE]; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (WARN_ON(vec->iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (WARN_ON(vec->ciphertext_size <= vec->plaintext_size)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(impl, 0, 0); |
| if (IS_ERR(tfm)) |
| return fips_handle_alloc_tfm_error(impl, PTR_ERR(tfm)); |
| err = fips_validate_alg(&crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->base); |
| if (err) |
| goto out; |
| if (crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) != vec->iv_size) { |
| pr_err("%s has wrong IV size\n", impl); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| req = aead_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); |
| assoc = kmemdup(vec->assoc, vec->assoc_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
| message = kzalloc(vec->ciphertext_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!req || !assoc || !message) { |
| err = -ENOMEM; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| memcpy(message, vec->plaintext, vec->plaintext_size); |
| |
| sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); |
| if (vec->assoc_size) |
| sg_set_buf(&sg[sg_idx++], assoc, vec->assoc_size); |
| sg_set_buf(&sg[sg_idx++], message, vec->ciphertext_size); |
| |
| aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->assoc_size); |
| aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL); |
| |
| err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->key_size); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("failed to set %s key: %d\n", impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, tag_size); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("failed to set %s authentication tag size: %d\n", |
| impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Encrypt the plaintext, then verify the resulting ciphertext (which |
| * includes the authentication tag). |
| */ |
| memcpy(iv, vec->iv, vec->iv_size); |
| aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, vec->plaintext_size, iv); |
| err = crypto_aead_encrypt(req); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("%s encryption failed: %d\n", impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| err = fips_check_result(message, vec->ciphertext, vec->ciphertext_size, |
| impl, "encryption"); |
| if (err) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* |
| * Decrypt the ciphertext (which includes the authentication tag), then |
| * verify the resulting plaintext. |
| */ |
| memcpy(iv, vec->iv, vec->iv_size); |
| aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, vec->ciphertext_size, iv); |
| err = crypto_aead_decrypt(req); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("%s decryption failed: %d\n", impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| err = fips_check_result(message, vec->plaintext, vec->plaintext_size, |
| impl, "decryption"); |
| out: |
| kfree(message); |
| kfree(assoc); |
| aead_request_free(req); |
| crypto_free_aead(tfm); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Test a hash algorithm using the crypto_shash API. |
| * |
| * Note that we don't need to test the crypto_ahash API too, since none of the |
| * hash algorithms in the FIPS module have the ASYNC flag, and thus there will |
| * be no hash algorithms that can be accessed only through crypto_ahash. |
| */ |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_test_hash(const struct fips_test *test, const char *impl) |
| { |
| const struct hash_testvec *vec = &test->hash; |
| struct crypto_shash *tfm; |
| u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE]; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (WARN_ON(vec->digest_size > HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(impl, 0, 0); |
| if (IS_ERR(tfm)) |
| return fips_handle_alloc_tfm_error(impl, PTR_ERR(tfm)); |
| err = fips_validate_alg(&crypto_shash_alg(tfm)->base); |
| if (err) |
| goto out; |
| if (crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) != vec->digest_size) { |
| pr_err("%s has wrong digest size\n", impl); |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (vec->key) { |
| err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->key_size); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("failed to set %s key: %d\n", impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, vec->message, vec->message_size, |
| digest); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("%s digest computation failed: %d\n", impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| err = fips_check_result(digest, vec->digest, vec->digest_size, |
| impl, "digest"); |
| out: |
| crypto_free_shash(tfm); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_test_sha256_library(const struct fips_test *test, const char *impl) |
| { |
| const struct hash_testvec *vec = &test->hash; |
| u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
| |
| if (WARN_ON(vec->digest_size != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| sha256(vec->message, vec->message_size, digest); |
| return fips_check_result(digest, vec->digest, vec->digest_size, |
| impl, "digest"); |
| } |
| |
| /* Test a DRBG using the crypto_rng API. */ |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_test_drbg(const struct fips_test *test, const char *impl) |
| { |
| const struct drbg_testvec *vec = &test->drbg; |
| struct crypto_rng *rng; |
| u8 *output = NULL; |
| struct drbg_test_data test_data; |
| struct drbg_string addtl, pers, testentropy; |
| int err; |
| |
| rng = crypto_alloc_rng(impl, 0, 0); |
| if (IS_ERR(rng)) |
| return fips_handle_alloc_tfm_error(impl, PTR_ERR(rng)); |
| err = fips_validate_alg(&crypto_rng_alg(rng)->base); |
| if (err) |
| goto out; |
| |
| output = kzalloc(vec->out_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!output) { |
| err = -ENOMEM; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Initialize the DRBG with the entropy and personalization string given |
| * in the test vector. |
| */ |
| test_data.testentropy = &testentropy; |
| drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, vec->entropy, vec->entropy_size); |
| drbg_string_fill(&pers, vec->pers, vec->pers_size); |
| err = crypto_drbg_reset_test(rng, &pers, &test_data); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("failed to reset %s\n", impl); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Generate some random bytes using the additional data string provided |
| * in the test vector. Also use the additional entropy if provided |
| * (relevant for the prediction-resistant DRBG variants only). |
| */ |
| drbg_string_fill(&addtl, vec->add_a, vec->add_size); |
| if (vec->entpr_size) { |
| drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, vec->entpr_a, vec->entpr_size); |
| err = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(rng, output, |
| vec->out_size, &addtl, |
| &test_data); |
| } else { |
| err = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(rng, output, vec->out_size, |
| &addtl); |
| } |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("failed to get bytes from %s (try 1): %d\n", |
| impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Do the same again, using a second additional data string, and (when |
| * applicable) a second additional entropy string. |
| */ |
| drbg_string_fill(&addtl, vec->add_b, vec->add_size); |
| if (test->drbg.entpr_size) { |
| drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, vec->entpr_b, vec->entpr_size); |
| err = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(rng, output, |
| vec->out_size, &addtl, |
| &test_data); |
| } else { |
| err = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(rng, output, vec->out_size, |
| &addtl); |
| } |
| if (err) { |
| pr_err("failed to get bytes from %s (try 2): %d\n", |
| impl, err); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check that the DRBG generated the expected output. */ |
| err = fips_check_result(output, vec->output, vec->out_size, |
| impl, "get_bytes"); |
| out: |
| kfree(output); |
| crypto_free_rng(rng); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Include the test vectors generated by the Python script. */ |
| #include "fips140-generated-testvecs.h" |
| |
| /* |
| * List of all self-tests. Keep this in sync with fips140_algorithms[]. |
| * |
| * When possible, we have followed the FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance (IG) |
| * document when creating this list of tests. The result is intended to be a |
| * list of tests that is near-minimal (and thus minimizes runtime overhead) |
| * while complying with all requirements. For additional details, see the |
| * comment at the beginning of this file. |
| */ |
| static const struct fips_test fips140_selftests[] __initconst = { |
| /* |
| * Test for the AES library API. |
| * |
| * Since the AES library API may use its own AES implementation and the |
| * module provides no support for composing it with a mode of operation |
| * (it's just plain AES), we must test it directly. |
| * |
| * In contrast, we don't need to directly test the "aes" ciphers that |
| * are accessible through the crypto_cipher API (e.g. "aes-ce"), as they |
| * are covered indirectly by AES-CMAC and AES-ECB tests. |
| */ |
| { |
| .alg = "aes", |
| .impls = {"aes-lib"}, |
| .func = fips_test_aes_library, |
| .skcipher = { |
| .key = fips_aes_key, |
| .key_size = sizeof(fips_aes_key), |
| .plaintext = fips_message, |
| .ciphertext = fips_aes_ecb_ciphertext, |
| .message_size = 16, |
| } |
| }, |
| /* |
| * Tests for AES-CMAC, a.k.a. "cmac(aes)" in crypto API syntax. |
| * |
| * The IG requires that each underlying AES implementation be tested in |
| * an authenticated mode, if implemented. Of such modes, this module |
| * implements AES-GCM and AES-CMAC. However, AES-GCM doesn't "count" |
| * because this module's implementations of AES-GCM won't actually be |
| * FIPS-approved, due to a quirk in the FIPS requirements. |
| * |
| * Therefore, for us this requirement applies to AES-CMAC, so we must |
| * test the "cmac" template composed with each "aes" implementation. |
| * |
| * Separately from the above, we also must test all standalone |
| * implementations of "cmac(aes)" such as "cmac-aes-ce", as they don't |
| * reuse another full AES implementation and thus can't be covered by |
| * another test. |
| */ |
| { |
| .alg = "cmac(aes)", |
| .impls = { |
| /* "cmac" template with all "aes" implementations */ |
| "cmac(aes-generic)", |
| "cmac(aes-arm64)", |
| "cmac(aes-ce)", |
| /* All standalone implementations of "cmac(aes)" */ |
| "cmac-aes-neon", |
| "cmac-aes-ce", |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_hash, |
| .hash = { |
| .key = fips_aes_key, |
| .key_size = sizeof(fips_aes_key), |
| .message = fips_message, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| .digest = fips_aes_cmac_digest, |
| .digest_size = sizeof(fips_aes_cmac_digest), |
| } |
| }, |
| /* |
| * Tests for AES-ECB, a.k.a. "ecb(aes)" in crypto API syntax. |
| * |
| * The IG requires that each underlying AES implementation be tested in |
| * a mode that exercises the encryption direction of AES and in a mode |
| * that exercises the decryption direction of AES. CMAC only covers the |
| * encryption direction, so we choose ECB to test decryption. Thus, we |
| * test the "ecb" template composed with each "aes" implementation. |
| * |
| * Separately from the above, we also must test all standalone |
| * implementations of "ecb(aes)" such as "ecb-aes-ce", as they don't |
| * reuse another full AES implementation and thus can't be covered by |
| * another test. |
| */ |
| { |
| .alg = "ecb(aes)", |
| .impls = { |
| /* "ecb" template with all "aes" implementations */ |
| "ecb(aes-generic)", |
| "ecb(aes-arm64)", |
| "ecb(aes-ce)", |
| /* All standalone implementations of "ecb(aes)" */ |
| "ecb-aes-neon", |
| "ecb-aes-neonbs", |
| "ecb-aes-ce", |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_skcipher, |
| .skcipher = { |
| .key = fips_aes_key, |
| .key_size = sizeof(fips_aes_key), |
| .plaintext = fips_message, |
| .ciphertext = fips_aes_ecb_ciphertext, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message) |
| } |
| }, |
| /* |
| * Tests for AES-CBC, AES-CBC-CTS, AES-CTR, AES-XTS, and AES-GCM. |
| * |
| * According to the IG, an AES mode of operation doesn't need to have |
| * its own test, provided that (a) both the encryption and decryption |
| * directions of the underlying AES implementation are already tested |
| * via other mode(s), and (b) in the case of an authenticated mode, at |
| * least one other authenticated mode is already tested. The tests of |
| * the "cmac" and "ecb" templates fulfill these conditions; therefore, |
| * we don't need to test any other AES mode templates. |
| * |
| * This does *not* apply to standalone implementations of these modes |
| * such as "cbc-aes-ce", as such implementations don't reuse another |
| * full AES implementation and thus can't be covered by another test. |
| * We must test all such standalone implementations. |
| * |
| * The AES-GCM test isn't actually required, as it's expected that this |
| * module's AES-GCM implementation won't actually be able to be |
| * FIPS-approved. This is unfortunate; it's caused by the FIPS |
| * requirements for GCM being incompatible with GCM implementations that |
| * don't generate their own IVs. We choose to still include the AES-GCM |
| * test to keep it on par with the other FIPS-approved algorithms, in |
| * case it turns out that AES-GCM can be approved after all. |
| */ |
| { |
| .alg = "cbc(aes)", |
| .impls = { |
| /* All standalone implementations of "cbc(aes)" */ |
| "cbc-aes-neon", |
| "cbc-aes-neonbs", |
| "cbc-aes-ce", |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_skcipher, |
| .skcipher = { |
| .key = fips_aes_key, |
| .key_size = sizeof(fips_aes_key), |
| .iv = fips_aes_iv, |
| .iv_size = sizeof(fips_aes_iv), |
| .plaintext = fips_message, |
| .ciphertext = fips_aes_cbc_ciphertext, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| } |
| }, { |
| .alg = "cts(cbc(aes))", |
| .impls = { |
| /* All standalone implementations of "cts(cbc(aes))" */ |
| "cts-cbc-aes-neon", |
| "cts-cbc-aes-ce", |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_skcipher, |
| /* Test vector taken from RFC 3962 */ |
| .skcipher = { |
| .key = "\x63\x68\x69\x63\x6b\x65\x6e\x20" |
| "\x74\x65\x72\x69\x79\x61\x6b\x69", |
| .key_size = 16, |
| .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" |
| "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", |
| .iv_size = 16, |
| .plaintext = "\x49\x20\x77\x6f\x75\x6c\x64\x20" |
| "\x6c\x69\x6b\x65\x20\x74\x68\x65" |
| "\x20\x47\x65\x6e\x65\x72\x61\x6c" |
| "\x20\x47\x61\x75\x27\x73\x20", |
| .ciphertext = "\xfc\x00\x78\x3e\x0e\xfd\xb2\xc1" |
| "\xd4\x45\xd4\xc8\xef\xf7\xed\x22" |
| "\x97\x68\x72\x68\xd6\xec\xcc\xc0" |
| "\xc0\x7b\x25\xe2\x5e\xcf\xe5", |
| .message_size = 31, |
| } |
| }, { |
| .alg = "ctr(aes)", |
| .impls = { |
| /* All standalone implementations of "ctr(aes)" */ |
| "ctr-aes-neon", |
| "ctr-aes-neonbs", |
| "ctr-aes-ce", |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_skcipher, |
| .skcipher = { |
| .key = fips_aes_key, |
| .key_size = sizeof(fips_aes_key), |
| .iv = fips_aes_iv, |
| .iv_size = sizeof(fips_aes_iv), |
| .plaintext = fips_message, |
| .ciphertext = fips_aes_ctr_ciphertext, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| } |
| }, { |
| .alg = "xts(aes)", |
| .impls = { |
| /* All standalone implementations of "xts(aes)" */ |
| "xts-aes-neon", |
| "xts-aes-neonbs", |
| "xts-aes-ce", |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_skcipher, |
| .skcipher = { |
| .key = fips_aes_xts_key, |
| .key_size = sizeof(fips_aes_xts_key), |
| .iv = fips_aes_iv, |
| .iv_size = sizeof(fips_aes_iv), |
| .plaintext = fips_message, |
| .ciphertext = fips_aes_xts_ciphertext, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| } |
| }, { |
| .alg = "gcm(aes)", |
| .impls = { |
| /* All standalone implementations of "gcm(aes)" */ |
| "gcm-aes-ce", |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_aead, |
| .aead = { |
| .key = fips_aes_key, |
| .key_size = sizeof(fips_aes_key), |
| .iv = fips_aes_iv, |
| /* The GCM implementations assume an IV size of 12. */ |
| .iv_size = 12, |
| .assoc = fips_aes_gcm_assoc, |
| .assoc_size = sizeof(fips_aes_gcm_assoc), |
| .plaintext = fips_message, |
| .plaintext_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| .ciphertext = fips_aes_gcm_ciphertext, |
| .ciphertext_size = sizeof(fips_aes_gcm_ciphertext), |
| } |
| }, |
| |
| /* Tests for SHA-1 */ |
| { |
| .alg = "sha1", |
| .impls = { |
| /* All implementations of "sha1" */ |
| "sha1-generic", |
| "sha1-ce" |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_hash, |
| .hash = { |
| .message = fips_message, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| .digest = fips_sha1_digest, |
| .digest_size = sizeof(fips_sha1_digest) |
| } |
| }, |
| /* |
| * Tests for all SHA-256 implementations other than the sha256() library |
| * function. As per the IG, these tests also fulfill the tests for the |
| * corresponding SHA-224 implementations. |
| */ |
| { |
| .alg = "sha256", |
| .impls = { |
| /* All implementations of "sha256" */ |
| "sha256-generic", |
| "sha256-arm64", |
| "sha256-ce", |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_hash, |
| .hash = { |
| .message = fips_message, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| .digest = fips_sha256_digest, |
| .digest_size = sizeof(fips_sha256_digest) |
| } |
| }, |
| /* |
| * Test for the sha256() library function. This must be tested |
| * separately because it may use its own SHA-256 implementation. |
| */ |
| { |
| .alg = "sha256", |
| .impls = {"sha256-lib"}, |
| .func = fips_test_sha256_library, |
| .hash = { |
| .message = fips_message, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| .digest = fips_sha256_digest, |
| .digest_size = sizeof(fips_sha256_digest) |
| } |
| }, |
| /* |
| * Tests for all SHA-512 implementations. As per the IG, these tests |
| * also fulfill the tests for the corresponding SHA-384 implementations. |
| */ |
| { |
| .alg = "sha512", |
| .impls = { |
| /* All implementations of "sha512" */ |
| "sha512-generic", |
| "sha512-arm64", |
| "sha512-ce", |
| }, |
| .func = fips_test_hash, |
| .hash = { |
| .message = fips_message, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| .digest = fips_sha512_digest, |
| .digest_size = sizeof(fips_sha512_digest) |
| } |
| }, |
| /* |
| * Test for HMAC. As per the IG, only one HMAC test is required, |
| * provided that the same HMAC code is shared by all HMAC-SHA*. This is |
| * true in our case. We choose HMAC-SHA256 for the test. |
| * |
| * Note that as per the IG, this can fulfill the test for the underlying |
| * SHA. However, we don't currently rely on this. |
| */ |
| { |
| .alg = "hmac(sha256)", |
| .func = fips_test_hash, |
| .hash = { |
| .key = fips_hmac_key, |
| .key_size = sizeof(fips_hmac_key), |
| .message = fips_message, |
| .message_size = sizeof(fips_message), |
| .digest = fips_hmac_sha256_digest, |
| .digest_size = sizeof(fips_hmac_sha256_digest) |
| } |
| }, |
| /* |
| * Known-answer tests for the SP800-90A DRBG algorithms. |
| * |
| * These test vectors were manually extracted from |
| * https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip. |
| * |
| * The selection of these tests follows the FIPS 140-2 IG as well as |
| * Section 11 of SP800-90A: |
| * |
| * - We must test all DRBG types (HMAC, Hash, and CTR) that the module |
| * implements. However, currently the module only implements |
| * HMAC_DRBG (since CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR and CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH |
| * aren't enabled). Therefore, we only need to test HMAC_DRBG. |
| * |
| * - We only need to test one HMAC variant. |
| * |
| * - We must test all DRBG operations: Instantiate(), Reseed(), and |
| * Generate(). However, a single test sequence with a single output |
| * comparison may cover all three operations, and this is what we do. |
| * Note that Reseed() happens implicitly via the use of the additional |
| * input and also via the use of prediction resistance when enabled. |
| * |
| * - The personalization string, additional input, and prediction |
| * resistance support must be tested. Therefore we have chosen test |
| * vectors that have a nonempty personalization string and nonempty |
| * additional input, and we test the prediction-resistant variant. |
| * Testing the non-prediction-resistant variant is not required. |
| */ |
| { |
| .alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha256", |
| .func = fips_test_drbg, |
| .drbg = { |
| .entropy = |
| "\xc7\xcc\xbc\x67\x7e\x21\x66\x1e\x27\x2b\x63\xdd" |
| "\x3a\x78\xdc\xdf\x66\x6d\x3f\x24\xae\xcf\x37\x01" |
| "\xa9\x0d\x89\x8a\xa7\xdc\x81\x58\xae\xb2\x10\x15" |
| "\x7e\x18\x44\x6d\x13\xea\xdf\x37\x85\xfe\x81\xfb", |
| .entropy_size = 48, |
| .entpr_a = |
| "\x7b\xa1\x91\x5b\x3c\x04\xc4\x1b\x1d\x19\x2f\x1a" |
| "\x18\x81\x60\x3c\x6c\x62\x91\xb7\xe9\xf5\xcb\x96" |
| "\xbb\x81\x6a\xcc\xb5\xae\x55\xb6", |
| .entpr_b = |
| "\x99\x2c\xc7\x78\x7e\x3b\x88\x12\xef\xbe\xd3\xd2" |
| "\x7d\x2a\xa5\x86\xda\x8d\x58\x73\x4a\x0a\xb2\x2e" |
| "\xbb\x4c\x7e\xe3\x9a\xb6\x81\xc1", |
| .entpr_size = 32, |
| .output = |
| "\x95\x6f\x95\xfc\x3b\xb7\xfe\x3e\xd0\x4e\x1a\x14" |
| "\x6c\x34\x7f\x7b\x1d\x0d\x63\x5e\x48\x9c\x69\xe6" |
| "\x46\x07\xd2\x87\xf3\x86\x52\x3d\x98\x27\x5e\xd7" |
| "\x54\xe7\x75\x50\x4f\xfb\x4d\xfd\xac\x2f\x4b\x77" |
| "\xcf\x9e\x8e\xcc\x16\xa2\x24\xcd\x53\xde\x3e\xc5" |
| "\x55\x5d\xd5\x26\x3f\x89\xdf\xca\x8b\x4e\x1e\xb6" |
| "\x88\x78\x63\x5c\xa2\x63\x98\x4e\x6f\x25\x59\xb1" |
| "\x5f\x2b\x23\xb0\x4b\xa5\x18\x5d\xc2\x15\x74\x40" |
| "\x59\x4c\xb4\x1e\xcf\x9a\x36\xfd\x43\xe2\x03\xb8" |
| "\x59\x91\x30\x89\x2a\xc8\x5a\x43\x23\x7c\x73\x72" |
| "\xda\x3f\xad\x2b\xba\x00\x6b\xd1", |
| .out_size = 128, |
| .add_a = |
| "\x18\xe8\x17\xff\xef\x39\xc7\x41\x5c\x73\x03\x03" |
| "\xf6\x3d\xe8\x5f\xc8\xab\xe4\xab\x0f\xad\xe8\xd6" |
| "\x86\x88\x55\x28\xc1\x69\xdd\x76", |
| .add_b = |
| "\xac\x07\xfc\xbe\x87\x0e\xd3\xea\x1f\x7e\xb8\xe7" |
| "\x9d\xec\xe8\xe7\xbc\xf3\x18\x25\x77\x35\x4a\xaa" |
| "\x00\x99\x2a\xdd\x0a\x00\x50\x82", |
| .add_size = 32, |
| .pers = |
| "\xbc\x55\xab\x3c\xf6\x52\xb0\x11\x3d\x7b\x90\xb8" |
| "\x24\xc9\x26\x4e\x5a\x1e\x77\x0d\x3d\x58\x4a\xda" |
| "\xd1\x81\xe9\xf8\xeb\x30\x8f\x6f", |
| .pers_size = 32, |
| } |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| static int __init __must_check |
| fips_run_test(const struct fips_test *test) |
| { |
| int i; |
| int err; |
| |
| /* |
| * If no implementations were specified, then just test the default one. |
| * Otherwise, test the specified list of implementations. |
| */ |
| |
| if (test->impls[0] == NULL) { |
| err = test->func(test, test->alg); |
| if (err) |
| pr_emerg("self-tests failed for algorithm %s: %d\n", |
| test->alg, err); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test->impls) && test->impls[i] != NULL; |
| i++) { |
| err = test->func(test, test->impls[i]); |
| if (err) { |
| pr_emerg("self-tests failed for algorithm %s, implementation %s: %d\n", |
| test->alg, test->impls[i], err); |
| return err; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| bool __init fips140_run_selftests(void) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| pr_info("running self-tests\n"); |
| for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fips140_selftests); i++) { |
| if (fips_run_test(&fips140_selftests[i]) != 0) { |
| /* The caller is responsible for calling panic(). */ |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| pr_info("all self-tests passed\n"); |
| return true; |
| } |