| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 | |
| /* | |
| * arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c: Guest/host FPSIMD context coordination helpers | |
| * | |
| * Copyright 2018 Arm Limited | |
| * Author: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> | |
| */ | |
| #include <linux/irqflags.h> | |
| #include <linux/sched.h> | |
| #include <linux/kvm_host.h> | |
| #include <asm/fpsimd.h> | |
| #include <asm/kvm_asm.h> | |
| #include <asm/kvm_hyp.h> | |
| #include <asm/kvm_mmu.h> | |
| #include <asm/sysreg.h> | |
| /* | |
| * Called on entry to KVM_RUN unless this vcpu previously ran at least | |
| * once and the most recent prior KVM_RUN for this vcpu was called from | |
| * the same task as current (highly likely). | |
| * | |
| * This is guaranteed to execute before kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(vcpu), | |
| * such that on entering hyp the relevant parts of current are already | |
| * mapped. | |
| */ | |
| int kvm_arch_vcpu_run_map_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) | |
| { | |
| struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd = ¤t->thread.uw.fpsimd_state; | |
| int ret; | |
| /* pKVM has its own tracking of the host fpsimd state. */ | |
| if (is_protected_kvm_enabled()) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Make sure the host task fpsimd state is visible to hyp: */ | |
| ret = kvm_share_hyp(fpsimd, fpsimd + 1); | |
| if (ret) | |
| return ret; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Prepare vcpu for saving the host's FPSIMD state and loading the guest's. | |
| * The actual loading is done by the FPSIMD access trap taken to hyp. | |
| * | |
| * Here, we just set the correct metadata to indicate that the FPSIMD | |
| * state in the cpu regs (if any) belongs to current on the host. | |
| */ | |
| void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) | |
| { | |
| BUG_ON(!current->mm); | |
| if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) | |
| return; | |
| fpsimd_kvm_prepare(); | |
| /* | |
| * We will check TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE just before entering the | |
| * guest in kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxflush_fp() and override this to | |
| * FP_STATE_FREE if the flag set. | |
| */ | |
| *host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED; | |
| *host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state) = kern_hyp_va(¤t->thread.uw.fpsimd_state); | |
| *host_data_ptr(fpmr_ptr) = kern_hyp_va(¤t->thread.uw.fpmr); | |
| vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED); | |
| if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN) | |
| vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED); | |
| if (system_supports_sme()) { | |
| vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED); | |
| if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN) | |
| vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED); | |
| /* | |
| * If PSTATE.SM is enabled then save any pending FP | |
| * state and disable PSTATE.SM. If we leave PSTATE.SM | |
| * enabled and the guest does not enable SME via | |
| * CPACR_EL1.SMEN then operations that should be valid | |
| * may generate SME traps from EL1 to EL1 which we | |
| * can't intercept and which would confuse the guest. | |
| * | |
| * Do the same for PSTATE.ZA in the case where there | |
| * is state in the registers which has not already | |
| * been saved, this is very unlikely to happen. | |
| */ | |
| if (read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR) & (SVCR_SM_MASK | SVCR_ZA_MASK)) { | |
| *host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_FREE; | |
| fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state(); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * If normal guests gain SME support, maintain this behavior for pKVM | |
| * guests, which don't support SME. | |
| */ | |
| WARN_ON(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sme() && | |
| read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR)); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Called just before entering the guest once we are no longer preemptible | |
| * and interrupts are disabled. If we have managed to run anything using | |
| * FP while we were preemptible (such as off the back of an interrupt), | |
| * then neither the host nor the guest own the FP hardware (and it was the | |
| * responsibility of the code that used FP to save the existing state). | |
| */ | |
| void kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxflush_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) | |
| { | |
| if (test_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE)) | |
| *host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_FREE; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Called just after exiting the guest. If the guest FPSIMD state | |
| * was loaded, update the host's context tracking data mark the CPU | |
| * FPSIMD regs as dirty and belonging to vcpu so that they will be | |
| * written back if the kernel clobbers them due to kernel-mode NEON | |
| * before re-entry into the guest. | |
| */ | |
| void kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) | |
| { | |
| struct cpu_fp_state fp_state; | |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled()); | |
| if (guest_owns_fp_regs()) { | |
| /* | |
| * Currently we do not support SME guests so SVCR is | |
| * always 0 and we just need a variable to point to. | |
| */ | |
| fp_state.st = &vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs; | |
| fp_state.sve_state = vcpu->arch.sve_state; | |
| fp_state.sve_vl = vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl; | |
| fp_state.sme_state = NULL; | |
| fp_state.svcr = &__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, SVCR); | |
| fp_state.fpmr = &__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, FPMR); | |
| fp_state.fp_type = &vcpu->arch.fp_type; | |
| if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) | |
| fp_state.to_save = FP_STATE_SVE; | |
| else | |
| fp_state.to_save = FP_STATE_FPSIMD; | |
| fpsimd_bind_state_to_cpu(&fp_state); | |
| clear_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Write back the vcpu FPSIMD regs if they are dirty, and invalidate the | |
| * cpu FPSIMD regs so that they can't be spuriously reused if this vcpu | |
| * disappears and another task or vcpu appears that recycles the same | |
| * struct fpsimd_state. | |
| */ | |
| void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long flags; | |
| local_irq_save(flags); | |
| /* | |
| * If we have VHE then the Hyp code will reset CPACR_EL1 to | |
| * the default value and we need to reenable SME. | |
| */ | |
| if (has_vhe() && system_supports_sme()) { | |
| /* Also restore EL0 state seen on entry */ | |
| if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED)) | |
| sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0, CPACR_ELx_SMEN); | |
| else | |
| sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, | |
| CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN, | |
| CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN); | |
| isb(); | |
| } | |
| if (guest_owns_fp_regs()) { | |
| if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) { | |
| u64 zcr = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR); | |
| /* | |
| * If the vCPU is in the hyp context then ZCR_EL1 is | |
| * loaded with its vEL2 counterpart. | |
| */ | |
| __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, vcpu_sve_zcr_elx(vcpu)) = zcr; | |
| /* | |
| * Restore the VL that was saved when bound to the CPU, | |
| * which is the maximum VL for the guest. Because the | |
| * layout of the data when saving the sve state depends | |
| * on the VL, we need to use a consistent (i.e., the | |
| * maximum) VL. | |
| * Note that this means that at guest exit ZCR_EL1 is | |
| * not necessarily the same as on guest entry. | |
| * | |
| * ZCR_EL2 holds the guest hypervisor's VL when running | |
| * a nested guest, which could be smaller than the | |
| * max for the vCPU. Similar to above, we first need to | |
| * switch to a VL consistent with the layout of the | |
| * vCPU's SVE state. KVM support for NV implies VHE, so | |
| * using the ZCR_EL1 alias is safe. | |
| */ | |
| if (!has_vhe() || (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu) && !is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu))) | |
| sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1, | |
| SYS_ZCR_EL1); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Flush (save and invalidate) the fpsimd/sve state so that if | |
| * the host tries to use fpsimd/sve, it's not using stale data | |
| * from the guest. | |
| * | |
| * Flushing the state sets the TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE bit for the | |
| * context unconditionally, in both nVHE and VHE. This allows | |
| * the kernel to restore the fpsimd/sve state, including ZCR_EL1 | |
| * when needed. | |
| */ | |
| fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state(); | |
| } else if (has_vhe() && system_supports_sve()) { | |
| /* | |
| * The FPSIMD/SVE state in the CPU has not been touched, and we | |
| * have SVE (and VHE): CPACR_EL1 (alias CPTR_EL2) has been | |
| * reset by kvm_reset_cptr_el2() in the Hyp code, disabling SVE | |
| * for EL0. To avoid spurious traps, restore the trap state | |
| * seen by kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(): | |
| */ | |
| if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED)) | |
| sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0, CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN); | |
| else | |
| sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN, 0); | |
| } | |
| local_irq_restore(flags); | |
| } |