| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| #ifndef _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H | |
| #define _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H | |
| #include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> | |
| #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> | |
| #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> | |
| #include <asm/io_bitmap.h> | |
| #include <asm/fpu/api.h> | |
| #include <asm/fred.h> | |
| /* Check that the stack and regs on entry from user mode are sane. */ | |
| static __always_inline void arch_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) | |
| { | |
| if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY)) { | |
| /* | |
| * Make sure that the entry code gave us a sensible EFLAGS | |
| * register. Native because we want to check the actual CPU | |
| * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen. | |
| */ | |
| unsigned long flags = native_save_fl(); | |
| unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT; | |
| /* | |
| * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry. | |
| */ | |
| if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) || | |
| cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) | |
| mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC; | |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & mask); | |
| /* We think we came from user mode. Make sure pt_regs agrees. */ | |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(!user_mode(regs)); | |
| /* | |
| * All entries from user mode (except #DF) should be on the | |
| * normal thread stack and should have user pt_regs in the | |
| * correct location. | |
| */ | |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(!on_thread_stack()); | |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != task_pt_regs(current)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| #define arch_enter_from_user_mode arch_enter_from_user_mode | |
| static inline void arch_exit_work(unsigned long ti_work) | |
| { | |
| if (ti_work & _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY) | |
| fire_user_return_notifiers(); | |
| if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_IO_BITMAP)) | |
| tss_update_io_bitmap(); | |
| fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); | |
| if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) | |
| switch_fpu_return(); | |
| } | |
| static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs, | |
| unsigned long ti_work) | |
| { | |
| if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU) || unlikely(ti_work)) | |
| arch_exit_work(ti_work); | |
| fred_update_rsp0(); | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
| /* | |
| * Compat syscalls set TS_COMPAT. Make sure we clear it before | |
| * returning to user mode. We need to clear it *after* signal | |
| * handling, because syscall restart has a fixup for compat | |
| * syscalls. The fixup is exercised by the ptrace_syscall_32 | |
| * selftest. | |
| * | |
| * We also need to clear TS_REGS_POKED_I386: the 32-bit tracer | |
| * special case only applies after poking regs and before the | |
| * very next return to user mode. | |
| */ | |
| current_thread_info()->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT | TS_I386_REGS_POKED); | |
| #endif | |
| /* | |
| * This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), which is 10 | |
| * bits. The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler | |
| * when applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in | |
| * arch/x86/Makefile), which will remove the 3 (x86_64) or 2 (ia32) | |
| * low bits from any entropy chosen here. | |
| * | |
| * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 7 (x86_64) or | |
| * 8 (ia32) bits. | |
| */ | |
| choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc()); | |
| } | |
| #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare | |
| static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void) | |
| { | |
| amd_clear_divider(); | |
| } | |
| #define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode | |
| #endif |