| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
| /* |
| * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks |
| * |
| * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> |
| * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI |
| */ |
| |
| #include <asm/current.h> |
| #include <linux/cred.h> |
| #include <linux/errno.h> |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> |
| #include <linux/rcupdate.h> |
| #include <linux/sched.h> |
| #include <net/af_unix.h> |
| #include <net/sock.h> |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| #include "cred.h" |
| #include "fs.h" |
| #include "ruleset.h" |
| #include "setup.h" |
| #include "task.h" |
| |
| /** |
| * domain_scope_le - Checks domain ordering for scoped ptrace |
| * |
| * @parent: Parent domain. |
| * @child: Potential child of @parent. |
| * |
| * Checks if the @parent domain is less or equal to (i.e. an ancestor, which |
| * means a subset of) the @child domain. |
| */ |
| static bool domain_scope_le(const struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, |
| const struct landlock_ruleset *const child) |
| { |
| const struct landlock_hierarchy *walker; |
| |
| if (!parent) |
| return true; |
| if (!child) |
| return false; |
| for (walker = child->hierarchy; walker; walker = walker->parent) { |
| if (walker == parent->hierarchy) |
| /* @parent is in the scoped hierarchy of @child. */ |
| return true; |
| } |
| /* There is no relationship between @parent and @child. */ |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| static bool task_is_scoped(const struct task_struct *const parent, |
| const struct task_struct *const child) |
| { |
| bool is_scoped; |
| const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_parent, *dom_child; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| dom_parent = landlock_get_task_domain(parent); |
| dom_child = landlock_get_task_domain(child); |
| is_scoped = domain_scope_le(dom_parent, dom_child); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| return is_scoped; |
| } |
| |
| static int task_ptrace(const struct task_struct *const parent, |
| const struct task_struct *const child) |
| { |
| /* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */ |
| if (!landlocked(parent)) |
| return 0; |
| if (task_is_scoped(parent, child)) |
| return 0; |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * hook_ptrace_access_check - Determines whether the current process may access |
| * another |
| * |
| * @child: Process to be accessed. |
| * @mode: Mode of attachment. |
| * |
| * If the current task has Landlock rules, then the child must have at least |
| * the same rules. Else denied. |
| * |
| * Determines whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission |
| * granted, -errno if denied. |
| */ |
| static int hook_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *const child, |
| const unsigned int mode) |
| { |
| return task_ptrace(current, child); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * hook_ptrace_traceme - Determines whether another process may trace the |
| * current one |
| * |
| * @parent: Task proposed to be the tracer. |
| * |
| * If the parent has Landlock rules, then the current task must have the same |
| * or more rules. Else denied. |
| * |
| * Determines whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current |
| * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -errno if denied. |
| */ |
| static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent) |
| { |
| return task_ptrace(parent, current); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * domain_is_scoped - Checks if the client domain is scoped in the same |
| * domain as the server. |
| * |
| * @client: IPC sender domain. |
| * @server: IPC receiver domain. |
| * @scope: The scope restriction criteria. |
| * |
| * Returns: True if the @client domain is scoped to access the @server, |
| * unless the @server is also scoped in the same domain as @client. |
| */ |
| static bool domain_is_scoped(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client, |
| const struct landlock_ruleset *const server, |
| access_mask_t scope) |
| { |
| int client_layer, server_layer; |
| struct landlock_hierarchy *client_walker, *server_walker; |
| |
| /* Quick return if client has no domain */ |
| if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!client)) |
| return false; |
| |
| client_layer = client->num_layers - 1; |
| client_walker = client->hierarchy; |
| /* |
| * client_layer must be a signed integer with greater capacity |
| * than client->num_layers to ensure the following loop stops. |
| */ |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(client_layer) > sizeof(client->num_layers)); |
| |
| server_layer = server ? (server->num_layers - 1) : -1; |
| server_walker = server ? server->hierarchy : NULL; |
| |
| /* |
| * Walks client's parent domains down to the same hierarchy level |
| * as the server's domain, and checks that none of these client's |
| * parent domains are scoped. |
| */ |
| for (; client_layer > server_layer; client_layer--) { |
| if (landlock_get_scope_mask(client, client_layer) & scope) |
| return true; |
| |
| client_walker = client_walker->parent; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Walks server's parent domains down to the same hierarchy level as |
| * the client's domain. |
| */ |
| for (; server_layer > client_layer; server_layer--) |
| server_walker = server_walker->parent; |
| |
| for (; client_layer >= 0; client_layer--) { |
| if (landlock_get_scope_mask(client, client_layer) & scope) { |
| /* |
| * Client and server are at the same level in the |
| * hierarchy. If the client is scoped, the request is |
| * only allowed if this domain is also a server's |
| * ancestor. |
| */ |
| return server_walker != client_walker; |
| } |
| client_walker = client_walker->parent; |
| server_walker = server_walker->parent; |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| static bool sock_is_scoped(struct sock *const other, |
| const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain) |
| { |
| const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_other; |
| |
| /* The credentials will not change. */ |
| lockdep_assert_held(&unix_sk(other)->lock); |
| dom_other = landlock_cred(other->sk_socket->file->f_cred)->domain; |
| return domain_is_scoped(domain, dom_other, |
| LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET); |
| } |
| |
| static bool is_abstract_socket(struct sock *const sock) |
| { |
| struct unix_address *addr = unix_sk(sock)->addr; |
| |
| if (!addr) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (addr->len >= offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1 && |
| addr->name->sun_path[0] == '\0') |
| return true; |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| static int hook_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *const sock, |
| struct sock *const other, |
| struct sock *const newsk) |
| { |
| const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = |
| landlock_get_current_domain(); |
| |
| /* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */ |
| if (!dom) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (is_abstract_socket(other) && sock_is_scoped(other, dom)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock, |
| struct socket *const other) |
| { |
| const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = |
| landlock_get_current_domain(); |
| |
| if (!dom) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Checks if this datagram socket was already allowed to be connected |
| * to other. |
| */ |
| if (unix_peer(sock->sk) == other->sk) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (is_abstract_socket(other->sk) && sock_is_scoped(other->sk, dom)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int hook_task_kill(struct task_struct *const p, |
| struct kernel_siginfo *const info, const int sig, |
| const struct cred *const cred) |
| { |
| bool is_scoped; |
| const struct landlock_ruleset *dom; |
| |
| if (cred) { |
| /* Dealing with USB IO. */ |
| dom = landlock_cred(cred)->domain; |
| } else { |
| dom = landlock_get_current_domain(); |
| } |
| |
| /* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */ |
| if (!dom) |
| return 0; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| is_scoped = domain_is_scoped(dom, landlock_get_task_domain(p), |
| LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| if (is_scoped) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int hook_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, |
| struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) |
| { |
| const struct landlock_ruleset *dom; |
| bool is_scoped = false; |
| |
| /* Lock already held by send_sigio() and send_sigurg(). */ |
| lockdep_assert_held(&fown->lock); |
| dom = landlock_file(fown->file)->fown_domain; |
| |
| /* Quick return for unowned socket. */ |
| if (!dom) |
| return 0; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| is_scoped = domain_is_scoped(dom, landlock_get_task_domain(tsk), |
| LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| if (is_scoped) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, hook_unix_stream_connect), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, hook_unix_may_send), |
| |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, hook_task_kill), |
| LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, hook_file_send_sigiotask), |
| }; |
| |
| __init void landlock_add_task_hooks(void) |
| { |
| security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), |
| &landlock_lsmid); |
| } |