| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later | |
| /* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate | |
| * | |
| * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. | |
| * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) | |
| */ | |
| #define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt | |
| #include <linux/module.h> | |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
| #include <linux/err.h> | |
| #include <crypto/public_key.h> | |
| #include "asymmetric_keys.h" | |
| static bool use_builtin_keys; | |
| static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid; | |
| #ifndef MODULE | |
| static struct { | |
| struct asymmetric_key_id id; | |
| unsigned char data[10]; | |
| } cakey; | |
| static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) | |
| { | |
| if (!str) /* default system keyring */ | |
| return 1; | |
| if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) { | |
| struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id; | |
| size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2; | |
| int ret; | |
| if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) { | |
| pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n"); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen); | |
| if (ret < 0) | |
| pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n"); | |
| else | |
| ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ | |
| } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) { | |
| use_builtin_keys = true; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); | |
| #endif | |
| /** | |
| * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys | |
| * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to. | |
| * @type: The type of key being added. | |
| * @payload: The payload of the new key. | |
| * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert. | |
| * | |
| * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of | |
| * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the | |
| * new certificate as being trusted. | |
| * | |
| * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a | |
| * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the | |
| * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted, -ENOPKG if the signature | |
| * uses unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching | |
| * certificate but the signature check cannot be performed. | |
| */ | |
| int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, | |
| const struct key_type *type, | |
| const union key_payload *payload, | |
| struct key *trust_keyring) | |
| { | |
| const struct public_key_signature *sig; | |
| struct key *key; | |
| int ret; | |
| pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); | |
| if (!trust_keyring) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| if (type != &key_type_asymmetric) | |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
| sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; | |
| if (!sig) | |
| return -ENOPKG; | |
| if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| /* See if we have a key that signed this one. */ | |
| key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, | |
| sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], | |
| false); | |
| if (IS_ERR(key)) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) | |
| ret = -ENOKEY; | |
| else | |
| ret = verify_signature(key, sig); | |
| key_put(key); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *pair, | |
| const struct asymmetric_key_id *single) | |
| { | |
| return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[0], single) || | |
| asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[1], single)); | |
| } | |
| static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, | |
| const struct key_type *type, | |
| const union key_payload *payload, | |
| struct key *trusted, bool check_dest) | |
| { | |
| const struct public_key_signature *sig; | |
| struct key *key = NULL; | |
| int ret; | |
| pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); | |
| if (!dest_keyring) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| else if (dest_keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) | |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
| if (!trusted && !check_dest) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| if (type != &key_type_asymmetric) | |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
| sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; | |
| if (!sig) | |
| return -ENOPKG; | |
| if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| if (trusted) { | |
| if (trusted->type == &key_type_keyring) { | |
| /* See if we have a key that signed this one. */ | |
| key = find_asymmetric_key(trusted, sig->auth_ids[0], | |
| sig->auth_ids[1], false); | |
| if (IS_ERR(key)) | |
| key = NULL; | |
| } else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) { | |
| const struct asymmetric_key_ids *signer_ids; | |
| signer_ids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted); | |
| /* | |
| * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the | |
| * one that is being considered for addition to | |
| * dest_keyring) and identify the key that was | |
| * used to sign. | |
| * | |
| * The signer_ids are identifiers for the | |
| * signing key specified for dest_keyring. | |
| * | |
| * The first auth_id is the preferred id, and | |
| * the second is the fallback. If only one | |
| * auth_id is present, it may match against | |
| * either signer_id. If two auth_ids are | |
| * present, the first auth_id must match one | |
| * signer_id and the second auth_id must match | |
| * the second signer_id. | |
| */ | |
| if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) { | |
| const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id; | |
| auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1]; | |
| if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id)) | |
| key = __key_get(trusted); | |
| } else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids->id[1], | |
| sig->auth_ids[1]) && | |
| match_either_id(signer_ids, | |
| sig->auth_ids[0])) { | |
| key = __key_get(trusted); | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (check_dest && !key) { | |
| /* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */ | |
| key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0], | |
| sig->auth_ids[1], false); | |
| if (IS_ERR(key)) | |
| key = NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (!key) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| ret = key_validate(key); | |
| if (ret == 0) | |
| ret = verify_signature(key, sig); | |
| key_put(key); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring - Restrict additions to a ring of public | |
| * keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring. | |
| * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to. | |
| * @type: The type of key being added. | |
| * @payload: The payload of the new key. | |
| * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert. | |
| * | |
| * Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data | |
| * parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new | |
| * certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link. | |
| * | |
| * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we | |
| * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list, | |
| * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses | |
| * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate | |
| * but the signature check cannot be performed. | |
| */ | |
| int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring, | |
| const struct key_type *type, | |
| const union key_payload *payload, | |
| struct key *trusted) | |
| { | |
| return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted, | |
| false); | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain - Restrict additions to a ring of | |
| * public keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring. | |
| * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to. | |
| * @type: The type of key being added. | |
| * @payload: The payload of the new key. | |
| * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert. | |
| * | |
| * Check the new certificate against the key or keys passed in the data | |
| * parameter and against the keys already linked to the destination keyring. If | |
| * one of those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark | |
| * the new certificate as being ok to link. | |
| * | |
| * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we | |
| * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list, | |
| * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses | |
| * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate | |
| * but the signature check cannot be performed. | |
| */ | |
| int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring, | |
| const struct key_type *type, | |
| const union key_payload *payload, | |
| struct key *trusted) | |
| { | |
| return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted, | |
| true); | |
| } |