security/Kconfig.hardening - linux - Git at Google

 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 menu "Kernel hardening options"

 config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
 	bool
 	help
 	  While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed
 	  stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for
 	  anything passed by reference to another function, under the
 	  occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do
 	  the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable
 	  flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize
 	  such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage.

 	  This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
 	  information at:
 	   * https://grsecurity.net/
 	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/

 menu "Memory initialization"

 config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
 	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)

 config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_BARE
 	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero)

 config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_ENABLER
 	# Clang 16 and later warn about using the -enable flag, but it
 	# is required before then.
 	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang)
 	depends on !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_BARE

 config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
 	def_bool CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_BARE || CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_ENABLER

 choice
 	prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
 	default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
 	default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
 	default INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO if CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
 	default INIT_STACK_NONE
 	help
 	  This option enables initialization of stack variables at
 	  function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
 	  greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
 	  variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
 	  on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
 	  syscalls.

 	  This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
 	  uninitialized variables. The selected class of variable will be
 	  initialized before use in a function.

 	config INIT_STACK_NONE
 		bool "no automatic stack variable initialization (weakest)"
 		help
 		  Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
 		  This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
 		  classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
 		  and information exposures.

 	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER
 		bool "zero-init structs marked for userspace (weak)"
 		# Plugin can be removed once the kernel only supports GCC 12+
 		depends on GCC_PLUGINS && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
 		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
 		help
 		  Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing
 		  a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of
 		  uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
 		  exposures, like CVE-2013-2141:
 		  https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca

 	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
 		bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
 		# Plugin can be removed once the kernel only supports GCC 12+
 		depends on GCC_PLUGINS && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
 		depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
 		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
 		help
 		  Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
 		  be passed by reference and had not already been
 		  explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes
 		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
 		  exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410:
 		  https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654

 		  As a side-effect, this keeps a lot of variables on the
 		  stack that can otherwise be optimized out, so combining
 		  this with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK can lead to a stack overflow
 		  and is disallowed.

 	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
 		bool "zero-init everything passed by reference (very strong)"
 		# Plugin can be removed once the kernel only supports GCC 12+
 		depends on GCC_PLUGINS && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
 		depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
 		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
 		help
 		  Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
 		  by reference and had not already been explicitly
 		  initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
 		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
 		  exposures.

 		  As a side-effect, this keeps a lot of variables on the
 		  stack that can otherwise be optimized out, so combining
 		  this with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK can lead to a stack overflow
 		  and is disallowed.

 	config INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
 		bool "pattern-init everything (strongest)"
 		depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
 		depends on !KMSAN
 		help
 		  Initializes everything on the stack (including padding)
 		  with a specific debug value. This is intended to eliminate
 		  all classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and
 		  information exposures, even variables that were warned about
 		  having been left uninitialized.

 		  Pattern initialization is known to provoke many existing bugs
 		  related to uninitialized locals, e.g. pointers receive
 		  non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big. The
 		  pattern is situation-specific; Clang on 64-bit uses 0xAA
 		  repeating for all types and padding except float and double
 		  which use 0xFF repeating (-NaN). Clang on 32-bit uses 0xFF
 		  repeating for all types and padding.

 	config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
 		bool "zero-init everything (strongest and safest)"
 		depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
 		depends on !KMSAN
 		help
 		  Initializes everything on the stack (including padding)
 		  with a zero value. This is intended to eliminate all
 		  classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and
 		  information exposures, even variables that were warned
 		  about having been left uninitialized.

 		  Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings
 		  (immediately NUL-terminated), pointers (NULL), indices
 		  (index 0), and sizes (0 length), so it is therefore more
 		  suitable as a production security mitigation than pattern
 		  initialization.

 endchoice

 config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
 	bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
 	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
 	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# too noisy
 	help
 	  This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
 	  structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
 	  initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
 	  by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.

 config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
 	bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
 	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
 	depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	help
 	  This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
 	  returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
 	  the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces
 	  the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces
 	  potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information
 	  exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack
 	  depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks
 	  most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance
 	  impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than
 	  the function calling complexity.

 	  The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation
 	  sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you
 	  are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
 	  deploying it.

 	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
 	   * https://grsecurity.net/
 	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/

 config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE
 	bool "Report stack depth analysis instrumentation" if EXPERT
 	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
 	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# too noisy
 	help
 	  This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
 	  stackleak plugin finds a function it thinks needs to be
 	  instrumented. This is useful for comparing coverage between
 	  builds.

 config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
 	int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
 	default 100
 	range 0 4096
 	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
 	help
 	  The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
 	  the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
 	  It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
 	  a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
 	  If unsure, leave the default value 100.

 config STACKLEAK_METRICS
 	bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
 	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
 	depends on PROC_FS
 	help
 	  If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
 	  the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
 	  shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
 	  previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
 	  can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
 	  your workloads.

 config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
 	bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
 	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
 	help
 	  This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
 	  runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
 	  CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.

 config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
 	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
 	depends on !KMSAN
 	help
 	  This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel
 	  command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0".
 	  When "init_on_alloc" is enabled, all page allocator and slab
 	  allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, eliminating
 	  many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially
 	  heap content exposures. The performance impact varies by
 	  workload, but most cases see <1% impact. Some synthetic
 	  workloads have measured as high as 7%.

 config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
 	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
 	depends on !KMSAN
 	help
 	  This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel
 	  command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0".
 	  Similar to "init_on_alloc", when "init_on_free" is enabled,
 	  all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed
 	  when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory"
 	  flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference
 	  with "init_on_free" is that data lifetime in memory is reduced,
 	  as anything freed is wiped immediately, making live forensics or
 	  cold boot memory attacks unable to recover freed memory contents.
 	  The performance impact varies by workload, but is more expensive
 	  than "init_on_alloc" due to the negative cache effects of
 	  touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some
 	  synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%.

 config CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
 	def_bool $(cc-option,-fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr)
 	# https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1766
 	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/59242
 	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION > 150006

 config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
 	bool "Enable register zeroing on function exit"
 	depends on CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
 	help
 	  At the end of functions, always zero any caller-used register
 	  contents. This helps ensure that temporary values are not
 	  leaked beyond the function boundary. This means that register
 	  contents are less likely to be available for side channels
 	  and information exposures. Additionally, this helps reduce the
 	  number of useful ROP gadgets by about 20% (and removes compiler
 	  generated "write-what-where" gadgets) in the resulting kernel
 	  image. This has a less than 1% performance impact on most
 	  workloads. Image size growth depends on architecture, and should
 	  be evaluated for suitability. For example, x86_64 grows by less
 	  than 1%, and arm64 grows by about 5%.

 endmenu

 menu "Hardening of kernel data structures"

 config LIST_HARDENED
 	bool "Check integrity of linked list manipulation"
 	help
 	  Minimal integrity checking in the linked-list manipulation routines
 	  to catch memory corruptions that are not guaranteed to result in an
 	  immediate access fault.

 	  If unsure, say N.

 config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
 	bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
 	select LIST_HARDENED
 	help
 	  Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
 	  data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked
 	  for validity.

 	  If unsure, say N.

 endmenu

 config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
 	def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null)
 	# Randstruct was first added in Clang 15, but it isn't safe to use until
 	# Clang 16 due to https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/60349
 	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 160000

 choice
 	prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
 	default RANDSTRUCT_FULL if COMPILE_TEST && (GCC_PLUGINS || CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT)
 	default RANDSTRUCT_NONE
 	help
 	  If you enable this, the layouts of structures that are entirely
 	  function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
 	  __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
 	  marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
 	  This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
 	  exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
 	  types.

 	  Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
 	  slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
 	  tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
 	  source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).

 	  The seed used for compilation is in scripts/basic/randomize.seed.
 	  It remains after a "make clean" to allow for external modules to
 	  be compiled with the existing seed and will be removed by a
 	  "make mrproper" or "make distclean". This file should not be made
 	  public, or the structure layout can be determined.

 	config RANDSTRUCT_NONE
 		bool "Disable structure layout randomization"
 		help
 		  Build normally: no structure layout randomization.

 	config RANDSTRUCT_FULL
 		bool "Fully randomize structure layout"
 		depends on CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT || GCC_PLUGINS
 		select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
 		help
 		  Fully randomize the member layout of sensitive
 		  structures as much as possible, which may have both a
 		  memory size and performance impact.

 		  One difference between the Clang and GCC plugin
 		  implementations is the handling of bitfields. The GCC
 		  plugin treats them as fully separate variables,
 		  introducing sometimes significant padding. Clang tries
 		  to keep adjacent bitfields together, but with their bit
 		  ordering randomized.

 	config RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
 		bool "Limit randomization of structure layout to cache-lines"
 		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
 		select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
 		help
 		  Randomization of sensitive kernel structures will make a
 		  best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
 		  groups of members. It will further not randomize bitfields
 		  in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
 		  at the cost of weakened randomization.
 endchoice

 config RANDSTRUCT
 	def_bool !RANDSTRUCT_NONE

 config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
 	def_bool GCC_PLUGINS && RANDSTRUCT
 	help
 	  Use GCC plugin to randomize structure layout.

 	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
 	  information at:
 	   * https://grsecurity.net/
 	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/

 endmenu
	# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
	menu "Kernel hardening options"

	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
	bool
	help
	While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed
	stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for
	anything passed by reference to another function, under the
	occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do
	the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable
	flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize
	such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage.

	This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
	information at:
	* https://grsecurity.net/
	* https://pax.grsecurity.net/

	menu "Memory initialization"

	config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)

	config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_BARE
	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero)

	config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_ENABLER
	# Clang 16 and later warn about using the -enable flag, but it
	# is required before then.
	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang)
	depends on !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_BARE

	config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
	def_bool CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_BARE \|\| CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO_ENABLER

	choice
	prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
	default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
	default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
	default INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO if CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
	default INIT_STACK_NONE
	help
	This option enables initialization of stack variables at
	function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
	greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
	variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
	on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
	syscalls.

	This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
	uninitialized variables. The selected class of variable will be
	initialized before use in a function.

	config INIT_STACK_NONE
	bool "no automatic stack variable initialization (weakest)"
	help
	Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
	This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
	classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
	and information exposures.

	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER
	bool "zero-init structs marked for userspace (weak)"
	# Plugin can be removed once the kernel only supports GCC 12+
	depends on GCC_PLUGINS && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
	select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
	help
	Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing
	a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of
	uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
	exposures, like CVE-2013-2141:
	https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca

	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
	bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
	# Plugin can be removed once the kernel only supports GCC 12+
	depends on GCC_PLUGINS && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
	depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
	select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
	help
	Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
	be passed by reference and had not already been
	explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes
	of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
	exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410:
	https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654

	As a side-effect, this keeps a lot of variables on the
	stack that can otherwise be optimized out, so combining
	this with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK can lead to a stack overflow
	and is disallowed.

	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
	bool "zero-init everything passed by reference (very strong)"
	# Plugin can be removed once the kernel only supports GCC 12+
	depends on GCC_PLUGINS && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
	depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
	select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
	help
	Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
	by reference and had not already been explicitly
	initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
	of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
	exposures.

	As a side-effect, this keeps a lot of variables on the
	stack that can otherwise be optimized out, so combining
	this with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK can lead to a stack overflow
	and is disallowed.

	config INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
	bool "pattern-init everything (strongest)"
	depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
	depends on !KMSAN
	help
	Initializes everything on the stack (including padding)
	with a specific debug value. This is intended to eliminate
	all classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and
	information exposures, even variables that were warned about
	having been left uninitialized.

	Pattern initialization is known to provoke many existing bugs
	related to uninitialized locals, e.g. pointers receive
	non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big. The
	pattern is situation-specific; Clang on 64-bit uses 0xAA
	repeating for all types and padding except float and double
	which use 0xFF repeating (-NaN). Clang on 32-bit uses 0xFF
	repeating for all types and padding.

	config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
	bool "zero-init everything (strongest and safest)"
	depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
	depends on !KMSAN
	help
	Initializes everything on the stack (including padding)
	with a zero value. This is intended to eliminate all
	classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and
	information exposures, even variables that were warned
	about having been left uninitialized.

	Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings
	(immediately NUL-terminated), pointers (NULL), indices
	(index 0), and sizes (0 length), so it is therefore more
	suitable as a production security mitigation than pattern
	initialization.

	endchoice

	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
	bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
	depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
	help
	This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
	structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
	initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
	by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.

	config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
	bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
	depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
	help
	This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
	returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
	the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces
	the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces
	potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information
	exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack
	depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks
	most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance
	impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than
	the function calling complexity.

	The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation
	sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you
	are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
	deploying it.

	This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
	* https://grsecurity.net/
	* https://pax.grsecurity.net/

	config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE
	bool "Report stack depth analysis instrumentation" if EXPERT
	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
	depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
	help
	This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
	stackleak plugin finds a function it thinks needs to be
	instrumented. This is useful for comparing coverage between
	builds.

	config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
	int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
	default 100
	range 0 4096
	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
	help
	The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
	the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
	It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
	a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
	If unsure, leave the default value 100.

	config STACKLEAK_METRICS
	bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
	depends on PROC_FS
	help
	If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
	the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
	shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
	previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
	can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
	your workloads.

	config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
	bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
	help
	This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
	runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
	CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.

	config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
	depends on !KMSAN
	help
	This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel
	command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0".
	When "init_on_alloc" is enabled, all page allocator and slab
	allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, eliminating
	many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially
	heap content exposures. The performance impact varies by
	workload, but most cases see <1% impact. Some synthetic
	workloads have measured as high as 7%.

	config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
	depends on !KMSAN
	help
	This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel
	command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0".
	Similar to "init_on_alloc", when "init_on_free" is enabled,
	all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed
	when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory"
	flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference
	with "init_on_free" is that data lifetime in memory is reduced,
	as anything freed is wiped immediately, making live forensics or
	cold boot memory attacks unable to recover freed memory contents.
	The performance impact varies by workload, but is more expensive
	than "init_on_alloc" due to the negative cache effects of
	touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some
	synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%.

	config CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
	def_bool $(cc-option,-fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr)
	# https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1766
	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/59242
	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG \|\| CLANG_VERSION > 150006

	config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
	bool "Enable register zeroing on function exit"
	depends on CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
	help
	At the end of functions, always zero any caller-used register
	contents. This helps ensure that temporary values are not
	leaked beyond the function boundary. This means that register
	contents are less likely to be available for side channels
	and information exposures. Additionally, this helps reduce the
	number of useful ROP gadgets by about 20% (and removes compiler
	generated "write-what-where" gadgets) in the resulting kernel
	image. This has a less than 1% performance impact on most
	workloads. Image size growth depends on architecture, and should
	be evaluated for suitability. For example, x86_64 grows by less
	than 1%, and arm64 grows by about 5%.

	endmenu

	menu "Hardening of kernel data structures"

	config LIST_HARDENED
	bool "Check integrity of linked list manipulation"
	help
	Minimal integrity checking in the linked-list manipulation routines
	to catch memory corruptions that are not guaranteed to result in an
	immediate access fault.

	If unsure, say N.

	config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
	bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
	select LIST_HARDENED
	help
	Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
	data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked
	for validity.

	If unsure, say N.

	endmenu

	config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
	def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null)
	# Randstruct was first added in Clang 15, but it isn't safe to use until
	# Clang 16 due to https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/60349
	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG \|\| CLANG_VERSION >= 160000

	choice
	prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
	default RANDSTRUCT_FULL if COMPILE_TEST && (GCC_PLUGINS \|\| CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT)
	default RANDSTRUCT_NONE
	help
	If you enable this, the layouts of structures that are entirely
	function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
	__no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
	marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
	This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
	exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
	types.

	Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
	slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
	tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
	source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).

	The seed used for compilation is in scripts/basic/randomize.seed.
	It remains after a "make clean" to allow for external modules to
	be compiled with the existing seed and will be removed by a
	"make mrproper" or "make distclean". This file should not be made
	public, or the structure layout can be determined.

	config RANDSTRUCT_NONE
	bool "Disable structure layout randomization"
	help
	Build normally: no structure layout randomization.

	config RANDSTRUCT_FULL
	bool "Fully randomize structure layout"
	depends on CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT \|\| GCC_PLUGINS
	select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
	help
	Fully randomize the member layout of sensitive
	structures as much as possible, which may have both a
	memory size and performance impact.

	One difference between the Clang and GCC plugin
	implementations is the handling of bitfields. The GCC
	plugin treats them as fully separate variables,
	introducing sometimes significant padding. Clang tries
	to keep adjacent bitfields together, but with their bit
	ordering randomized.

	config RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
	bool "Limit randomization of structure layout to cache-lines"
	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
	select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
	help
	Randomization of sensitive kernel structures will make a
	best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
	groups of members. It will further not randomize bitfields
	in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
	at the cost of weakened randomization.
	endchoice

	config RANDSTRUCT
	def_bool !RANDSTRUCT_NONE

	config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
	def_bool GCC_PLUGINS && RANDSTRUCT
	help
	Use GCC plugin to randomize structure layout.

	This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
	information at:
	* https://grsecurity.net/
	* https://pax.grsecurity.net/

	endmenu